Rabbi  Isadore  Isaacson 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 


AMERICAN   SOCIAL   PROGRESS   SERIES 

EDITED  BY 

Professor  Samuel  McCune  Lindsay,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 
Columbia  University 


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AMEB1CAN  SOCIAL  PBOGBESS  SEBIES 

THE 
SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 


BY 


SIMON  N.  PATTEN,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR   OF   POLITICAL   ECONOMY,    UNIVERSITY 

OF   PENNSYLVANIA 

AUTHOR  OF  "  THE  NEW  BASIS  OF  CIVILIZATION,"    ETC. 


Neftj    f£0tfc 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 
1911 

AU  rights  reserved 


COPYRIGHT,   1911, 

By   THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  March,  1911. 

IN  MEMORIAM 


Norton  oft  $rr8« 

J.  S.  Cushlng  Co.  — Berwick  <fe  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


OS  *■ 


PEEFACE 

I  began  writing  this  book  with  a  simple  plan,  which 
was  the  welding  together  of  the  ideas  acquired  in  two 
earlier  fields  of  work.  My  "Development  of  English 
Thought"  was  an  endeavor  to  create  an  economic 
interpretation  of  history.  This,  carried  to  its  legitimate 
consequences,  would  afford  the  objective  basis  of  social 
progress.  I  had  written  also  in  the  field  of  social  psy- 
chology. From  this  a  subjective  view  of  these  same 
facts  is  derived.  Religion  seemed  to  me  to  be  the  point 
of  union  between  these  isolated  views.  I  thought  to 
use  the  economic  interpretation  of  history  to  explain 
the  degenerate  tendencies  in  civilization,  and  then  to 
employ  social  psychology  to  set  forth  the  opposing 
forces  of  regeneration.  To  put  this  in  another  way: 
Degeneration  is  objective  and  economic,  while  regen- 
eration is  psychic  and  personal.  This  conforms  to  the 
views  held  by  religious  reformers,  and,  if  correct,  gives 
a  firm  basis  to  religious  thought.  Religion  is  by  this 
means  given  a  scientific  foundation  and  its  doctrines 
are  transferred  from  the  traditional  basis  to  the  realm 
of  social  science. 

[v] 


943988 


PREFACE 

On  this  plan  I  began  to  write,  and  I  hope  I  have  not 
departed  from  it.  There  was,  however,  a  break  in  the 
process  which  to  some  degree  modified  my  plan.  After 
I  had  written  several  chapters,  a  review  called  my 
attention  to  the  books  of  the  late  much  lamented 
William  James.  I  was  influenced  by  his  view  of  prag- 
matism, not  that  it  seemed  new,  but  that  it  was  a  better 
expression  of  a  view  towards  which  economists  like 
myself  were  struggling,  but  into  which  they  have  never 
clearly  come.  Professor  James,  I  said,  is  a  philosopher 
turning  towards  economics:  I  am  an  economist  on  the 
road  to  philosophy ;  the  two  seemingly  different  views 
should  blend  and  make  one  truth.  Animated  by  this 
thought,  I  wrote  several  chapters  restating  pragmatism 
from  a  social  viewpoint.  But  in  the  end  I  cut  out 
these  chapters.  I  could  not  enter  into  a  full  discussion 
of  pragmatism  without  turning  my  book  from  one 
on  religion  into  one  on  philosophy.  Tempting  as  it  is  to 
make  this  transition,  the  need  of  clear  religious  thought 
seemed  too  great  to  permit  such  a  modification  of  my 
plan.  Now,  however,  that  the  book  is  written,  it  will 
help  the  reader  to  understand  my  thought  if  I  contrast 
it  with  the  well-known  views  of  Professor  James.  Our 
likenesses  and  differences  are  of  such  a  nature  that  this 
can  be  done  without  entering  into  the  general  discussion 
that  would  be  necessary  if  there  were  not  a  common 

fvil 


PREFACE 

basis  for  our  views.  Professor  James,  in  a  touching 
way,  dedicates  his  "  Pragmatism  "  to  John  Stuart  Mill. 
I  have  frequently  taken  a  similar  attitude,  and  I  feel 
that  no  honor  would  be  greater  than  to  be  one  of  Mill's 
disciples.  From  this  common  ground  both  Professor 
James  and  I  have  gone  forth.  Each  has  tried  to  inter- 
pret events  in  the  manner  and  from  the  premises  that 
Mill  would  have  employed.  Two  men  may,  however, 
have  a  common  master  and  yet  move  forward  in  differ- 
ent directions.  How  this  has  happened  in  the  present 
case  can  be  illustrated  by  starting  with  a  restatement 
of  Mill's  position  on  the  points  involved. 

To  understand  Mill  demands  a  study  of  his  "  Logic," 
the  place  where  his  views  are  most  fully  presented. 
He  there  tries  to  prove  universal  laws  from  general 
inductive  experience.  This  method  is  the  same  as  that 
of  Professor  James  who,  in  his  radical  empiricism,  has 
the  authority  of  Mill  on  his  side.  But  a  disciple  has 
the  right  to  appeal  from  this  to  Mill's  subsequent  atti- 
tude and  to  the  later  development  of  the  social  sciences. 
The  purpose  of  the  "  Logic  "  was  to  strengthen  social 
reasoning,  and  it  is  by  this  test  that  it  should  be  judged. 
Even  while  writing  the  "Logic,"  a  change  of  opinion 
came  over  Mill  as  to  the  nature  of  social  proof.  This 
was  due  to  the  influence  of  Comte,  by  which  he  was 
led  to  put  universal  historical  proofs  in  the  place  of 

fviil 


PREFACE 

those  derived  from  empirical  observation.  Even  this 
change  did  not  prove  satisfactory,  for  neither  in  Mill's 
later  writings  nor  in  the  oncoming  development  of 
social  science  have  either  empirical  data  or  crude  his- 
torical generalizations  of  the  type  proposed  by  Comte 
served  as  the  basis  of  progress.  Mill  made  an  attempt 
to  write  an  Ethology  on  the  plan  outlined  in  the 
"Logic,"  but  was  forced  to  give  it  up.  In  its  place 
"  Political  Economy  "  appeared,  and  in  this  deductive 
reasoning  was  freely  used.  All  of  his  later  books 
follow  the  logic  of  his  "  Political  Economy."  We  are 
thus  left  without  any  evidence  that  radical  empiricism 
is  a  fitting  method  for  social  science.  Nor  has  Comte 
fared  any  better  with  his  historical  method.  Neither 
he  nor  his  disciples  have  given  the  world  anything  but 
crude  generalizations,  differing  in  no  respect  from  those 
obtained  by  other  methods.  Doubtless,  Mill  always 
held  to  the  hope  that  universal  propositions  could  be 
proved  in  the  way  he  outlined.  Professor  James  is 
justified  in  taking  up  the  task  and  trying  to  complete 
the  work  the  master  left  undone.  At  the  same  time, 
another  disciple  is  equally  justified  in  following  the 
plan  that  Mill  in  practice  used  and  which  has  been  the 
basis  of  subsequent  progress.  In  no  social  science  are 
universal  propositions  accepted  on  data  that  would 
have  satisfied  Mill  and  Comte.     Particular  laws  have 

f  viii  1 


PREFACE 

often  been  established,  but  their  application  is  limited 
to  the  field  from  which  they  are  derived.  There  can 
be  no  universal  laws  unless  they  are  derived  from  some 
other  source. 

&»*The  most  fruitful  law  of  a  general  nature  is  Comte's 
theory  of  the  stages  in  the  development  of  thought ; 
but  even  this  must  be  restated  to  meet  modern  condi- 
tions. Comte  affirmed  that  thought  had  three  stages, 
—  the  theological,  the  metaphysical  and  the  positive. 
The  concept  of  stages  of  thought  is  valid  ;  but  Comte's 
description  of  them  is  defective.  The  theological  stage 
is  really  the  traditional  stage.  The  metaphysical  stage 
is  better  described  by  calling  it  the  critical  or  skeptical 
stage,  while  the  positive  stage  should  be  renamed  the 
pragmatic  stage.  Early  societies  are  "under  the  domain 
of  custom,  of  which  religious  traditions  are  a  part. 
Then  comes  a  reaction  that  takes  the  form  of  skepti- 
cism, criticism  and  individualism.  This,  in  turn,  is 
displaced  by  positive  doctrines  tested  by  empirical 
methods  and  pragmatic  results. 

While  the  validity  of  these  stages  is  apparent,  the 
order  in  which  Comte  placed  them  is  open  to  question. 
He  used  the  historical  method,  and  by  it  the  order  of 
the  stages  is  correctly  described.  The  historical  epoch, 
however,  does  not  cover  the  whole  development  of  the 
race.     The  traditional  attitude  of  early  races  is  a  result 

[m] 


PREFACE 

of  earlier  growth,  and  of  this  our  knowledge  is  frag- 
mentary. All  traditions  must  have  had  a  basis  in 
experience  and  have  been  proved  valid  by  some  facts. 
The  theological  or  traditional  epoch  of  Comte  could 
not  therefore  have  been  the  first  epoch,  and  to  get  at 
that  some  other  method  than  Comte's  must  be  used. 
A  better  explanation  is  given  by  the  economic  interpre- 
tation of  history.  By  it  history  is  divided  into  epochs, 
each  of  which  begins  with  notable  economic  changes 
and  ends  with  a  social  reorganization,  bringing  a  read- 
justment to  the  new  conditions.  In  such  an  epoch  the 
stages  of  thought  development  are  the  reverse  of  those 
in  general  history.  The  new  conditions  first  affect 
individuals  and  are  pragmatically  tested.  Results  are 
formulated  as  general  laws  and  are  then  made  rules  of 
action.  This  is  the  deductive  or  metaphysical  stage. 
Finally,  they  become  social  customs  and  are  enforced 
as  habits.  This  is  the  traditional  stage  to  be  found  in 
static  societies. 

If  this  is  a  correct  statement  of  the  evolution  of 
thought,  it  has  a  direct  bearing  on  the  way  in  which 
universal  laws  arise  and  get  their  validity.  New  facts 
are  the  basis  of  empirical  laws  which  are  tested  by  their 
pragmatic  results.  If  the  tone  of  public  thought  is 
metaphysical,  an  endeavor  is  made  to  give  these  new 
laws  a  universal  validity.     A  resort  is  therefore  had  to 

[x] 


PREFACE 

radical  empiricism  or  to  a  priori  reasoning  to  effect  this 
end.  Another  road  is  open  that  does  not  employ  the 
premises  of  rationalism  in  either  of  these  forms.  The 
force  of  new  empirical  generalizations  is  due  to  the  ap- 
peal they  make  to  men's  interests  and  desires.  The 
value  of  general  laws  lies,  not  in  the  greater  authority 
that  springs  from  broad  generalization,  but  in  the  appeal 
to  new  motives  for  action.  The  force  back  of  them 
is  the  imagination  instead  of  the  desires  and  interests 
of  men.  The  value  of  the  metaphysical  stage  of 
thought  arises  from  its  appeal  to  the  imagination  that 
brings  action  into  relation  with  the  future.  A  double 
motive  for  action  and  a  double  test  of  it  are  thus 
obtained.  Personal  or  empirical  pragmatism  is  based 
on  present  desires  and  interests.  Social  pragmatism 
is  based  on  the  future  results  of  acts,  and  for  it  to 
displace  the  former,  the  imagination  must  be  aroused 
and  the  social  motives  made  active.  The  metaphysi- 
cal stage  is  thus  a  real  advance,  even  if  misused  by 
overzealous  rationalists.  The  subsequent  traditional 
stage  also  has  its  advantages,  since  habitual  action 
is  an  economy ;  it  is  also  the  only  means  by  which 
social  control  can  be  exercised  over  ignorant,  defective 
or  degenerate  men.  Each  of  the  three  stages  thus 
creates  new  motives  for  action,  and  among  them  all 
the  truth  is  made  manifest. 

[n] 


PREFACE 

If  this  is  a  correct  description  of  forces  back  of  the 
progress  of  thought,  the  radical  empiricism  of  Mill  and 
Comte  and  of  James  does  not  offer  an  adequate  expla- 
nation of  thought  processes.  Universal  propositions 
and  skeptical  methods  appeal  to  those  who  are  in  revolt 
against  the  oversocialization  of  thought  prevalent  in  static 
societies.  They  are  thus  freed  from  the  social  control 
over  action  which  real  progress  demands ;  in  its  place 
they  put  their  own  personal  standards  or  those  derived 
from  physical  sciences.  Feeling  and  prejudice  may  for 
a  time  give  vogue  to  these  substitutes  for  social  mo- 
tives; but  in  the  end  social  standards  and  pragmatic 
tests  must  reassert  themselves,  for  they  alone  can  arouse 
the  whole  man  to  action. 

The  trouble  with  the  radical  empiricist,  the  skeptic 
or  the  so-called  positivist  is  that  he  tries  to  stay  in  the 
first  stage  of  thought  development  and  thus  is  com- 
pelled to  make  crude  empirical  generalizations  and 
personal  standards  the  supreme  test  of  truth.  Out  of 
this  comes,  legitimately  enough,  a  pragmatic  attitude ; 
but  it  is,  after  all,  only  one  kind  of  pragmatism.  There 
are  two  tests  of  thought,  the  social  and  the  individual. 
The  personal  tests  are  satisfactions  which  appeal  to 
the  desires.  The  social  tests  are  objective  and  are 
measured  by  the  social  results  of  action.  Satisfactions 
must  always  remain  individual.    They  afford  no  test 

[xii] 


PREFACE 

of  what  society  gains  or  loses  by  any  outlined  program. 
These  can  be  determined  by  the  objective  effects  that 
each  measure  produces.  There  are  three  such  tests 
of  social  results:  the  economic  tests  are  prosperity, 
peace  and  cooperation ;  the  physical  tests  are  efficiency, 
vigor  and  longevity ;  the  emotional  tests  are  service, 
public  spirit  and  missionary  zeal.  In  some  of  these 
ways,  or  through  a  combination  of  them,  every  social 
act  can  be  objectively  tested.  The  test  of  individual 
satisfaction  misleads  except  in  crude  economic  situa- 
tions where  social  action  is  ineffective. 

There  is  thus  a  social  pragmatism  which  should  be 
contrasted  with  the  radical  empiricism  that  Professor 
James  advocates.  The  difference  between  the  two, 
and  the  test  of  truth  that  each  uses,  may  be  made 
clear  by  a  statement  of  the  four  criteria  that  social 
pragmatism  sets  up  and  must  defend  to  make  its  posi- 
tion valid. 

First,  the  tests  of  truth  are  objective  and  social. 
Psychic  tests  are  defective,  because  any  degenerate 
tendency  in  a  man  makes  his  personal  satisfactions 
abnormal.  Thought  is  not  a  test  of  truth  unless  it 
leads  to  activity.  The  only  valid  personal  test  is 
whether  or  not  individual  action  conforms  to  social 
standards. 

Second,  there  are  no  universal  laws.  Action  is 
fxiiil 


PREFACE 

aroused,  not,  as  the  rationalist  assumes,  by  the  correct- 
ness of  formal  statements  of  truth,  but  by  a  group  of 
motives  of  which  the  formal  statement  of  facts  and 
principles  is  but  a  subordinate,  although  an  essential, 
part.  The  test  of  truth  is  action,  and  this  comes  only 
when  the  whole  man  is  aroused. 

Third,  skepticism  affords  no  test  of  truth.  It  is 
merely  a  shifting  from  social  to  psychic  standards, 
resulting  in  the  displacement  of  social  law  by  individual 
caprice.  Skepticism  is  either  a  revolt  against  the 
arrogance  of  social  tradition  or  springs  from  degenerate 
tendencies  in  those  who  are  affected  by  it.  In  neither 
case  can  it  be  a  part  of  the  forward  movement  of 
thought.  It  may  help  the  individual,  but  is  always 
socially  destructive. 

Fourth,  the  psychic  test  of  truth  as  a  relation  between 
an  idea  and  its  object  is  defective.  A  philosophical 
pragmatist  may,  as  Professor  James  says,  accept  this 
as  a  matter  of  course,  but  social  pragmatists  must 
look  elsewhere  for  their  test.  Truth  is  a  relation  be- 
tween thought  and  act,  and  not  between  feeling  and  its 
external  cause.  The  truth  is  not  merely  workable ;  it 
makes  men  work.  If  it  does  not  do  this,  the  man  is 
either  economically  dependent  or  psychically  defective. 
Ideas  are  not  sense  perceptions,  but  are  social  impress- 
ments, due  to  activity  carried  on  by  men  in  society. 

[xiv] 


PREFACE 

Their  relations  are  not,  primarily,  to  physical  atoms 
about  them,  but  to  the  social  environment  from  which 
they  are  derived.  Thought  is  adjustment  socially 
acquired ;  activity  is  adjustment  biologically  inherited. 
All  tests  of  truth  must  be  measures  of  this  joint  adjust- 
ment, not  of  the  relations  of  individuals  to  the  objec- 
tive world. 


[*v] 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface      v 

CHAPTER 

I.    Introduction 1 

II.     Scientific  Method         .        .        .        .17 

III.  The  Economic  Interpretation  of  His- 

tory   31 

IV.  The  Social  Interpretation  of  Thought      45 
V.    The  Social  Process       ....      63 

VI.  The  Stages  of  Thought  Development      83 

VII.  Morbid  Degeneration  .         .        .        .105 

VIII.  Senile  Degeneration    .         .        .        .119 

IX.  The  Will 135 

X.  Character 149 

XI.  Inspiration 165 

XII.  Historic  or  State  Religion         .        .179 

XIII.  Social  Religion 191 

XIV.  The  Social  Mission  of  the  Church    .    207 
XV.  The      Socialization      of      Religious 

Thought 225 


[xvii 


Sin  is  Misery;  Misery  is  Poverty; 
the  Antidote  of  Poverty  is  Income 


I  xviii  ] 


CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 


This  book  is  not  an  apology  for  religion,  but  a  con- 
structive defense.  Itidenttfes  religion;  hot  witt  moral- 
ity, but  with  the  social  reaction  against  degeneration 
and  vice.  Were  all  men  moral  and  normal,  religion 
would  have  less  vitality ;  it  grows  in  power  as  the  pres- 
sure of  external  conditions  forces  men  into  degradation 
and  misery.  Religion  and  morality  are  the  reverse  sides 
of  a  larger  scheme  of  purifying  and  elevating  humanity. 

A  generation  ago  the  defense  of  religion  was  a  subject 
of  popular  discourse.  Thoughtful  men  wrote  books 
on  Christian  Evidence  that  were  widely  read  and  made 
the  basis  of  popular  discussion.  Many  books  are  still 
written  about  religion,  but  they  are  mainly  occupied 
with  an  exposition  of  its  moral  doctrines.  It  is  regarded 
sufficient  if  it  is  shown  that  personal  morality  is  advan- 
tageous and  beyond  the  assaults  of  adverse  critics.  It 
seems  to  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  beliefs  of  earlier 
generations  have  been  overthrown  and  that  religion 
must  utilize  its  waning  forces  to  uphold  morality  and 
social  stability.  The  Christian  plan  of  salvation,  how- 
ever, is  as  important  as  ever  and  as  capable  of  defense. 

[3] 


f\ 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

It  has  fallen  into  disrepute,  not  because  it  lacks  proof, 
but  because  its  historical  setting  has  been  lost  through 
the  increase  of  knowledge  and  through  better  methods 
of  investigation.  If  we  make  religion  social  instead  of 
historical,  proof  can  be  found  for  its  essential  doctrines. 
I  do  not  mean  that  all  modern  thought  is  in  harmony 
with  the  Christian  scheme  of  salvation,  but  that  an 
energetic  defense  of  it  has  a  fair  chance  of  success.  This 
is  made  clear  by  a  restatement  of  the  plan  of  salvation 
so  as  to  emphasize  its  modern  aspects.  The  following 
are  its  essential  doctrines  expressed  in  social  instead  of 
theological  terms:  — 

1.  The  doctrine  of  one  supreme  God. 

2.  The  doctrine  of  the  fall  of  man,  or  of  social  de- 
generation. 

3.  The  doctrine  of  regeneration,  or  the  reincorpora- 
tion of  social  outcasts  into  society,  in  contrast  with  the 
doctrine  of  elimination. 

4.  The  doctrine  of  a  personal  uplift  through  con- 
I  tact,  influence  and  suggestion,  in  contrast  with  the 
\  doctrine  of  evolution  through  biologic  variation. 

5.  The  doctrine  of  progress  through  peace  and  love, 
in  contrast  with  progress  through  conflict. 

6.  The  doctrine  of  the  Messiah,  or  of  lofty  inspiring 
leadership,  in  contrast  with  the  material  concept  of 
civilization. 

[4] 


INTRODUCTION 

7.  The  doctrine  of  service,  in  contrast  with  self- 
centered  aggression. 

8.  The  doctrine  of  social  responsibility,  in  contrast 
with  individual  rights. 

9.  The  doctrine  of  personal  responsibility  in  con- 
trast with  fatalism  or  external  domination. 

10.  The  doctrine  that  the  wages  of  sin  are  death. 

1     Each  of  these  doctrines  is  capable  of  a  vigorous  de- 
v<  fense,  and  if  stated  in  social  terms  the  opposition  to  them 
Of    does  not  come  from  science,  but  from  a  mistaken  concept 
JN     of  history.     Science  is  a  method  of  proof,  not  a  dogma. 
Any  problem  becomes  scientific  when  it  is  so  formu- 
lated that  evidence  may  be  collected,  sifted   and   di- 
i       rected  to  a  decision.     It  is  true  that  every  proposition 
c  v        about  religion  is  subject  to  dispute ;  but  it  is  equally 
true  that  none  is  without  many  verifying  facts    and 
principles. 

The  real  cause  of  the  decline  of  religious  aggressive- 
ness lies  in  an  opposition  not  so  fundamental,  but  more 
potent  than  science  presents.  Our  beliefs  are  in  the 
main  not  directly  scientific,  but  cultural.  Ideas  and 
modes  of  thought  are  adopted  not  so  much  on  their 
evidence  as  through  their  power  to  arouse  freshness 
and  vigor  of  action.  Science  is  merely  a  contributing 
element  whose  dogmas  resolve  themselves  into  cultural 
attitudes  rather  than  scientific  facts.     All  well-estab- 

[5] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

lished  beliefs  grow  or  decline  in  vigor  as  the  cultural 
emphasis  is  shifted  to  or  from  the  basis  on  which  they 
rest.  We  must  look  to  these  cultural  changes  for  the 
causes  of  the  decline  in  faith.  Only  when  the  premises 
of  culture  are  altered,  or  those  of  religion  changed  so  as 
to  harmonize  with  them,  can  a  revival  of  Christian  zeal 
be  anticipated. 

The  change  in  culture  that  has  paralyzed  religious 
thought  has  many  phases  but  few  causes.  Expressed 
in  terms  of  history,  the  Renaissance,  with  its  revival 
of  Greek  learning,  and  the  modern  emphasis  of  nature 
stand  out  prominently  as  causes.  Interpreted  in  eco- 
nomic terms,  the  cause  of  the  change  lies  in  the  shifting 
of  civilization  from  Southern  regions  subject  to  famine, 
disease  and  war  to  those  of  the  North,  where  peace, 
security  and  prosperity  abound.  Stated  in  either 
way,  the  fact  develops  that  religious  thought  is  bound 
up  with  the  cultural,  economic  and  political  experiences 
and  exigencies  of  the  Southern  races.  It  reflects  their 
views  and  gives  them  a  universal  validity  to  which  the 
evidence  gives  no  warrant.  Culture  has  returned  to 
the  primitive  attitude  of  the  pagan  world ;  religion 
has  resisted  the  change.  In  consequence,  the  power 
of  culture  has  dampened  the  ardor  of  those  who  inter- 
pret Christianity  in  harmony  with  traditional  views. 
Changes  in  science  are  needed  much  less  than  a  re- 

[6] 


INTRODUCTION 

vision  of  the  foundations  of  Christian  tradition.  A 
broader  view  departing  from  this  conventional  attitude 
would  give  religion  a  basis  in  economics  and  psychology. 
Religion  would  thus  obtain  a  general  rather  than  a 
local  validity,  and  be  freed  from  the  dominance  of  any 
particular  situation  or  mental  temperament.  If  this 
transformation  can  be  wrought,  there  is  little  to  fear 
from  science ;  for  it,  like  religion,  gets  its  basis  and  its 
dogmas  from  the  prevailing  social  atmosphere.  The 
two  will  harmonize  when  they  have  the  same  cultural 
antecedents  and  get  their  inspiration  from  the  same 
ideals. 

An  example  of  the  contrast  between  cultural  and 
religious  ideas  is  afforded  by  the  doctrine  of  the  super- 
natural, so  often  cited  to  show  that  religion  and  science 
are  opposed.  Religion  uses  the  language  of  the  desert 
or  of  vile  material  surroundings.  Hence  nature  is 
something  bad  —  the  bottom  below  which  men  cannot 
fall.  The  natural  man  is  a  degenerate  because  he  is 
the  type  such  conditions  evolve.  To  get  away  from 
nature  means  to  approach  God.  With  such  ideas,  it 
is  proper  to  speak  of  Him  as  supernatural.  In  cul- 
tural language,  nature  is  the  highest,  not  the  lowest, 
category;  for  its  terms  have  been  coined  by  men  in 
happy  physical  surroundings  with  nature  at  its  best. 
To  them  the  natural  man  is  not  the  sodden  brute  of 

[7] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

want  and  disease,  but  an  ideal  to  be  attained  under 
favorable  conditions.  " Supernatural' '  thus  becomes 
a  meaningless  term,  because  nature  is  the  highest  state, 
and  the  natural  man  better  than  the  best  of  men.  It 
is  this  view  of  nature  that  clashes  with  religious 
thought.  Either  culture  must  give  up  its  use  of 
"natural,"  or  religion  must  adapt  itself  to  it  by  a 
change  in  its  terminology.  If  the  cultural  usage  is 
accepted,  "supernatural"  must  be  replaced  by  some 
other  term  expressing  the  idea  but  avoiding  the  con- 
fusion of  conflicting  usage.  This  does  not  imply  that 
religious  thought  is  wrong  in  the  contrasts  it  deems 
vital.  The  depraved  and  the  divine  are  as  far  apart 
when  other  terms  are  employed  as  when  "natural" 
and  "supernatural"  are  used.  And  in  making  this 
contrast,  science  is  on  the  side  of  religion ;  for  culture 
in  its  nature  worship  shuts  its  eyes  to  the  bad  that 
creates  depravity  in  man.  We  have  only  to  alter 
terms  to  give  scientific  form  to  this  important  religious 
concept. 

The  doctrine  of  the  fall  of  man  is  another  instance 
of  the  seeming  conflict  of  science  and  religion  that, 
rightly  understood,  proves  groundless.  In  this  case 
the  opposition  does  not  lie  in  any  essential  element  of 
the  religious  position,  but  to  the  way  in  which  it  is 
stated.     The  attributing  of  the  fall  to  the  eating  of 

[8] 


INTRODUCTION 

an  apple  is  absurd.  It  is  equally  plain  that  there  has 
been  a  moral  and  physical  fall  of  man  when  the  man  of 
the  historical  epoch  is  compared  with  preceding  ages. 
There  may  have  been  no  garden  of  Eden,  but  there 
was  an  earlier  epoch  when  men  attained  their  maxi- 
mum of  vigor  and  longevity.  Our  heredity  calls  for  a 
life  of  ninety  years,  some  say  of  one  hundred  and  fifty 
years.  Man,  previous  to  the  last  century,  did  not  live 
on  the  average  more  than  thirty  years,  and  his  health 
and  vigor  were  far  below  the  normal.  From  what  he 
was  to  what  he  became  there  is  a  real  fall,  justifying 
the  religious  doctrine,  even  if  the  story  picturing  it  is 
a  myth.  This  view  is  supported  by  the  increase  of 
disease,  war,  famine  and  crime,  bringing  degradation 
to  men  subsequent  to  the  rise  of  civilization.  The 
aggregation  of  great  populations  in  the  lowland  dis- 
tricts, due  to  the  change  from  pastoral  to  agricultural 
life,  the  spread  of  disease,  the  exploitation  of  rulers, 
the  decline  of  physical  resources,  pushed  men  down  to 
the  lowest  limits  of  misery,  poverty  and  vice.  It  is 
in  these  regions  and  under  these  conditions  that  re- 
ligion takes  its  rise ;  its  statement  of  facts  is  historically 
correct  and  its  doctrine  sound,  even  if  their  pictorial 
setting  does  not  bear  investigation. 

A  further  illustration  of  how  religious  doctrines  have 
fallen  into  disrepute  because  of  the  way  of  stating 

[9] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

them  is  to  be  found  in  the  contrast  between  the  ma- 
terial and  the  spiritual.  To  be  religious  we  do  not 
need  to  deny  that  we  have  material  elements  in  our 
nature,  but  only  that  we  are  not  dominated  by  them. 
Religious  interest  is  not  in  our  bodies  but  in  our  wills ; 
and  freedom  is  a  matter  of  control,  not  of  essence.  We 
can  be  spiritual,  even  though  we  are  material.  The 
real  contrast  with  the  spiritual  is  the  traditional.  It 
is  the  dominance  of  habit  and  routine  that  kills  the 
spirit,  not  any  fatal  predetermination  of  our  bodily 
powers.  The  "law"  to  which  Paul  objects  is  not  a 
part  of  our  heredity,  but  the  social  impressment  of 
past  ages.  The  traditional  is  objective  and  social  in 
origin;  the  spiritual  is  a  psychic  reaction  against  it, 
a  yearning  for  the  freedom  that  social  uniformity 
prevents.  The  conflict  of  religion  is  between  social 
habit  and  social  feeling.  The  spiritual  is  the  inner 
self  in  contrast  to  the  social  self.  It  is  a  suppressed 
heredity  battling  with  the  routine  and  habit  of  an 
external  world.  That  there  is  such  a  conflict  and  that 
the  inner  self,  championed  by  religion,  should  be  vic- 
torious, no  careful  student  of  human  nature  would 
deny.  The  right  is  with  religion,  even  if  it  states  its 
case  in  a  wrong  way. 

Another  difficulty  of  the  present  situation  is  the  use 
of  the  term  " normal* '  in  the  sense  of  the  average  man 

[101 


INTRODUCTION 

instead  of  making  it  designate  the  man  of  full  develop- 
ment. The  average  man  has  many  abnormalities,  some 
permanent,  others  temporary;  and  so  long  as  we 
think  in  terms  of  him,  no  clear  contrast  can  be  made 
between  normal  and  abnormal  men.  This  contrast  is 
of  importance  not  only  in  religion  but  likewise  in 
every  branch  of  social  investigation.  A  second  change 
of  usage  is  demanded  in  our  concept  of  mind.  A  struc- 
tural concept  has  prevailed  that  makes  thought  a 
definite,  predetermined  product  of  some  mechanism, 
material  or  otherwise,  molded  by  predetermined  con- 
ditions. The  materialist  tells  us  that  the  mind  secretes 
thought  as  the  liver  secretes  bile.  The  transcenden- 
talist  is  no  less  positive  about  the  mechanism  of  the 
mind,  even  if  he  expresses  his  thought  in  general  laws 
instead  of  material  examples.  Both  are  parts  of  a 
preevolutionary  view  that  persists  because  no  recon- 
struction of  our  general  concepts  has  taken  place  in 
harmony  with  our  increased  knowledge. 

In  contrast  to  this  structural  concept  should  be  put 
the  genetic  concept  of  mind  that  causes  us  to  judge  it 
by  its  products  instead  of  by  its  structure  or  ante- 
cedents. The  mind  modifies  its  content  not  only  as 
it  grows  but  also  as  the  external  pressure  varies  from 
which  its  ideas  come.  There  is  no  mechanism  for 
producing  ideas.     The  individual  gets  them  from  the 

[in 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

society  of  which  he  is  a  part.  They  are  handed  on  by 
an  objective  social  process  instead  of  being  the  result 
of  the  mental  mechanism  which  each  individual  in- 
herits. Thought  is  immaterial  because  its  ideas  are 
social,  not  structural,  products.  This  genetic  viewpoint 
which  subordinates  brain  structures  to  the  social 
process  controlling  thought  opens  up  the  only  way  to 
free  mental  science  from  the  materialism  that  structural 
concepts  promote.  The  brain  may  be  ever  so  material 
without  doing  damage  so  long  as  thought  originates 
socially  and  dominates  the  action  of  the  brain  through 
the  reactions,  growth  and  change  it  evokes.  Similar 
to  the  change  in  the  concept  of  mind  is  the  change 
demanded  in  our  concept  of  God  and  the  Universe. 
So  long  as  space  concepts  dominate,  the  universe  is 
thought  of  as  a  predetermined  structure,  definite  in 
parts  and  unified  in  character,  making  God  a  being 
with  functions  complementary  to  those  of  men.  This 
attitude  is  easily  understood  when  we  recognize  that 
thought  is  social  and  that  material  and  spatial  con- 
cepts were  useful  at  an  earlier  date  than  those  of  time. 
Our  thought  processes  thus  favor  structural  views  of 
mind,  of  God  and  of  the  universe.  We  can  change 
from  them  to  genetic  views  of  fundamental  relations 
only  with  much  difficulty,  and  against  them  is  always 
the  weight  of  authority,  tradition  and  language. 

[12] 


INTRODUCTION 

Religion  begins  not  with  a  belief  in  God  but  with 
an  emotional  opposition  to  removable  evils.  It  is  a 
psychic  reaction,  not  an  intellectual  conviction,  and 
its  one  essential  element  is  its  program  for  saving  social 
outcasts.  Our  social  instincts  are  thus  evoked  in  its 
favor,  and  its  opposite  lies  in  the  selfish  tendencies 
that  would  force  to  the  wall  those  not  fitted  for  the 
struggle  demanded  for  survival.  Out  of  this  back- 
ground all  religions  have  risen;  they  will  continue  to 
evoke  human  sympathies  and  generate  religious  en- 
thusiasm so  long  as  the  present  rigid  conditions  of 
survival  remain.  Social  activity  readily  assumes  a 
religious  form  when  men  recognize  that  they  sink 
through  degeneration  and  may  rise  again  through 
regeneration.  Degeneration,  regeneration  and  the  will 
are  thus  religion's  first  problems,  from  which  all  others 
are  derived.  When  religion  emphasizes  degeneration 
as  a  starting  point,  its  position  assumes  both  a  scientific 
and  a  pragmatic  quality.  The  subnormal  —  below 
us  —  is  to  be  avoided ;  the  supernormal  —  above  us 
—  is  to  be  striven  for.  Religion  voices  our  opposition 
to  the  one  and  our  aspiration  for  the  other.  So  long 
as  men  hope  to  be  better,  and  fear  to  become  worse, 
religion  cannot  die  out.  It  cures  degeneration  through 
the  development  of  character.  Degeneration  is  the 
worst  of  evils ;  the  will  is  the  greatest  of  forces.     Only 

[13] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

when  these  two  are  put  in  opposition  is  progress  safe 
and  the  supernormal  attainable. 

The  discussions  that  follow  may  seem  disconnected 
because  they  bring  together  several  viewpoints  that 
have  thus  far  been  isolated.  One  of  the  evils  of  the 
division  of  science  into  minute  parts  is  that  the  same 
views  may  be  held  by  different  groups  of  specialists, 
and  yet  through  differences  in  terminology  they  may 
be  kept  distinct  and  thus,  although  one  in  reality, 
seem  to  be  parts  of  distinct  disciplines.  It  is  hard  to 
break  through  these  artificial  barriers  and  get  at  the 
essence  of  the  recent  advances  of  science.  Many  seem 
to  resent  the  restatement  of  ideas  in  terms  other  than 
their  own.  Some  time  ago  I  wrote  to  a  scientist  in  a 
field  far  removed  from  my  own,  and  congratulated  him 
on  a  discovery  that  seemed  to  me  to  be  of  importance 
in  my  field  as  well  as  his.  I  received  from  him  a  curt 
reply,  saying  that  he  hoped  I  would  not  use  his  thought, 
because  he  was  sure  I  would  discredit  it  by  using  it  in 
a  bad  way.  Doubtless  this  is  an  exaggeration  of  pre- 
vailing tendencies,  but  enough  of  it  exists  to  keep  apart 
subjects  that  are  closely  related.  Science  defeats  its 
own  ends  by  a  narrow  specialization  that  isolates  and 
antagonizes  its  workers.  As  a  result,  the  broader 
aspects  of  recent  progress  are  not  worked  out  in  a 
way  that  furthers  general  changes  in  thought  which 

[141 


INTRODUCTION 

legitimately  flow  from  it.  Antiquated  scientific  ideas 
persist  because  the  viewpoint  of  workers  is  still  molded 
by  the  ideas  of  an  earlier  generation.  Little  endeavor 
is  made  to  recast  them  in  harmony  with  the  results 
these  same  workers  have  wrought.  Scientific  tradi- 
tion, whether  in  its  social  or  physical  aspects,  may 
become  as  bad  as  theological  tradition,  and  for  much 
the  same  reasons.  Philosophy  also  has  become  a  creed 
with  a  tradition  as  narrow  as  that  of  the  other  groups. 
Under  such  conditions  the  reshaping  of  general  con- 
cepts in  harmony  with  newer  facts  becomes  a  matter 
of  difficulty.  Evidence  of  these  changes  cannot  be 
found  in  any  one  field  of  investigation,  nor  is  there  any 
single  discovery  that  would  lead  to  their  acceptance. 
A  writer  can  at  best  offer  only  partial  proof,  and  much 
he  uses  will  be  second-hand  material,  of  which  other 
specialists  know  more  than  he  does.  This  difficulty 
is  involved  in  any  general  change  in  thought,  and 
must  be  faced  by  any  one  who  attempts  it.  Whether 
I  succeed  or  not  others  must  judge,  but  failure  does 
not  necessarily  mean  that  my  method  is  wrong.  I 
shall  at  least  outline  problems  for  others  to  solve. 


[15] 


CHAPTER  II 


SCIENTIFIC  METHOD 


3 


II 


Religious  impulses  and  sentiments  are  among  the 
oldest  of  the  race,  and  have  existed  with  all  kinds  of 
institutions,  civilizations  and  degrees  of  culture. 
There  is  no  race  without  some  form  of  religion,  and 
nowhere  can  it  be  found  so  separated  from  other 
social  facts  that  it  can  be  studied  by  itself.  It  is  an 
alloy  hard  to  isolate,  because  blended  with  every  other 
part  of  the  social  structure.  Every  activity  is  to 
some  degree  religious,  but  none  is  purely  so.  Put 
religion  by  itself  and  it  disappears,  or  becomes  merely 
a  formal  institution,  with  no  vitality  outside  of  its 
routine.  To  isolate  phenomena  of  this  sort  demands 
a  special  method  and  much  preliminary  study,  but  if 
the  key  is  once  found  and  the  field  of  religion  plainly 
demarcated,  the  subsequent  stages  of  research  will  be 
rapid  and  sure. 

A  study  of  method  must  therefore  precede  even  a 
definition  of  religion,  for  definitions  are  of  no  avail 
when  the  subject  matter  is  never  found  alone  and 
nothing  else  is  found  except  in  some  way  compounded 
with  it.     To  define  is  to  contrast,  and  what  is  there 

[19] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

to  contrast  with  religion  ?  At  first  thought  one  might 
say  the  secular  and  the  religious  give  a  contrast,  but 
here  only  the  organized  aspects  of  religion  get  a  defi- 
nition. The  secular  can  be  contrasted  with  the  ecclesi- 
astical but  not  with  the  religious,  for  the  secular  life 
of  a  nation  may  express  the  religious  tendencies  better 
than  the  ecclesiastical.  Again  a  contrast  is  made  of 
science  and  religion,  but  there  can  be  a  scientific  re- 
ligion as  well  as  an  irrational  one.  To  take  for  granted 
that  religion  is  irrational  is  to  give  away  its  case. 
There  are  many  other  contrasts,  and  yet  none  of  them 
would  define  religion.  Its  essential  qualities  would  be 
as  indefinite  as  before  and  as  incapable  of  clear  analysis. 
Only  a  sound  method  of  investigation  can  clear  away 
these  difficulties  and  furnish  the  basis  for  a  clear 
demarcation  of  religion  from  other  fields. 

The  method  of  physical  science  seems  to  many  the 
only  one  that  has  advanced  human  knowledge;  in 
addition,  however,  the  method  of  economics  deserves 
consideration.  Economics  for  the  past  century  has 
been  the  representative  social  science,  forced  into  the 
foreground  because  its  material  has  been  so  abundant. 
In  the  old  division  of  the  sciences  natural  philosophy 
had  the  field  now  taken  by  the  various  physical  sciences, 
while  moral  philosophy  had  the  province  now  occupied 
by  the  social  sciences.     Had  many  social  sciences  de- 

[20] 


SCIENTIFIC  METHOD 

veloped  on  a  par  with  each  other,  the  methods  of  these 
sciences  could  be  obtained  by  comparison.  But  the 
moral  philosophers  of  England,  stimulated  by  the 
success  of  Adam  Smith,  turned  themselves  into  econ- 
omists and  won  their  victories  mainly  within  its 
preserves.  For  a  whole  century  politics,  psychology, 
sociology  and  morals  were  merely  by-products  of 
economics  —  the  crude  generalizations  of  men  whose 
main  interest  was  in  the  promotion  of  economic  thought 
and  the  impressment  of  economic  standards  on  public 
opinion.  It  is  no  wonder,  therefore,  that  the  victories 
won  were  economic  and  not  sociologic,  psychologic  or 
moral.  The  study  of  the  methods  of  these  thinkers  is 
valuable  mainly  in  economics,  and  the  method  they 
used  can  properly  be  called  the  economic  method  of 
investigation,  even  if  it  should  prove  to  be  the  best 
method  for  all  the  social  sciences.  What,  then,  is  the 
essence  of  this  method,  and  how  does  it  differ  from 
that  of  the  physical  sciences  ? 

The  method  of  investigation  in  the  physical  sciences 
is  not  so  simple  that  it  can  be  formulated  in  terms 
that  would  provoke  no  opposition,  yet  its  leading 
features  can  be  easily  described.  It  is  agreed  that  all 
knowledge  must  be  founded  on  the  observation  of 
facts,  and  that  all  laws  must  be  capable  of  an  empirical 
verification.     Even  if  there  is  some  intermediate  de- 

[21] 


THE   SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

duction,  a  student  of  a  physical  science  must  start  with 
facts  and  end  with  them.  Observation,  experiment  and 
verification  are  thus  the  main  tools  of  physical  sciences, 
and  many  would  claim  that  they  should  be  its  sole  tools. 
To  employ  this  method  effectively,  the  object  under 
investigation  must  be  isolated  from  other  objects  and 
contrasted  with  them.  This  necessity  creates  the  de- 
mand for  laboratories,  since  success  in  investigation 
demands  complete  isolation  and  exact  measurement. 

In  contrast  to  this  process  of  isolation  and  detailed 
study  is  the  economic  method  dealing  with  wholes  or 
with  a  composition  of  forces  that  can  neither  be  iso- 
lated, nor  studied  as  single  units.  Society  is  a  living 
organism.  It  cannot  be  put  in  a  laboratory,  nor  can 
its  various  elements  be  studied  apart  from  the  whole. 
The  method  of  physical  science  cannot  go  beyond 
a  mere  statement  of  what  is,  and  if  one  attempts  to 
follow  it  in  social  studies,  he  must  fall  back  upon  crude 
historical  generalizations  or  upon  equally  bad  ones 
derived  from  a  comparative  study  of  nations.  These 
difficulties  have  forced  economists  to  begin  with  the 
study  of  great  changes,  which,  when  consummated, 
produce  modifications  so  prominent  that  their  effects 
can  be  observed.  The  whole  society  before  a  given 
change  can  be  compared  with  the  same  society  after 
the  change  only  when  the  results  are  conspicuous.    The 

[22;] 


SCIENTIFIC  METHOD 

introduction  of  free  trade  into  England  so  radically 
altered  industry  and  commerce  that  its  results  could 
be  easily  perceived.  In  the  same  way  the  change 
from  an  absolute  to  a  constitutional  government  pro- 
duces effects  that  can  be  readily  measured. 

A  series  of  prominent  events  of  this  kind  gives  a 
body  to  economic  doctrine  which  can  be  increased 
so  long  as  important  changes  produce  effects  visible 
enough  to  constitute  a  verification.  A  direct  exami- 
nation of  current  facts  can  never  prove  an  economic 
theory.  The  verification  only  comes  in  a  subsequent 
epoch  when  the  changes  in  question  have  worked  out 
their  logical  consequences.  The  economic  unit  is  an 
industrial  epoch,  all  of  which  cannot  at  any  one  time 
be  directly  under  observation.  Society,  as  it  is,  must 
be  put  in  contrast  with  itself  plus  or  minus  some  im- 
portant condition.  Minor  changes  are  ignored,  and  the 
whole  alteration  is  imputed  to  the  major  modification 
that  society  is  undergoing.  It  is  this  ignoring  of  minor 
disturbing  causes  that  creates  the  marked  contrast  be- 
tween economic  method  and  that  of  physical  science. 
Natural  science  can  isolate  minor  causes  and  measure 
them;  social  science  cannot.  It  must  therefore  leave 
out  of  account  events  so  unimportant  that  their  results 
cannot  be  readily  determined.  Every  important  cause 
is  assumed  to  have  one  effect  and  each  effect  is  im- 

[23] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

puted  to  some  single  cause.  This  method  works 
admirably  so  long  as  important  changes  are  under 
consideration.  That  it  often  fails  must  also  be  ad- 
mitted, but  if  it  is  the  only  method  of  advancing  social 
knowledge,  the  way  in  which  it  proceeds  is  worthy  of 
consideration. 

The  contrast  between  natural  science  and  economic 
methods  can  be  made  clearer  by  saying  that  the  one 
endeavors  to  ascertain  qualities,  while  the  other  seeks 
for  consequences.  Qualities  appear  when  an  object  is 
isolated  or  when  accurately  tested  by  a  series  of  ex- 
periments and  studies.  Consequences  follow  and  are 
clearly  seen  only  in  a  distant  epoch.  The  qualities  of 
a  germ  cell  may  be  observed  through  a  microscope, 
but  no  one  has  ever  seen  a  plant  evolve  out  of  some 
other  species.  Consequences  can  be  measured  only 
by  the  changes  resulting  over  long  epochs ;  they  are 
never  found  in  a  laboratory.  If  time  is  involved,  the 
economic  is  the  only  method  of  investigation. 

When  this  method  is  used  in  social  science,  two 
distinct  types  of  investigation  come  into  prominence. 
There  must  first  be  found  the  qualities  of  men  and 
nature,  reappearing  with  such  regularity  that  they 
may  be  said  to  be  the  common  qualities  of  men  and 
nature.  Most  of  this  work  was  done  by  the  natural 
theologians  before  the  reorganization  of  their  work  as 

[241 


SCIENTIFIC  METHOD 

economics.  The  concepts  of  a  normal  man  and  of  a 
beneficent  nature  were  inherited  by  the  economists 
from  their  predecessors.  All  they  have  done  is  to 
bring  out  more  clearly  the  characteristics  of  the 
normal  man  and  the  natural  laws  that  work  to  his 
advantage.  The  successful  work  of  the  economists 
has  been  in  another  type  of  investigation,  which  also 
has  at  its  basis  an  assumption  of  the  natural  theo- 
logians. If  man  is  good  and  nature  perfect,  what  is 
the  cause  of  evil  ?  The  economist  restates  this  prob- 
lem by  asking  what  is  the  cause  of  misery  ?  Evil  may 
be  subjective,  and  hence  sin,  or  objective,  and  then  it 
is  misery.  The  economist  has  simplified  the  problem 
by  assuming  that  sin  is  a  consequence  of  misery. 
Remove  misery,  and  sin  will  disappear.  It  has  no 
independent  existence  apart  from  the  misery  that  bad 
conditions  create.  It  is  but  a  step  from  this  to  the 
thought  that  misery  is  the  result  of  poverty,  and  thus 
dependent  on  industrial  conditions.  Sin,  misery  and 
poverty  thus  become  one  problem,  and  their  antidote 
is  income.  All  three  can  be  wiped  out  by  changes  in 
industrial  conditions. 

I  know  of  no  place  where  the  problem  of  the  econo- 
mist is  better  stated  than  by  Henry  George.  Why 
does  poverty  persist  with  progress  ?  If  George  had 
not  been  in  a  hurry  to  give  his  answer,  he  would  have 

[251 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

brought  out  other  assumptions  that  lie  in  such  dis- 
cussions. If  man  is  good  and  nature  beneficent, 
poverty  is  due  to  specific  causes  that  can  be  removed. 
Economics  thus  becomes  a  study  of  the  relations  of 
poverty  and  misery  to  bad  industrial  conditions.  It 
is  here  that  the  "one  cause  and  one  effect"  doctrine 
gets  its  importance  and  reveals  its  truth,  which  I  will 
illustrate  by  the  doctrine  of  free  trade.  The  theory  of 
competition  that  lies  in  the  background  assumes  the 
existence  of  a  normal  man  and  of  a  beneficent  nature. 
English  misery  must  therefore  be  due  to  some  specific 
cause  not  inherent  in  normal  men  nor  in  nature.  Pro- 
tection is  such  a  cause  out  of  harmony  with  natural 
and  economic  law.  Its  removal  will  restore  England 
to  a  natural  condition  and  enable  human  nature  to 
express  itself  more  fully  in  industrial  activity.  All 
other  causes  of  misery  are  for  the  time  ignored,  and 
protection  viewed  as  its  sole  cause.  These  assump- 
tions may  not  be  accurate,  but  if  enough  misery  is 
removed  by  a  change  of  industrial  policy  to  make  the 
effect  in  social  betterment  plainly  visible,  the  change 
in  policy  will  be  justified.  And  so  it  is  with  other 
economic  slogans.  Child  labor,  the  use  of  alcohol,  the 
lack  of  labor  organizations,  the  growth  of  rent,  exploi- 
tation and  woman's  emancipation  —  these  like  many 
other  doctrines,  are  boldly  asserted  and  defended  by 

[261 


SCIENTIFIC  METHOD 

the  same  arguments,  and  the  success  of  each  agitation 
is  measured  in  the  same  way.  The  net  elimination  of 
human  misery  furnishes  the  verification  to  which  they 
must  submit.  The  method  fails  only  when  measures 
are  adopted  out  of  their  order  of  importance.  The 
greater  evils  must  be  attacked  first.  Small  causes  pro- 
duce no  effects  until  their  natural  antecedents  —  the 
great  changes  —  have  produced  their  results,  and  men 
are  restored  more  nearly  to  normal  conditions.  The 
fight  for  the  normal  is  always  made  by  the  elimina- 
tion of  abnormalities.  They  alone  can  be  tested  and 
measured  by  the  changes  that  historical  epochs  pro- 
duce, and  hence  their  study  and  prevention  is  the  first 
work  of  the  economist. 

The  value  of  this  method  cannot  be  properly  appre- 
ciated until  its  power  to  generate  faith  in  progress 
and  energy  in  action  becomes  manifest.  The  first 
step  in  a  social  reform  is  a  clear  contrast  between 
existing  conditions  and  those  now  possible.  It  must 
^p-  also  be  recognized  that  present  evils  are  due  not  to 
^  *  general  but  to  particular  causes.  If  there  is  no  con- 
trast between  the  "is  "  and  the  "might  be,"  the  imagina- 
tion has  no  chance  to  work  ;  if  evils  are  due  to  general 
and  not  to  local  conditions,  there  is  no  way  of  altering 
them.  When  clear  contrasts  are  made  and  the  local 
nature  of  evils  becomes  manifest,  a  social  program  can 

[27] 


& 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

be  formulated  that,  setting  aside  local  evils,  makes  the 
"might  be"  into  a  reality.  Take,  for  example,  the 
social  program  now  forming  that  would  eliminate 
poverty.  To  make  it  effective,  people  must  first  see 
how  different  the  world  would  be  if  poverty  were 
removed.  But  to  make  this  picture  an  effective 
motive,  poverty  must  be  shown  to  be  due  to  definite 
causes.  The  older  view  did  not  permit  the  isolation 
of  the  causes  of  poverty  because  they  were  viewed  as 
resulting  from  defects  in  human  nature  or  in  natural 
conditions.  The  doctrine  of  total  depravity  made 
poverty  a  general  condition  from  which  there  was  only 
occasional  relief.  The  law  of  diminishing  returns, 
coupled  as  it  was  with  the  "niggardliness  of  nature" 
doctrine  of  the  classical  economists,  had  a  like  effect. 
The  abolition  of  poverty  can  become  a  social  program 
only  when  both  these  viewpoints  are  displaced  and 
the  particular  causes  of  poverty  are  separated  from  the 
general  conditions  of  prosperity.  We  can  conceive  of 
progress  without  poverty  only  as  we  ascribe  poverty 
to  some  specific  cause. 

Picture  again  the  change  that  is  coming  in  the 
South  because  of  the  recognition  of  the  hookworm  as 
one  cause  of  its  misery.  The  older  view  assumed  that 
the  characteristics  of  the  Southern  people  were  due  to 
their  climate  and  physical  conditions.     People  in  hot 

[28] 


SCIENTIFIC  METHOD 

climates,  it  was  said,  are  lazy,  indolent  and  imprudent. 
It  lies  in  the  nature  of  things  that  they  should  be  so, 
and  that  only  people  north  of  the  frost  line  can  be  ener- 
getic and  efficient.  Southern  misery  thus  becomes  a  part 
of  a  general  situation  —  a  condition  without  a  remedy. 
All  this  is  changed  by  the  discovery  of  the  hookworm 
as  a  cause  of  laziness,  languor  and  misery.  We  can 
now  picture  what  the  Southern  States  would  be  with- 
out hookworms  to  destroy  the  vitality  of  their  people. 
And  this  vision  of  greatness  creates  the  motive  of 
power  to  work  out  the  change.  When  an  "is"  can 
be  put  in  contrast  with  a  "might  be,"  the  "ought  to 
be"  looms  up  with  sufficient  clearness  to  make  the 
change.  To  localize  evils  always  generates  enough 
will  power  to  remove  them.  The  method  of  isolating 
evils  and  ignoring  their  minor  causes  is  justified  by 
the  moral  awakening  it  evokes. 

To  make  use  of  these  facts,  tendencies  and  forces 
is  the  end  of  economic  method.  The  first  picture  is 
of  the  normal  man  possessing  all  the  qualities  of  the 
race,  and  thus  a  contrast  is  created  with  abnormal 
environments  in  which  degeneration  and  subnormal 
tendencies  prevail.  Then  comes  the  thought  of  a 
normal  environment  that  evokes  ennobling  human 
characters,  and  is  never  the  source  of  degeneration  nor 
of  its  consequences  in  vice  and  crime.     The  primal 

[29] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

cause  of  degeneration  is  failing  resources  or  some  mis- 
use of  them.  Sin  is  misery,  misery  is  poverty,  and  the 
antidote  of  poverty  is  income.  Such  is  the  message  of 
hope  delivered  by  economics  and  natural  theology 
when  their  principles  are  blended  in  one  discipline. 
This  is  the  method  that  should  be  used  in  determin- 
ing what  religion  is  and  how  it  works.  No  empirical 
study  of  religion  can  get  beyond  the  petty  details  that 
confuse  and  mislead,  but  which,  when  once  understood, 
serve  as  good  illustrations  of  the  principles  involved. 
First  the  essence  and  then  the  details  is  the  only 
method  that  will  make  religion  a  study  fit  to  be  com- 
pared with  other  sciences. 


[SO] 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ECONOMIC  INTERPRETATION 
OF  HISTORY 


2 


Ill 


The  concept  of  a  normal  man  and  of  normal  indus- 
trial conditions  has  thrown  into  the  foreground  the 
motives  that  create  progress.  The  resulting  isolation 
of  the  abnormal  and  local  from  the  normal  and  general 
generates  the  enthusiasm  that  leads  to  reform.  To 
localize  an  evil  and  to  show  its  abnormal  character 
evoke  the  spiritual  unrest  that  is  the  forerunner  of 
revolution.  Interest  evokes  progress  ;  enthusiasm  de- 
mands regeneration.  These  two  primal  forces  are 
aroused  and  intensified  by  a  skillful  use  of  the  eco- 
nomic method  of  investigation.  The  method  however, 
has  its  dangers  as  well  as  merits.  It  succeeds  when 
the  relative  importance  of  evils  can  be  accurately 
measured  and  public  attention  concentrated  on  the 
greatest  of  them.  But  when  problems  are  taken  out 
of  their  natural  order,  or  the  enthusiasm  of  reformers  is 
dissipated  by  wrong  standards  of  normality  or  by  the 
emphasis  of  minor  evils  before  the  removal  of  their 
logical  antecedents,  the  path  of  progress  may  be  barred, 
and  should  the  dissension  persist,  a  downward  move- 
d  [33] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

ment  may  result.  To  insure  progress,  more  than  a 
sound  method  is  necessary.  Some  way  must  be  found 
to  select  between  proposed  alterations  and  to  test  the 
evidence  which  various  advocates  present  to  promote 
their  reforms. 

To  meet  this  urgent  need  is  the  aim  of  the  economic 
interpretation  of  history.  To  simplify  history  and  to 
separate  its  truths  from  its  errors,  some  type  of  society 
must  be  accepted  as  normal,  and  other  societies  be 
judged  through  its  standards.  The  dominance  of 
economic  motives  and  the  urgency  of  economic  needs 
give  to  economic  societies  a  legitimate  claim  to  be 
regarded  as  normal ;  and  if  we  further  assume  that 
modern  nations  are  more  advanced  than  those  of  the 
ancient  world,  there  is  little  room  for  doubt  but  that 
industrial  nations  should  provisionally  be  accepted  as 
the  standard  by  whose  events  the  abnormalities  of 
other  societies  must  be  judged.  The  only  other  wide- 
spread form  of  society  is  the  military,  whose  defects 
and  transient  nature  are  so  obvious  that  no  one  seems 
willing  to  adopt  it  as  a  standard  by  which  to  measure 
social  structures.  It  is  often  put  forward  as  an  objec- 
tion to  the  economic  interpretation  of  history  that 
there  are  just  as  strong  grounds  for  a  social,  an  intel- 
lectual or  a  religious  interpretation  as  for  an  economic 
interpretation.     Such  critics  fail,  however,  to  perceive 

[34] 


ECONOMIC    INTERPRETATION   OF   HISTORY 

the  essential  difference  between  an  economic  inter- 
pretation and  those  contrasted  with  it.  The  qualities 
of  mankind  are  divided  into  two  groups,  the  natural 
and  the  acquired.  For  many  thousand  years  there 
has  been  little  or  no  change  in  natural  characters.  As 
biologic  beings  we  are  to-day  what  our  ancestors  were 
when  historians  began  to  keep  records :  all  the  changes 
have  been  within  the  group  of  acquired  characters 
which  are  in  the  main  economic.  Religious,  social, 
intellectual  and  sexual  feelings  cannot  be  regarded  as 
the  causes  of  the  changes  appearing  in  history  if  these 
feelings  have  not  varied  in  intensity  during  the  his- 
toric epoch.  It  is  only  their  relation  to  economic 
events  that  has  altered,  and  in  this  way  many  institu- 
tions have  arisen  that  reflect  or  reenforce  the  natural 
feelings.  Institutions,  however,  are  acquired  phenom- 
ena, and  their  alterations  give  evidence  of  changes 
within  the  realm  of  economics  to  which  natural  feel- 
ings must  adjust  themselves.  Should  industrial  habits, 
methods  of  production  and  institutions  become  stable, 
while  new  natural  characters  appeared,  or  the  older 
ones  gained  in  strength,  a  period  of  history  would 
begin  in  which  progress  must  be  interpreted  in  other 
than  economic  terms.  The  present  epoch,  with  its 
fixed  natural  characters  and  rapid  industrial  changes, 
can   have   but  one  valid   method  of   interpretation, 

[35] 


THE   SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

and  that  is  in  terms  of  its  acquired  characters  im- 
pressed and  modified  by  the  pressure  of  economic  con- 
ditions. 

A  second  reason  for  beginning  social  investigations 
with  an  economic  interpretation  lies  in  the  exaggerated 
importance  the  economic  factors  acquire  in  periods  of 
decay  and  of  diminishing  productivity.  The  poorer 
the  resources  upon  which  a  nation  depends,  the  greater 
is  the  amount  of  time  that  its  people  must  give  to 
earning  a  living,  and  the  less  they  have  for  other  activi- 
ties. The  economic  discipline  thus  becomes  more 
severe,  and  its  habits  being  more  deeply  impressed, 
determine  more  fully  the  history  and  institutions  of 
such  nations.  Those  whose  energies  just  suffice  to 
earn  a  living  must  lead  a  life  capable  of  an  economic 
interpretation.  Even  nations  with  great  natural  re- 
sources are  not  free  from  this  exaggeration  of  economic 
tendencies,  for  they  have  been  in  the  regions  most 
subject  to  invasion  and  conquest.  Where  a  military 
caste,  by  absorbing  the  surplus,  keeps  the  workers  in 
poverty,  they  have  conditions  no  better  than  workers 
in  nations  with  meager  resources.  Exploitation  ex- 
aggerates the  force  of  an  economic  discipline  even 
more  ruthlessly  than  does  a  poverty  of  resources. 
These  forces  were  still  further  increased  during  the 
historic  epoch  by  the  drying  up  of  the  region  in  Western 

[36] 


ECONOMIC    INTERPRETATION    OF    HISTORY 

Asia  and  Southern  Europe,  where  the  early  civilizations 
were  located.  In  this  way  region  after  region  felt 
the  force  of  decaying  resources,  and  went  down  before 
physical  obstacles  they  could  not  surmount.  The 
civilization  that  arose  on  this  basis  could  not  but  bear 
the  impress  of  the  economic  events  which  shaped  it. 
There  was  no  passing  on  of  an  improved  heredity  from 
one  nation  to  its  successors.  Only  the  traditions,  in- 
stitutions and  acquired  characters  were  transmitted, 
and  these,  from  the  necessities  of  the  case,  were  mainly 
industrial.  For  such  a  history  there  can  be  no  other 
key  than  an  economic  interpretation.  If  any  other 
viewpoint  should  in  the  end  prevail,  it  must  have  its 
basis  in  modern  times,  when  industrial  stability  is  once 
more  secured  and  the  pressure  of  economic  conditions 
made  less  severe.  But  even  here  economic  pressure  is 
too  evident  to  be  set  aside,  and  other  factors  in  civiliza- 
tion cannot  be  fully  appreciated  until  economic  forces 
have  been  isolated  and  their  laws  formulated. 

The  expansion  of  this  last  thought  gives  a  third 
reason  why  social  investigation  should  begin  with  an 
economic  interpretation.  The  pressure  of  economic 
events  has  modified,  dwarfed  and  subordinated  the 
natural  characters  so  that  their  present  manifestations 
do  not  at  all  represent  their  full  vigor.  I  freely  admit 
that  the  social,  moral  and  religious  traits  are  funda- 

[37] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

mental  and  of  earlier  origin  than  those  characters  to 
which  economists  give  attention.  In  principle,  Adam 
Smith  was  right  in  investigating  sympathy  before  he 
wrote  a  book  about  self-interest ;  but  in  practice  every 
one  fails,  just  as  he  did,  who  tries  to  study  social  and 
moral  problems  before  the  effects  of  economic  pressure 
on  these  natural  traits  have  been  ascertained.  The 
natural  man  has  little  chance  to  express  himself  when 
held  in  subjection  by  the  pressure  of  external  condi- 
tions. The  revolts  against  environmental  control 
have  been  too  feeble  and  of  too  short  a  duration  to 
show  the  vitality  and  power  of  the  social  and  moral 
traits  suppressed  beneath  the  routine  of  daily  life. 

This  subordination  of  natural  traits  is  often  ap- 
proved because  it  carries  with  it  the  weakening  of  the 
impulses  and  passions  of  the  primitive  man.  Fear, 
anger,  hatred,  jealousy  and  the  sex  feelings  are  par- 
tially suppressed  by  the  economic  pressure  making 
courage,  prudence,  patience  and  forethought  and 
moral  restraint  the  leading  characters  of  civilized 
races.  Were  these  the  only  effects,  we  might  con- 
gratulate ourselves  on  the  change  and  think  of  our 
moral  advance  as  a  net  gain.  But  the  suppression 
has  extended  to  all  the  natural  traits,  the  good  as 
well  as  the  bad.  There  is  a  general  blurring  of  the 
sentiments  that  unfavorably  affects  religion,  art  and 

[38] 


ECONOMIC   INTERPRETATION   OF   HISTORY 

poetry.  We  lose  in  inspiration  more  than  we  gain  by 
the  suppression  of  passion.  The  drudgery  of  modern 
industry  may  keep  men  from  becoming  very  bad,  but 
it  likewise  prevents  them  from  reaching  the  loftier 
ends  to  which  the  free  working  of  natural  motives 
would  lead  them.  So  long  as  natural  instincts  are 
repressed,  we  cannot  measure  the  force  and  vitality  of 
religion  and  art,  which  depend  so  fully  on  what  nature 
did  for  man  in  those  earlier  days  before  the  economic 
regime  forced  a  life  of  routine  drudgery  on  the  great 
mass  of  mankind. 

We  regard  many  characters  as  natural  that  are 
acquired,  because  they  appear  so  regularly  in  cur- 
rent events,  while  the  underlying  natural  traits,  seen 
only  in  distorted  forms,  are  misjudged  and  under- 
estimated. In  this  way  sympathy  is  displaced  by 
selfishness,  religion  sinks  into  superstition,  democracy 
yields  to  imperialism,  cooperation  is  displaced  by  class 
struggle,  competition  gives  way  to  monopoly,  and 
liberty  to  absolute  power.  In  each  case  acquired 
views  and  habits  gain  a  dominance  that  so  subordi- 
nates and  distorts  natural  traits  as  to  make  them 
servants  to  economic  needs  instead  of  masters  of  our 
lives  and  activities.  Economic  interpretation  gives 
the  only  method  that  will  unravel  the  tangled  skein 
of  social  events  and  permit  us  to  reach  the  ultimates 

[89] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

through  whose  dominance  alone  the  goal  of  civiliza- 
tion may  be  reached. 

Important  as  are  these  facts,  they  do  not  give  the 
real  reason  for  starting  social  investigations  with  an 
economic  interpretation.  There  are  two  ways  of 
creating  an  advance  :  by  bringing  out  more  clearly 
what  is  the  normal,  and  by  removing  abnormalities 
that  obscure  it.  To  get  at  the  normal  we  need  an 
economic  interpretation,  but  we  need  it  even  more  to 
isolate  the  abnormal  and  to  make  plain  its  source 
and  cause.  Evil  and  sin  are  either  the  result  of  defects 
in  human  nature,  and  hence  without  a  remedy,  or  they 
are  due  to  external  conditions  that  mar  human  nature 
by  producing  abnormalities.  If  the  latter  view  is 
accepted,  the  word  "economic"  must  be  substituted 
for  "external"  in  describing  the  conditions  that  origi- 
nate evil  and  sin.  While  many  good  things  are  natural, 
most  bad  things  are  economic.  The  good  is  also  the 
outcome  of  general  laws ;  the  bad  is  the  result  of  local 
conditions  that  may  be  altered.  Evils  thus  have 
specific  causes  that  may  be  isolated  and  removed. 
They  never  arise  from  the  general  laws  of  nature  nor 
from  the  native  impulses  of  men.  Neither  nature  nor 
man  needs  to  have  his  laws  altered.  Nature  is  benefi- 
cent and  man  is  good ;  they  become  malignant  forces 
only  under  local  conditions  that  prevent  the  full  ex- 

[40] 


ECONOMIC    INTERPRETATION    OF   HISTORY 

pression  of  natural  law  and  keep  men  from  following 
their  better  impulses.  To  remove  the  temptation  to 
sin  means  to  do  away  with  starvation,  poverty,  dis- 
ease, overwork  and  bad  conditions  which  depress 
workers  and  turn  virtue  into  vice.  There  is  no  general 
law  either  of  nature  or  of  man  that  forces  misery  and 
vice  on  men.  They  are  local  and  definite  in  origin, 
and  may  be  removed  one  by  one  through  modifying 
economic  conditions  or  by  the  use  of  the  surplus  which 
economic  conditions  create. 

So  simple  is  all  this  that  it  would  be  axiomatic  if 
it  were  not  for  misunderstandings  that  have  arisen 
through  the  injection  of  a  false  philosophy,  confusing 
the  economic  interpretation  of  history  with  a  ma- 
terialistic conception  of  history.  Historical  material- 
ism has  as  its  opposite  historical  idealism.  The  one 
claims  that  ideal  or  spiritual  facts  have  their  basis  in 
material  events,  while  the  [opposite  doctrine  is  held  by 
the  idealist.  In  economic  interpretation  the  problem 
is  not  of  the  dominance  of  spirit  or  of  matter,  but 
whether  a  first  place  shall  be  given  to  history  or  to 
economics.  Shall  past  events  be  interpreted  in  the 
light  of  present  events,  or  shall  present  events  be 
judged  by  similar  events  in  the  past  ?  Both  idealism 
and  materialism  are  historical  interpretations,  and  thus 
stand  opposed  to  the  economic  method  that  interprets 

1411 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

past  events  in  the  light  of  the  present.  Abnormal 
societies,  the  economist  holds,  should  be  judged  by 
normal  societies ;  past  nations  were  more  abnormal 
than  those  of  the  present ;  industrial  societies  are 
more  normal  than  those  of  any  other  kind.  The 
force  of  an  economic  interpretation  is  increased  by  the 
assumption  that  acquired  characters  are  economic  and 
that  the  history  of  the  race  is  a  record  of  their  evolu- 
tion and  modification.  It  is  still  further  intensified 
by  the  fact  that  evils  creating  social  abnormalities  are 
economic  in  origin,  local  in  nature,  and  have  specific, 
not  general,  causes.  The  end  of  economic  interpreta- 
tion is  to  separate  the  normal  from  the  abnormal  and 
to  raise  the  level  of  society  by  removing  the  abnormali- 
ties that  check  progress  and  prevent  clearness  in  social 
thought. 

Viewed  in  this  way,  economic  interpretation  is  not  a 
new  method  of  investigation,  but  only  a  new  name  for 
one  long  in  use.  The  economists  derived  it  from  their 
predecessors,  the  natural  theologians,  and  have  de- 
veloped it  into  an  accurate  instrument  of  research. 
Its  value  consists  in  the  emphasis  put  on  studies  of 
normal  life  as  an  antecedent  to  any  investigation  of 
the  complexities  of  modern  or  historical  problems.  To 
show  its  relation  to  religion,  we  must  put  ourselves  in 
the  attitude  of  the  natural  theologians  who  sought  to 

[42] 


ECONOMIC    INTERPRETATION    OF   HISTORY 

separate  the  good  from  the  bad  and  to  assign  the  bad 
to  local,  temporary  causes.  Had  they  had  the  thought 
that  evils  were  economic  in  origin  and  might  be  re- 
moved by  specific  changes  in  the  social  environment, 
they  would  not  have  been  so  easily  displaced,  and  their 
system  might  have  withstood  the  shock  that  evolution- 
ary concepts  gave  it.  Their  attitude  can  be  readily 
revived  by  reasoning  based  on  an  economic  interpre- 
tation of  the  confusing  facts  of  history.  Only  thus  can 
the  thread  of  social  progress  be  followed,  and  the 
abnormal  be  so  clearly  apprehended  that  it  may  be 
opposed  and  removed. 

Just  as  economic  interpretation  had  a  predecessor 
in  natural  theology,  so  it  has  a  contemporary  in  the 
pragmatism  of  to-day.  The  two  views  are  the  same  in 
their  essentials,  and  stand  in  contrast  to  the  rationalism 
and  skepticism  of  the  preceding  epoch.  Both  make 
values  ultimates,  and  measure  truth  by  its  effects.  To 
judge  the  past  by  the  present  is  to  judge  by  consequences 
and  not  by  causes.  Economic  interpretation  is  thus 
a  particular  instance  of  the  pragmatic  attitude  and  the 
best  field  in  which  its  worth  may  be  tested.  The  dif- 
ference seems  to  lie  in  the  fact  that  economists  have 
come  to  this  position  from  an  interest  in  social  problems, 
while  the  pragmatists  are  philosophers  tending  towards 
the  social  viewpoint.     Both  groups  of  thinkers  are  thus 

[431 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

more  or  less  inconsistent,  because  they  have  not  wholly 
cast  off  the  dogmatic  attitude  impressed  by  their  edu- 
cation. The  errors  and  inconsistencies  of  predecessors 
are  not  so  easily  cast  off  that  they  may  be  discarded  by 
a  single  generation.  So  radical  a  change  as  that  in- 
volved in  pragmatism  or  in  a  thoroughgoing  economic 
interpretation  of  history  is  a  slow  growth;  but  as  the 
various  movements  blend,  they  will  produce  changes 
comparable  with  any  of  the  great  thought  move- 
ments of  the  past.  The  interpretation  of  history 
is  but  an  instance  of  the  interpretation  of  thought. 
Analysis  should  begin  with  history,  because  its  data 
are  more  recent  and  its  material  more  accessible. 
Thought  is  older  and  more  socialized,  and  its  origins 
are  less  readily  interpreted  in  terms  of  the  living 
present.  No  more  principles  are  demanded  for  its 
interpretation  than  are  needed  for  the  interpretation 
of  history.  The  present  is  the  key  to  both,  and  out  of 
it  all  the  categories  of  thought  and  history  arise. 


[44] 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  SOCIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF 
THOUGHT 


S 


IV 


The  principle  of  interpretation  set  forth  in  the  last 
chapter  has  brought  out  the  fact  that,  while  the  good 
is  general  and  nature  beneficent,  evil  is  local  and  eco- 
nomic. The  evil  can  therefore  be  separated  from  the 
general  good  and  removed.  The  economic  interpreta- 
tion of  history  thus  carries  us  a  long  way  towards  our 
goal  but  not  to  it.  It  settles  a  number  of  the  initial 
problems  of  progress,  but  leaves  untouched  many  of  the 
more  intricate.  To  get  at  the  whole  truth,  the  same 
process  of  interpretation  must  be  applied  to  thought  as 
to  history.  The  best  records  of  the  past  are  not  in 
documents  handed  down  to  us  but  in  the  ideas  we  get 
from  our  mental  environment.  Error  is  to  thought 
what  evil  is  to  the  race.  The  true  and  the  false  are 
merely  particular  manifestations  of  the  good  and  the 
bad.  There  is  no  criterion  of  truth  except  that  it  is 
good,  and  none  of  error  except  that  it  is  bad.  The 
same  law  applies  to  error  as  to  evil.  It  is  specific  and 
local  in  its  origin  and  can  be  removed  by  making  defi- 
nite changes.  We  need,  therefore,  to  interpret  the 
relation  of  truth  and  error  just  as  we  have  done  that 

[47] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

of  the  good  and  bad.  The  chief  obstacle  lies  in  the 
assumption  that  we  have  a  faculty  for  the  perception 
of  truth  just  as  we  have  for  seeing  red  or  hearing 
sound.  An  act  of  cognition  permits  of  no  interpreta- 
tion. We  must  take  it  at  its  face  value.  But  if  truth 
is  a  process  and  not  a  perception,  we  must  discount 
this  face  value  by  every  element  of  error  that  enters 
the  process. 

Is,  then,  truth  a  process  or  a  perception  ?  A  ready 
and  apparently  conclusive  answer  to  this  is  given  by 
those  who  say  that  ideas  are  copies  of  external  things, 
and  that  their  truth  is  determined  by  a  simple  com- 
parison of  the  mental  impression  and  its  external 
object.  False  ideas  are  thus  those  that  have  no  ex- 
ternal cause ;  true  ideas  are  those  that  have  something 
external  which  they  resemble.  When  this  primitive 
standpoint  is  abandoned,  no  firm  resting  place  is  found 
until  it  is  recognized  that  ideas  are  social  products. 
We  do  not  start  with  ideas  ;  we  get  them  as  we  increase 
our  adjustment.  Ideas,  moreover,  come  at  the  end  of 
a  period  of  progress  and  not  at  its  beginning.  We  do 
not  get  ideas  and  adjust ;  we  adjust  and  then  get  ideas. 
Adjustment  is  a  social  process.  If  this  be  true,  the 
ideas  that  come  out  of  it  are  also  social,  and  not  the 
product  of  any  one  mind. 

The  history  of  particular  ideas  brings  out  the  same 
[48] 


SOCIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  THOUGHT 

fact.  Each  social  movement  begins  with  vague  notions 
as  to  how  the  old  adjustments  are  failing  and  how 
some  new  adjustment  is  to  be  reached.  Thousands 
express  their  dissatisfaction  in  crude  ways,  and  others 
vaguely  feel  there  is  a  goal  ahead  worth  striving  for. 
Out  of  these  struggles  and  failures  comes  a  clearer 
perception  both  of  old  evils  and  of  new  advantages ; 
finally  some  one,  but  slightly  in  advance  of  his  fellows, 
sees  clearly  both  the  goal  and  the  differences  between  the 
old  and  the  new.  He  sums  up  the  change  in  a  few 
words,  and  the  resulting  contrast  opens  up  to  the  whole 
society  a  new  adjustment.  Every  idea  that  is  a  part 
of  our  mental  atmosphere  represents  the  end  of  a  fierce 
struggle  through  which  the  race  has  passed.  Ideas  are 
our  most  precious  heritage,  for  they  guard  us  from  more 
evils  and  lead  us  to  more  goals  than  all  other  devices 
and  powers. 

In  face  of  such  facts  one  wonders  how  a  writer  like 
Professor  Green  can  say  that  every  philosopher  starts 
with  a  "  problem  "  and  a  "  method,"  the  problem  to 
be  solved  by  the  method.1  Locke,  to  whom  this  asser- 
tion is  specifically  applied,  is  said  to  start  with  the  prob- 
lem of  the  origin  of  ideas  and  to  solve  it  by  looking  into 
his  own  mind  for  their  origin.  Yet  nothing  is  plainer 
than  that  both  Locke  and  his  contemporaries  stumbled 
1  Work*  of  T.  A.  Green,  Vol.  I,  p.  6. 
i  T491 


THE   SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

about  for  a  long  time  in  the  maze  of  a  new  adjustment. 
He  and  others  wrote  for  decades  before  seeing  their 
problem  or  the  method  of  its  solution.  Their  evolution 
was  social,  and  when  clearness  came,  the  epoch  of 
which  they  were  a  part  was  at  its  end.  So  is  it  with 
all  writers  and  with  every  epoch.  Volumes  are  written 
by  each  great  thinker  before  his  clear  contrasts  come; 
he  gets  them  not  on  his  own  initiative,  but  through 
the  pressure  exerted  by  his  fellows,  who  are  moving 
with  him  in  the  process  of  adjustment.  Why  is  it  that 
every  new  thought  has  from  two  to  a  dozen  fathers, 
if  the  process  that  creates  them  is  not  social  and  the 
goal  ahead  is  not  some  new  form  of  adjustment  in 
which  the  whole  society  participates  ?  The  reply  is 
that  we  do  not,  as  individuals,  see  or  create  ideas ;  we 
get  them  out  of  the  current  of  life.  The  truth  of  an 
idea  is  established  before  it  is  an  idea.  Its  presence  is 
its  best  verification. 

We  get  the  same  results  when  ideas  are  treated  ana- 
lytically. In  every  idea,  sensation,  passion,  memory 
and  imagination  are  blended  because  it  has  been  acted 
upon  many  times  by  each  of  these  faculties  before  it 
is  clearly  perceived.  It  has  also  been  contrasted  with 
other  elements  in  present  adjustment  and  with  the 
cruder  ideas  in  preceding  stages  of  progress.  Not 
only  must  it  be  compounded,  analyzed  and   recom- 

[50] 


SOCIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  THOUGHT 

pounded,  but  it  must  also  be  capable  of  communica- 
tion and  transmission.  If  ideas  did  not  express  other 
people's  adjustment  as  well  as  one's  own;  if  the  next 
generation  could  not  acquire  them  by  contact,  illustra- 
tion and  example,  the  net  adjustment  of  the  race  would 
be  too  meager  to  make  men  intelligent  or  life  desirable. 
True  ideas  promote  adjustment;  false  ideas  obstruct 
it.  The  greater  the  adjustment,  the  greater  the  truth. 
There  are  but  two  measures  of  adjustment,  the  normal 
and  the  true.  The  normal  expresses  in  life  what  the 
truth  expresses  in  ideas,  for  the  truth  is  adjustment 
made  conscious  by  ideas. 

These  general  tests  are  too  vague  or  difficult  to  be 
available.  The  practical  test  of  truth  is  the  absence 
of  error.  There  are  few  who  expect  to  reach  new  truth 
by  argument.  Most  men  expect  to  find  it  in  hidden 
corners  and  in  unexpected  ways  after  an  arduous  search 
in  which  our  fellows  join  and  for  which  they  are  partly 
responsible.  But  when  we  want  to  remove  error,  we 
all  follow  the  plan  of  argumentation,  and  expect  cold 
facts  and  skillfully  stated  syllogisms  to  drive  error  out 
as  the  sun  dissipates  the  mist  or  as  light  displaces 
darkness. 

This  attitude  overlooks  the  social  nature  of  error 
and  of  its  need  of  interpretation.  Every  error  has  a 
history  and  is  a  force.     We  see  this  plainly  in  the  case 

[51] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

of  a  superstition  or  a  myth.  We  know  that  they  have 
value,  and  that  those  who  have  them  do  not  desire  to 
get  rid  of  them.  A  creed,  a  cult,  a  platform  or  a  pro- 
gram of  any  sort  is  tenaciously  held,  and  yields  to  new 
social  alignments  only  under  great  pressure.  The 
cause  is  the  same  in  all  these  and  other  similar  cases. 
They  are  social  in  origin,  formed  from  an  aggregate  of 
separate  elements  to  voice  the  sentiments  and  aspi- 
rations of  a  given  age,  sect  or  party.  To  make  a  creed 
or  platform  enough  demands  are  blended  into  one 
program  so  that,  when  carried  out,  definite,  measurable 
changes  are  wrought  in  society.  All  parts  of  the  creed 
are  valued  for  this  gross  result,  although  some  one  or  a 
few  of  its  tenets  may  have  been  the  sole  cause  of  the 
advantage.  The  tariff  and  the  greenbacks  after  the 
Civil  War  acquired  a  value  because  of  their  association 
in  the  platform  of  the  Republican  party  along  with 
the  demand  for  free  labor  and  national  unity.  These 
latter  demands,  sanctifying  the  errors  in  tariff  and 
monetary  discussions,  have  created  a  situation  from 
which  we  are  extricating  ourselves  with  difficulty. 
Errors  of  this  kind  do  not  disappear  before  the  mere 
presence  of  truth.  They  have  a  social  worth  due  to 
their  origin  and  connection  that  makes  them  dear  to 
their  defenders.  They  are  the  surviving  part  of  an 
earlier  social  unit,  and  get  their  value  from  some  his- 

[52] 


SOCIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  THOUGHT 

toric  source.  We  impute  to  this  remnant  the  utility 
of  the  earlier  whole,  and  defend  it  in  the  name  of  the 
antecedent  creed  or  cult  whose  emaciated  part  the  error 
is.  Errors  are  thus  historic  products  or  the  results  of 
abnormal  psychology.  In  either  case  their  origin  is 
definite  and  their  causes  removable.  The  good  is  gen- 
eral ;  evil  is  local  and  specific.  The  truth  is  likewise 
general,  while  error  has  definite  causes.  The  good  and 
the  true  are  measures  of  adjustment  which  evil  and 
error  prevent.  There  is  but  one  final  test  of  all  of 
them  —  the  utility  or  disutility  following  the  adjust- 
ment they  create  or  destroy. 

Utility,  however,  is  a  standard  to  be  taken  only 
when  the  loss  or  gain  involved  needs  no  interpreta- 
tion. This  simplicity  is  seldom  attained,  for  in  social 
matters  only  great  changes  can  be  accurately  meas- 
ured. We  must,  therefore,  in  most  cases  resort  to 
deduction  and  gain  simplicity  by  connecting  evils  and 
errors  with  their  causes  in  abnormal  conditions.  But 
deductive  arguments  can  be  accepted  at  their  face 
value  no  more  than  can  events  or  satisfactions.  They 
are  subject  to  the  same  errors  and  stand  the  same  need 
of  interpretation.  This  fact  is  covered  up  by  the  logical 
canons  that  science  uses.  We  seem  to  give  certainty  to 
conclusions  by  the  logical  chain  that  unites  them  to 
premises,  when  in  reality  what  we  give  them  is  value. 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

All  that  passes  down  the  chain  from  premise  to  con- 
clusion is  the  value  stored  up  in  the  premise.  When 
the  logical  chain  is  complete,  the  conclusion  gets  the 
value  past  experience  has  given  to  the  premise.  That 
A  is  B  means  nothing  unless  B,  by  some  previous 
experience,  is  a  source  of  satisfaction,  and  in  this  case 
there  passes  from  B  to  A  a  utility  equal  to  its  own. 
The  satisfaction  of  the  consequent  is  equal  to  that  of  the 
antecedent.  The  logical  chain  is  merely  a  wire  over 
which  more  or  less'  satisfaction  passes  just  as  more  or 
less  is  stored  up  in  the  primary  reservoir.  The  wire, 
however,  is  of  no  consequence  if  the  battery  is  not 
charged. 

The  real  facts  come  out,  however,  when  arguments 
are  considered  in  detail  and  the  effects  observed  that 
follow  their  acceptance.  All  primary  beliefs  are  social. 
By  this  I  mean  all  beliefs  have  a  value  stored  up  in 
them  that  may  be  imparted  to  anything  deduced  from 
them.  Utilities  are  divided  into  two  classes,  inherent 
utility  and  imputed  utility.  The  inherent  utility  of 
an  object  always  goes  with  it,  no  matter  where  placed 
or  what  its  relations  are.  Sugar  has  an  inherent  utility 
in  its  sweetness,  and  bread  in  its  life-giving  qualities, 
but  the  utility  of  sugar  in  a  cake  is  an  imputed  utility. 
We  know  what  the  whole  utility  of  the  cake  is,  but  how 
much  of  it  is  due  to  sugar,  and  what  to  other  ingredients, 

[54] 


SOCIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  THOUGHT 

is  a  matter  not  of  perception  but  of  judgment.  This 
judged  utility  is  its  imputed  utility,  and  only  through 
a  judgment  can  the  utility  of  any  part  of  an  enjoyed 
whole  be  determined.  There  are  two  rules  in  deciding 
upon  the  imputed  utility.  If  the  part  is  essential  to 
the  whole,  then  the  utility  of  the  whole  is  imputed  to  the 
part,  and  the  value  of  the  part  becomes  the  same  as  that 
of  the  whole.  If,  however,  the  whole  has  value  without 
the  part,  or  something  else  may  be  substituted  for  the 
part,  the  utility  of  the  part  is  equal  to  the  difference  of 
the  utility  of  the  whole  with  and  without  the  part. 
This  is  called  the  marginal  utility,  and  it  is  the  utility 
imputed  to  most  objects.  Social  units  do  not  follow 
this  rule.  The  part  is  essential  to  the  whole,  and  thus 
each  part  must  have  imputed  to  it  the  same  utility 
that  the  whole  has.  Logical  values  are  social  values. 
Consequences  thus  get  by  imputation  the  value  of  their 
antecedents.  The  social  belief  that  the  premise  repre- 
sents gives  all  the  value  the  conclusion  possesses. 

Premises  thus  are  predicates  about  beliefs  and  not 
about  reality.  The  social  value  of  the  belief  is  imputed 
to  all  its  consequences.  A  belief,  in  other  words,  is  a 
value  that  has  been  socially  tested.  A  creed  is  a  group 
of  these  beliefs  blended  into  an  harmonious  whole,  and 
back  of  creeds  are  tribal  rites,  dietary  laws,  moral  codes, 
folk  ways  and  other  early  and  crude  ways  of  measuring 

[551 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

social  values.  Every  social  predicate  must  bring  with 
itself  consequences  so  clear  and  definite  that  every 
member  of  the  group  can  see  its  utility.  It  must  not 
only  be  proved  but  proved  many  times  over.  All 
minor  values  not  capable  of  demonstration  are  imputed 
utilities  made  important  by  their  relation  to  larger  so- 
cial wholes.  Early  creeds  and  moral  codes  are  the  best 
examples  of  the  action  of  this  social  process,  but  the 
additions  made  to  our  beliefs  in  more  recent  times  follow 
the  same  law.  Every  epoch  gives  birth  to  new  creeds 
and  moral  codes  which  are  tested  in  the  same  crude 
way.  The  new  whole  is  born  a  social  unit,  to  the  parts 
of  which  utilities  are  imputed.  The  creation  of  the 
new  precedes  the  decay  of  the  old,  for  decay  means  not 
skepticism  but  a  new  imputation  of  values.  Some  of 
the  older  units  blend  with  the  new  social  creeds,  and 
thus  get  a  renewal  of  their  vitality,  while  others,  failing 
of  this,  lose  the  utility  imputed  to  them  through  their 
connection  with  earlier  creeds.  They  die  a  slow  death, 
as  the  creed  or  moral  code  of  which  they  are  a  part 
loses  its  vigor.  Yet,  in  spite  of  this  tendency,  imputed 
values  seem  to  grow  as  their  social  backgrounds  fade 
away.  The  vulnerable  points  of  a  creed  are  naturally 
first  attacked  and  most  bitterly  opposed.  As  a  defense 
its  advocates  impute  more  utility  to  the  parts  under  fire, 
until,  in  its  final  form,  many  curious  distortions  appear. 

[56] 


SOCIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  THOUGHT 

The  weak  points  are  extolled  as  of  prime  value,  and  the 
essentials  are  neglected  because  unopposed.  A  dying 
creed  thus  seems  an  irrational  product  of  the  imagina- 
tion, and  yet  if  its  history  is  followed,  each  step  towards 
irrationality  is  a  logical  process  impelled  by  the  need  of 
imputing  utility  to  vulnerable  points.  As  an  illustra- 
tion, take  the  growth  of  the  Southern  creed  about 
slavery.  As  the  advantages  of  free  labor  became 
more  manifest  and  the  opposition  to  slavery  grew,  the 
South  gave  more  importance  to  slavery.  Religion, 
constitution  and  economic  welfare  all  became  subordi- 
nate to  it,  and  its  defense  became  more  logical  as  its 
basis  became  weaker.  Such  a  history  has  been  repeated 
many  times,  and  each  case  shows  the  distortions  that 
beliefs  undergo  as  the  imputation  of  utility  to  its  vul- 
nerable points  becomes  more  apparent, 
v'  While  this  decay  in  creeds  is  taking  place,  another 
process  is  transforming  their  valuable  parts  into  forms 
not  subject  to  loss.  Premises  or  first  principles  are  the 
common  elements  of  the  various  social  creeds.  To 
them  we  impute  all  the  utility  of  the  creeds  under 
comparison.  Ethics  in  the  same  way  is  the  common 
element  of  the  various  moral  codes.  The  Golden  Rule 
and  the  ethical  imperative  represent  the  essence  of  the 
various  moral  codes,  and  to  them  we  give  a  value  greater 
than  that  of  the  codes,  under  consideration.     This  com- 

[571 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

parative  method  is  at  the  basis  of  all  predicates  that  we 
call  universal  or  absolute,  and  by  it  we  seem  to  get 
away  from  the  social  basis  on  which  judgments  rest. 
Yet  the  process  is  one  of  valuation,  even  if  it  be  dis- 
guised. All  universals  rest  on  imputed,  not  on  inherent, 
utility.  Truth  is  merely  desocialized  values  made 
infinite  in  amount  by  the  character  of  the  social  facts 
on  which  it  rests.  We  get  at  truth  through  the  impu- 
tation of  value  that  follows  agreements.  We  fall  into 
error  when  the  principles  that  made  creeds  valuable 
have  been  transformed  into  truths.  The  decaying  creed 
is  thus  upheld  by  a  wrong  imputation  of  utility  until 
the  skeptic  faces  it  squarely  and  tests  its  efficiency. 

While  skepticism  is  a  natural  stage  in  the  progress 
of  thought,  no  mistake  is  more  fraught  with  evil  than  to 
assume  that  it  is  the  first  stage.  It  is  interpretation 
and  not  skepticism  that  clarifies,  simplifies  and  adds 
to  the  positive  aspects  of  thought  and  blends  its  units 
into  larger,  more  homogeneous  wholes.  As  skepticism 
grows,  men  become  pessimistic.  As  interpretation 
proceeds,  men  become  optimistic.  Which  is  the  simpler 
and  earlier  tendency  ?  The  principle  of  interpretation 
is  nothing  more  than  the  first  canon  of  logic  —  the 
method  of  agreement  —  stated  in  terms  of  values.  If 
two  objects  have  certain  qualities  in  common,  the 
value  is  imputed  to  these  common  qualities  and  not  to 

[58] 


SOCIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  THOUGHT 

those  in  which  they  differ.  There  is  nothing  in  an  inter- 
pretation except  a  judgment  about  likeness.  The  clear, 
the  simple  and  the  essential  are  raised  in  value  by  every 
agreement,  while  their  opposites  lose  in  the  same  meas- 
ure. Skepticism  is  more  complex,  for  it  imposes  some 
external  standard  not  based  on  mere  likeness. 

The  skeptic  comes  into  religion  with  the  preestab- 
lished  premise  that  there  is  no  supernatural.  This 
he  does  not  get  from  religious  evidence,  but  from  some 
outside  discipline  from  which  he  draws  his  premises. 
This  external  standard  is  necessary  in  every  skeptical 
judgment.  A  is  always  judged  through  B,  never 
through  its  own  evidence.  This  means  that  a  skeptical 
conclusion  is  always  a  secondary,  not  a  primary,  judg- 
ment, and  is  more  complex  in  its  character  than  are 
judgments  based  on  simple  agreements.  Judgments 
of  difference  or  of  disutility  come  later,  and  have  more 
elements  than  those  of  value  and  agreement.  In  social 
affairs  we  become  aware  of  differences  and  evils  only  in 
epochs  of  decay.  Skepticism  and  pessimism  appear 
when  beliefs  and  creeds  have  lost  their  vigor.  This 
invariable  order  shows  belief  to  be  simpler  and  earlier, 
and  that  interpretation  is  the  first  of  our  logical  pro- 
cesses. Growth  preceded  decay,  truth  is  older  than 
error,  affirmation  comes  before  denial,  prerequisites 
come  before  consequences. 

[59] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

In  experience  we  find  ideas,  beliefs  and  creeds  so 
fused  that  they  seem  but  phases  of  some  one  process,  yet 
in  origin  they  are  distinct,  and  must  be  treated  geneti- 
cally to  bring  out  their  differences.  Ideas  are  social 
products  individually  acquired.  They  are  the  acts  of 
society  reacting  on  the  individual,  while  beliefs  are  the 
acts  of  men  reacting  on  society.  In  spite  of  the  fact 
that  ideas  are  only  found  as  constituents  of  beliefs,  the 
ideas  preceded  the  beliefs  in  society,  while  beliefs  in 
men  precede  the  social  control  they  exercise  in  society. 
Beliefs  start  in  individuals  and  at  first  reflect  only  per- 
sonal experience.  They  are  local  in  origin  and  reflect 
the  activity  of  some  one  man  before  they  are  elevated 
into  social  forces.  This  man  dominates  his  group  or 
tribe,  and  hence  his  belief  becomes  theirs  and  is  propa- 
gated as  a  social  fact.  A  local  environment  is  thus 
projected  beyond  itself  and  made  the  background  of 
social  thought.  A  creed  is  a  union  of  beliefs  derived 
from  a  local  environment  and  of  such  importance  that 
its  value  can  be  objectively  measured.  Its  local  utility 
leads  to  its  spread  and  adoption  in  larger  areas,  where 
it  either  blends  with  other  creeds  and  rises  into  social 
truth,  or,  losing  some  of  its  essential  elements,  it 
sinks  into  error  and  blocks  progress.  This  upward 
blending  movement  forms  the  social  predicates  on  which 
all  persons  act  but  no  one  can  test.     The  downward 

[60] 


SOCIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  THOUGHT 

movement  of  their  remnants  forms  the  superstitions, 
myths  and  ceremonies  that  chain  men  to  the  past. 
Beliefs  and  the  creeds  formed  from  them  are  never 
static.  They  are  at  first  local  and  vital,  then  good  or 
bad,  and  finally  true  or  false.  Genetically,  all  beliefs 
are  vital  in  origin  and  get  their  values  from  this  fact. 
The  vital,  the  good  and  the  true  are  but  phases  of  one 
judgment.  The  transformations  of  vital  values  into 
judgments  of  morality  and  truth  merely  impute  value 
to  elements  unperceived  in  the  original  judgment. 


61 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 


* 


The  preceding  analysis  of  mental  powers  and  social 
relations  has  proceeded  genetically,  beginning  with  the 
simpler  forms  of  life  and  society  and  ending  with  the 
complex.  The  method  has  been  one  of  interpretation, 
and  the  steps  taken  have  all  been  positive.  When  we 
are  close  to  the  origin  of  thought,  all  its  complexity  is 
reduced  to  a  few  elements,  all  its  values  are  vital  and 
its  laws  are  based  on  the  method  of  agreement.  The 
contents  of  mind  in  this  primitive  condition  are  sensa- 
tions, reactions  and  values,  each  of  which  the  simplest 
mind  has  some  mental  mechanism  to  produce.  There 
is,  however,  a  fourth  content,  ideas,  for  which  there  is 
no  mental  mechanism.  There  is  no  idea  producing 
faculty.  The  mind  neither  sees  nor  manufactures 
them ;  for  ideas  are  social  products  acquired  from  the 
medium  in  which  the  thinker  exists.  They  form  a 
subjective  environment  of  individuals  so  vital  to  every 
act  that  they  are  valued  more  highly  than  the  native 
products  of  mental  activity.  Because  of  his  social 
proclivities,  each  individual  starts  life  with  a  super- 
valuation  of  the  acquired.  It  is  only  by  the  subordi- 
p  [651 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS,  OF  RELIGION 

nation  of  his  natural  instincts  to  his  social  needs  that 
survival  in  complex  conditions  is  possible. 

When  the  social  is  analyzed  into  its  elements,  in  the 
later  stages  of  thought  development,  fundamental  rela- 
tions seem  to  be  between  man  and  nature  and  not,  as 
before,  between  man  and  society.  This  stage,  however, 
comes  in  not  by  the  creation  of  new  faculties  but  by 
the  recognition  of  new  values.  There  is  but  one  type 
of  judgment ;  for  all  values  are  in  origin  vital,  sinking 
or  rising  as  new  forms  of  adjustment  place  men  in  closer 
relation  to  the  world  about  them.  Human  progress 
from  primitive  times  to  the  present  has  not  resulted 
from  the  evolution  of  additional  faculties,  but  from 
their  utilization  in  new  ways.  Each  stage  in  this 
progress  has  added  new  types  of  value  without  dis- 
placing the  earlier  ones  from  which  they  were  derived. 
The  evolution  of  thought  and  of  faculties  differs  in  that 
thought  changes  growing  out  of  new  vital  relations  are 
not  due  to  alterations  in  psychic  powers.  Thought 
changes  are  environment  changes  influencing  men 
through  the  appearance  of  ideas  produced  by  new  adjust- 
ments. Thought  change  is  thus  a  social  change,  not  a 
structural  change  within  the  mind  itself.  It  is  genetic 
in  growth  not  only  for  the  race  but  for  each  individual 
and  age.  Each  epoch  and  each  person  recapitulates 
the  thought  history  of  the  race ;  the  new  always  begins 

[661 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

with  crude  vital  values  which  are  gradually  transformed 
into  those  that  more  fully  express  our  complex  civili- 
zation. Nothing  is  lost ;  all  is  transformed.  Maturity 
keeps  active  the  values  of  childhood.  They  are  absent 
only  in  abnormality  or  old  age.  Thought  is  abnormal 
when  some  stage  is  omitted,  or  when  the  final  stage  is 
not  reached.  The  omission  or  displacement  of  stages 
of  thought  thus  affords  tests  of  abnormality  by  the  use 
of  which  we  can  judge  abnormal  thought  as  objectively 
as  we  can  abnormal  bodily  traits.  No  one  can  rightly 
take  his  subjective  states  or  social  ideas  as  ultimates 
until  he  has  tested  them  through  the  normal  standards 
of  his  age  and  race. 

Appearances  and  contradictions  are  indeed  made  by 
our  faculties,  but  it  is  to  abnormal  and  not  to  normal 
psychology  which  we  must  look  for  their  origin.  Every 
defective  faculty  presents  reality  in  a  distorted  fash- 
ion, with  resulting  contradictory  appearances.  But 
these  distortions  of  the  truth  are  temporary.  Ab- 
normal psychology  merely  reflects  the  defects  of  the 
environment.  The  normal  alone  is  carried  along  by 
our  heredity,  and  it  would,  if  dominant,  reflect  the 
real  and  make  an  ever  present  contrast  with  the  defects 
and  absurdities  of  abnormal  life.  It  is  otherwise  with 
the  social  process  by  which  our  ideas  are  formed.  It 
works  through  the  acquired  traits,  and  superimposes 

[671 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

the  values  of  each  moment  on  the  next.  In  the  earlier 
stages  of  human  progress  instincts  were  developed  that 
forced  each  person  to  do  what  his  immediate  future  de- 
manded. With  the  growth  of  complex  conditions  in- 
stincts became  less  effective  and  covered  less  fully  the 
field  of  human  activity.  Where  instinct  failed,  con- 
scious motives  and  acquired  traits  had  to  be  substituted, 
and  they  were  made  effective  only  as  values  increased. 
The  social  process  cares  nothing  for  error  unless  it  im- 
pedes action,  and  hence  it  seizes  every  combination,  no 
matter  if  inherently  contradictory,  to  attain  its  ends. 
Our  ideas  are  social,  and  become  individual  only  through 
the  routine  imposed  on  the  young  by  their  elders.  Each 
man  is  drilled  to  see  the  world  as  his  predecessors  saw  it, 
so  that  their  values  may  become  his  values.  Language, 
habit  and  social  conventions  all  conspire  to  give  us  a 
heritage  that  makes  appearances  seem  more  important 
than  the  fundamental  concepts  outside  the  social  pro- 
cess. Appearances  and  error  once  having  been  social- 
ized, it  is  difficult  to  get  rid  of  them,  even  if  they 
become  injurious.  The  social  perpetuates  itself  by 
repetition  and  imitation.  Another  principle  than  that 
which  originally  made  things  social  carries  them  along. 
Thought  becomes  social  through  its  value ;  it  continues 
social  through  the  routine  that  habit  and  imitation  im- 
pose. 

[68] 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

It  is  these  two  forces  together  —  valuation  and 
routine — that  make  the  social  process,  and  both  of  them 
are  elements  in  the  creation  of  appearance  and  the 
submergence  of  reality  beneath  the  temporary  interests 
that  impose  contradiction  and  inconsistency  upon  us. 
It  is  not  in  our  perceptions  but  in  our  thought  that  these 
inconsistencies  lie.  Our  faculties  have  developed  to 
make  perception  accurate ;  thought  has  developed  to  in- 
crease motives.  Thought  is  thus  so  blended  with  per- 
ception that  we  seem  to  have  a  unity  where  diversity 
exists.  The  error  of  thought  is  that  it  uses  past  values 
given  by  the  social  process  instead  of  present  values  at- 
tested by  our  faculties.  Each  moment  is  thus  domi- 
nated by  the  values  of  past  moments,  and  present  per- 
ception is  distorted  to  put  its  products  into  a  form  that 
conforms  to  the  need  of  the  past  reflected  in  the  present 
by  its  values.  To  the  real  of  the  present  is  added  the 
acquired  of  the  past,  and  the  two,  when  blended,  seem 
to  be  a  product  of  our  faculties.  The  simplicity  is,  how- 
ever, only  apparent.  There  is  always  an  inherent  con- 
tradiction when  the  social  has  been  blended  with  the 
natural,  for  thought  processes  and  psychical  processes 
neither  work  on  the  same  material  nor  have  the  same 
basis. 

There  is  only  one  way  that  thought  can  be  brought  into 
harmony  with  reality,  and  that  is  through  the  method  of 

[69] 


THE  SpCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

agreement.  y  No  inconsistencies  in  thought  exist  so  long 
as  it  is  used ;  for  it  has  none  of  the  errors  arising  from 
the  influence  of  values  on  thought.  To  get  at  reality 
we  must  eliminate  every  element  coming  from  defective 
faculties  or  from  social  values.  The  acquired  gives  us  a 
measure  of  the  social ;  sound  psychology  enables  us  to 
eliminate  the  abnormal.  Contradiction  and  inconsist- 
ency arise  from  the  influence  of  one  or  the  other  of  these 
sources.  The  purely  real  thus  becomes  the  truly  nor- 
mal —  the  residual  left  over  after  the  social  and  the  ab- 
normal have  been  eliminated.  This  is  not  something 
beyond  experience  but  the  essence  of  it.  The  normal 
is  as  much  a  part  of  the  present  as  the  social  or  abnormal. 
Cut  off  all  the  acquired  factors  and  disregard  the  psy- 
chic abnormalities  of  depressed  conditions,  and  a  simple 
reality  stands  revealed  that  may  be  tested  by  the  method 
of  agreement  and  verified  by  the  normal  as  seen  in 
the  present.  This  is  the  genetic  as  contrasted  with  the 
structural  view  of  thought,  and  is  a  legitimate  conse- 
quence of  the  displacement  of  the  mechanical  view  of  the 
universe  by  the  evolutionary.  The  genetic  has  origins 
and  consequences  but  no  is,  for  it  is  complete  not  in  a 
single  moment  but  only  in  a  series  of  events.  Change 
from  the  structural  to  the  genetic  viewpoint,  and  the 
present  of  things  and  ideas  is  not  their  elements  but 
their  value.     The    reality  of    things  is    their    origin 

[70] 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

and  consequences,  for  they  are  all  that  time  changes 
reveal. 

Is  thought  an  act  in  time  or  an  element  in  a  mech- 
anism? As  we  answer  this  question  we  decide 
whether  the  structural  or  the  genetic  shall  have  first 
place.  And  from  the  decision  flows  a  series  of  conse- 
quences that  determine  our  view  of  life  and  character. 
The  structural  view  puts  elements  in  the  foreground 
that  can  be  compounded  into  wholes.  Movement  be- 
comes less  important  than  its  machinery.  The  genetic, 
however,  is  synthetic,  and  its  reality  is  revealed  in 
the  normal,  which  expresses  for  the  moment  that  which 
extends  into  the  past  and  will  continue  into  the  future. 
The  abnormal  is  the  temporary,  the  defective,  the  un- 
real. The  normal  is  the  permanent,  the  abiding  and 
the  good. 

A  long  evolution  has  developed  in  man  two  powers, 
the  appreciation  of  objects  and  the  appreciation  of  ends. 
Each  of  these  has  undergone  many  changes,  but  the 
normal  man  has  both  of  them  in  a  well-developed  form. 
To  keep  life  going  is  fully  as  important  as  to  react  suc- 
cessfully against  external  objects,  and  the  mechanisms 
by  which  the  normal  is  preserved  are  as  fully  developed 
as  are  those  that  acquaint  us  with  external  objects. 
The  normal  includes  all  that  is  carried  along  from  gen- 
eration to  generation  by  the  physical  heredity  of  the 

[71] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

social  group.  Normal  men  have  enough  energy  to  pre- 
serve life  and  to  perpetuate  the  group.  The  subnormal 
lack  this  energy  or  in  some  way  have  a  defective  hered- 
ity. The  supernormal  have  the  complete  heredity  of 
the  normal,  but  more  energy  than  is  demanded  for  race 
preservation.  This  energy  is  used  for  ends  other  than 
race  perpetuation  and  makes  for  the  group  its  social 
values.  The  aims  and  ideals  of  society  are  thus  set  by 
the  supernormal  and  accepted  by  the  subnormal.  The 
imitative  instinct,  reenforced  by  social  suggestion,  is 
stronger  than  that  of  self-preservation.  The  whole 
society  is  thus  transformed  from  a  realistic  to  a  telic 
basis,  which  disregards  the  inherited  instincts  of  self- 
preservation  and  even  the  utilitarian  calculus  that  natu- 
rally dominates  men.  The  social  is  the  blending  of 
agreements  into  unity  so  that  they  may  become  the 
basis  of  action.  Thought  development  depends  on  the 
evolution  of  these  agreements,  and  through  them  the 
social  process  gains  in  strength  and  clearness  until  it 
is  woven  into  the  very  warp  of  our  being.  Differences 
do  not  blend  into  unity  the  way  agreements  do.  Never 
capable  of  interpretation,  they  remain  mere  limits  to 
activity  until  the  scientific  stage  of  progress  is  reached. 
Primitive  men  act  on  agreement  and  stop  at  the  per- 
ception of  difference.  All  early  motives  but  fear  are 
aroused  by  similarities,  which  invite  approach  and  as- 

[72] 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

similation.  The  blind  instinct  of  fear  is  the  only  unso- 
cial force,  and  it  is  active  enough  to  keep  men  out  of  the 
dangers  that  differences  create.  So  long  as  fear  is  domi- 
nant, thought  processes  do  not  need  to  recognize  differ- 
ences. The  evolution  of  thought  is  thus  social  until  the 
progress  of  mankind  has  gone  so  far  that  fear  is  no  longer 
a  sufficient  safeguard  against  evil.  Then  the  canons 
of  logic  are  extended  so  as  to  recognize  difference,  and 
science  comes  into  being. 

There  are  thus  three  stages  in  progress  from  the  reign 
of  instinct  to  that  of  reason.  In  the  first,  both  action 
and  defense  are  mechanical  reactions  against  the  stimuli 
of  the  environment.  In  the  second,  action  passes  be- 
yond the  instinctive  stage,  but  defense  and  protection 
remain  unchanged.  In  the  third  stage  fear  ceases  to 
afford  protection,  and  the  basis  of  defense  becomes  in- 
direct as  well  as  that  of  action.  The  second  stage  is  the 
social.  Defense  is  still  instinctive,  and  all  differences  are 
opposed  or  avoided.  In  this  respect  little  advance  is 
made  beyond  the  mere  animal  stage.  A  sharp,  clear 
demarcation  shuts  out  everything  except  what  has  a 
dominant  element  of  likeness .  Within  the  realm  of  agree- 
ments values  rule,  because  here  indirect  methods  dis- 
place the  direct.  The  social  is  the  resulting  expansion 
and  evolution  of  agreements.  A  vague,  hazy  opposition 
to  the  unlike  keeps  the  unfamiliar  beyond  the  realm  of 

[73] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

investigation.  Mankind  has  not  yet  passed  out  of  this 
stage,  for  slight  differences  in  race,  color  or  speech  still 
arouse  instinctive  distrust  and  prevent  the  awakening 
of  social  feelings.  If  this  is  still  partially  true,  we  can 
easily  imagine  the  earlier  social  stage  that  arbitrarily 
shut  out  differences  and  thus  kept  reasoning  within  the 
realm  of  agreements.  Then  the  first  canon  of  logic  was 
its  sole  canon.  The  only  ends  were  those  of  action,  and 
the  only  values  were  economic.  Men  measured  what 
they  did  by  its  consequences,  and  instinctively  rejected 
what  they  did  not  like.  The  consciousness  of  agreement 
arouses  the  motive  power  by  which  ends  are  reached  and 
the  vitality  of  the  race  preserved.  Ideas  are  agreements 
that  reveal  the  path  along  which  the  race  can  safely 
reach  its  ends.  They  bind  together  clear  perception  and 
effective  action,  gaining  in  value  as  they  stand  the  test 
of  experience. 

The  social  process,  however,  has  gone  beyond  the 
realm  of  testable  ideas  and  established  social  predicates 
that  no  individual  can  verify,  but  which,  nevertheless,  are 
acted  upon  by  every  normal  person.  The  social  forces 
compel  men  to  live  beyond  themselves  and  act  as  though 
they  were  supermen,  with  powers  and  faculties  above 
their  own.  Society  anticipates  evolution,  sets  stand- 
ards above  the  actual  and  makes  predicates  that  men 
act  on  but  cannot  verify.     The  progress  of  the  society 

[74] 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

living  up  to  them  or  acting  on  them  gives  them  their 
validity.  Only  the  complete  evolution  of  the  race  can 
test  them.  In  the  meantime,  we  move  along  the  lines 
that  society  has  found  workable  and  with  the  con- 
fidence that  past  experience  has  given  to  agreements 
and  actions  dictated  by  them.  The  social  predicates 
are  truths,  not  facts.  Through  their  pressure  the 
superman  of  to-day  becomes  the  normal  man  of  to- 
morrow. God,  reality,  causation,  responsibility r  and 
immortality  are  tested  elements  of  the  realm  towards 
which  the  race  is  pushing,  but  into  which  none  of  us 
can  go.  They  are  the  agreements  of  racial  experience 
raised  by  social  pressure  above  the  discord  and  im- 
perfection of  the  world  of  sense.  If  sin,  error,  skepti- 
cism and  pessimism  arise  out  of  local  and  special  differ- 
ences not  yet  harmonized  with  the  wholes  of  which  they 
are  parts,  agreements  that  ignore  them  have  a  social 
validity  that  no  empirical  evidence  can  overthrow. 

Of  these  predicates  the  concept  of  God  is  most  impor- 
tant and  also  most  liable  to  misconception.  The  popu- 
lar conception  starts  with  some  depreciation  of  men,  and 
thus  makes  room  for  a  God  to  fill  in  the  gap  between 
man  and  perfection.  Some  larger  task  is  thus  assigned 
to  Him  of  which  men  are  incapable,  with  the  resulting 
dependence  of  men  on  their  Creator,  Judge  or  Ruler.  A 
God  of  tribulation,  poverty  and  disease  is  a  consolation 

[75] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

in  disaster,  and  the  accompanying  philosophy  always 
springs  into  prominence  when  nations,  races  or  con- 
ditions decay.  This  functional  God,  however,  is  not  a 
social  predicate.  Socially,  God  is  purpose,  not  cause ; 
will  not  function.  He  shapes  ends,  not  beginnings.  He 
is  the  eternal  purpose  that  runs  through  events,  and  not 
the  force  that  initiates  them.  He  does  not  supplement 
men  and  society ;  he  does  what  they  do  on  a  larger  scale, 
with  a  better  plan  and  in  more  efficient  ways.  We  rise 
as  we  accept  His  will  and  bring  our  plans  in  line  with 
His.  The  social  God  is  telic,  not  functional,  and  is 
made  manifest  in  the  progress  of  men  and  not  in  their 
failures. 

These  two  concepts  are  so  blended  in  religious  thought 
that  they  seem  one,  and  yet  they  are  opposing  concepts 
due  to  radically  different  conditions.  They  arise  from 
the  relative  emphasis  which  thinkers  give  to  the  con- 
cepts of  space  and  time.  If  the  universe  is  pictured  as 
an  object  in  space,  and  all  its  contents  are  measured  in 
spatial  terms,  God  acquires  a  different  meaning  from 
that  He  has  if  the  universe  is  thought  of  as  a  process 
in  time.  Matter  and  energy  each  represent  a  view  of 
the  universe,  the  one  in  terms  of  space  and  the  other  in 
terms  of  time.  The  mental  process,  however,  by  which 
we  attain  these  two  views  of  the  universe  is  the  same. 
Ask  for  foundations;    separate  them  from  the  super- 

[76] 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

structure,  and  the  spatial  view  of  reality  is  acquired. 
Ask  for  continuity  and  activity;  view  as  temporary 
everything  that  does  not  continuously  manifest  itself, 
and  we  exclude  from  the  ultimates  of  the  universe  all 
temporary  conjunctions  and  dead  relations.  What  is 
it,  however,  that  has  continuity  and  activity  but  no 
permanent  spatial  form?  We  must  ask  this  question 
to  get  a  clear  contrast  between  space  and  time  realities, 
and  we  must  acquire  habits  of  thought  that  make 
continuity  and  activity  persistent  before  the  crust  of 
habit  will  be  broken,  favoring  a  spatial  view  of  the 
universe. 

Philosophy,  following  the  lead  of  the  earlier  physical 
sciences,  has  committed  itself  thoroughly  to  the  spacial 
view.  The  social  sciences  have  at  least  partially  freed 
themselves  from  its  control,  and  it  is  in  them  that  a 
better  development  of  time  concepts  has  taken  place. 
This  has  been  due  to  the  need  of  using  history  and  to 
the  fact  that  the  units  making  a  society  are  not  per- 
manent. The  units  representing  the  normal  type  are 
constantly  changing,  and  yet  the  type  persists  and  gives 
to  nations  their  unity  and  history.  The  normal  is 
thus  a  time  concept  as  important  in  its  field  as  is  the 
corresponding  concept  of  matter  in  the  realm  of  space. 
Shut  out  all  the  incidental  qualities  of  material  things, 
and  the  concept  of  atoms  arises.     Shut  out  the  tern- 

[771 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

porary  qualities  of  men,  and  the  normal  is  the  endur- 
ing residual.  The  abnormal  is  always  prominent  and 
apparently  dominant,  yet  it  is  only  a  temporary  phase 
which  is  constantly  reappearing  but  never  enduring. 
Back  of  it  are  the  normal  processes  which  hold  human- 
ity to  its  standards  and  from  which  alone  the  trend  of 
progress  is  ascertainable.  The  real  is  that  which  may 
be  incorporated  into  the  normal.  All  that  is  normal 
is  real.  All  that  is  real  may  be  made  normal.  It  is 
not  the  oneness  of  things  but  the  oneness  of  type  that 
gives  unity  to  the  universe. 

To  show  that  time  concepts  are  fundamental,  and  not 
an  offspring  of  those  of  space,  needs  a  thorough  realiza- 
tion of  the  fact  that  all  ideas  are  social  and  the  result 
of  a  process  instead  of  being  immediately  given  or 
psychologically  made.  To  socialize  an  act  through 
habit  and  imitation  and  to  conceptualize  an  element 
in  consciousness  are  different  phases  of  one  process. 
We  cannot  form  and  retain  a  concept  except  as  it  is 
passed  over  to  others,  and  its  usefulness  is  tested  in  their 
experience  as  well  as  ours.  The  concepts  a  man  uses 
are  not  the  full  reality  of  his  experience,  but  only  that 
part  of  it  which  has  been  socialized.  Conceptualized 
time  is  the  part  of  time  reality  that  has  been  socialized, 
and  for  like  reasons  conceptualized  space  are  those 
elements  in  space  reality  that  have  become  socially 

[78] 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

useful,  and  hence  constantly  revived  and  passed  on 
by  social  habit.  Concepts  in  neither  case  are  taken 
directly  from  reality  by  perception,  but  are  imposed 
on  individuals  by  the  social  process  antecedent  to 
experience.  They  are  never  all  of  reality.  There  is 
always  a  residual  in  reality  which  concepts  never 
reveal. 

Concepts  are  a  heritage,  not  an  individual  creation. 
They  always  fall  short  of  the  real  because  they  repre- 
sent the  socially  useful,  and  are  never  modified  or 
enlarged  except  as  new  aspects  of  nature  become  im- 
portant to  men.  Beyond  them  is  always  a  residual 
that  is  constantly  encroached  upon  by  the  growth  of 
thought,  but  is  never  exhausted.  The  normal  repre- 
sents the  parts  of  the  social  process  that  are  complete ; 
the  residual  is  the  beyond,  always  directing  men's 
efforts,  but  never  being  completely  absorbed  in  the 
normal.  The  supernormal  includes  elements  of  the 
residual  plainly  in  sight  but  not  yet  embodied  into  nor- 
mal life.  By  it  the  normal  is  elevated,  and  the  social 
is  extended  into  new  fields.  The  link  between  the  unin- 
corporated residual  and  the  normal  is  thus  the  super- 
normal, and  to  it  all  the  telic  processes  are  due.  The 
normal  must  move  towards  the  supernormal,  which  is 
made  real  by  the  elements  of  the  residual  capable  of 
being  incorporated  into  the  normal. 

F791 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

It  is  a  practical  reversal  of  our  religious  education  to 
associate  God  with  the  residual  instead  of  the  primary 
forces  of  nature ;  and  yet  this  is  what  we  are  compelled 
to  do  if  we  shift  over  from  a  view  of  the  universe  that 
makes  space  concepts  fundamental  to  one  that  gives 
a  first  place  to  those  of  time.  Space  reality  demands 
a  basis  on  which  the  shifting,  unstable  sensual  appear- 
ances can  rest.  God  thus  becomes  that  from  which  all 
else  springs  and  through  which  it  obtains  its  unity. 
This  concept  of  God  is  made  real  by  the  feeling  of  de- 
pravity so  firmly  associated  with  religious  life.  We 
feel  that  there  is  something  in  us  that  leads  to  destruc- 
tion unless  our  weaknesses  are  supplemented  by  a  power 
higher  and  stronger  than  ourselves.  To  think  of  God 
as  a  residual  force  demands  that  we  put  the  normal 
in  the  foreground,  instead  of  missing  functions  and 
depravity.  Both  these  concepts  presuppose  the  normal, 
and  would  be  meaningless  without  it ;  and  yet  the  ordi- 
nary person  has  had  depravity  so  thoroughly  impressed 
on  him  by  the  imperfections  of  life  that  he  thinks  of 
humanity  as  being  in  a  subnormal  condition,  and  thus 
without  hope  except  by  the  intervention  of  the  super- 
natural. The  corresponding  concepts  in  time  reality 
are  parts  of  experience.  The  subnormal,  the  normal, 
the  supernormal  and  the  residual  are  all  within  expe- 
rience and  are  separated  by  no  absolute  lines.  The  nor- 

[80] 


THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

mal  can  sink  into  the  subnormal  or  rise  into  the  super- 
normal, and  the  residual,  although  indefinite  and  un- 
measurable,  is  always  in  sight  and  is  incorporated  into 
the  normal  by  every  progressive  social  change.  God  and 
man  are  not  distinct  in  kind,  but  as  man  incorporates 
the  godlike  into  himself  by  his  social  progress,  newer 
views  of  the  residual  that  lie  between  himself  and  per- 
fection make  God  appear  to  be  even  more  different 
from  himself  than  He  formerly  seemed  to  be.  God  is 
a  being  on  whose  trail  we  always  are,  but  whom  we 
never  can  overtake.  We  approach  Him  only  to  find 
ourselves  farther  off  than  before. 


[81] 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  STAGES  OF  THOUGHT  DEVELOPMENT 


* 


VI 


Of  the  various  attempts  to  coordinate  the  sciences, 
that  of  Comte  is  the  best  known.  Each  member  in 
his  series  is  more  special  than  the  one  before  it,  and 
depends  upon  the  facts  of  all  the  sciences  preceding  it. 
The  first  and  most  general  of  the  sciences  is  thus  astron- 
omy, while  the  last  in  order,  and  most  concrete,  is  soci- 
ology. Between  them  come  physics,  chemistry  and 
biology  in  the  order  named,  with  a  possible  place  for 
psychology,  when  this  subject  gets  its  facts  well  enough 
coordinated  to  show  its  worth.  Back  of  this  scheme, 
however,  and  serving  as  its  basis,  is  Comte's  doc- 
trine of  stages  in  human  thought.  In  the  early  epochs 
of  history  men  are  theological;  then  they  become 
metaphysical,  and  finally  positive  in  their  thinking. 
The  theologian  disappears  before  the  philosopher,  and 
he  in  turn  gives  way  to  the  man  of  science.  The 
scientist  does  not  start  in  a  virgin  field,  but  begins  his 
work  after  myth,  superstition,  creed  and  dogma  have 
been  formed  by  the  theologian  and  further  distorted 
by  the  metaphysician. 

If  Comte 's  conclusions  are  to  be  doubted,  the  real 
[85] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

issue  is  not  to  be  taken  with  the  sequence  of  the  sciences, 
but  with  the  preliminary  work  by  which  the  field  is 
cleared  for  scientific  investigation.  If  it  is  asked  how 
did  the  philosophers  displace  the  theologians  ?  the  reply 
must  be,  "Mainly  through  their  skepticism  and  pessi- 
mism.* '  It  is  true  that  the  philosophers  had  dogmas, 
but  they  laid  the  foundation  for  their  principles  through 
skepticism  and  not  through  positive  research.  Comte 
overthrows  metaphysics  by  using  the  skepticism  phi- 
losophers devised  to  discredit  the  theologians,  and  thus 
clears  the  field  for  the  positive  methods  of  the  sciences. 
In  this  way  skepticism  lies  at  the  basis  of  Comte's 
system.  If  the  philosophers  were  wrong  in  using  it  to 
discredit  theology,  Comte  is  in  the  wrong  when  he  em- 
ploys it  to  clear  the  field  for  positivism. 

What,  then,  is  the  basis  of  skepticism  ?  Here  is  the 
fundamental  problem  on  which  all  else  turns.  Skep- 
ticism cannot  be  made  the  logical  starting  point  of 
science  if  it  presupposes  the  very  things  that  science 
must  establish.  To  be  skeptical  we  set  up  objective 
standards  so  that  the  object  under  criticism  is  judged 
by  something  different  from,  and  superior  to,  itself. 
Skeptical  conclusions  thus  depend  on  the  truth  of  the 
second  logical  canon,  the  method  of  difference.  And 
this  method  can  seldom  be  used  except  where  experi- 
mentation is  possible.     It  presupposes  the  uniformity 


THE   STAGES   OF  THOUGHT   DEVELOPMENT 

of  nature,  and  thus  cannot  be  used  to  prove  the  very 
law  its  premises  assert.  To  doubt  involves  an  affirma- 
tion, and  no  doubt  is  effective  unless  it  assumes  some 
antecedent  objective  truth.  Theology  and  metaphysics 
must  have  left  something  positive,  or  science  would  have 
been  unable  to  start  on  its  most  useful  mission. 

In  contrast  to  the  method  of  skepticism  is  that  of 
interpretation.  If  skepticism  fails  to  give  a  starting 
point,  it  is  worth  while  to  test  what  interpretation  can 
do.  It  depends  on  the  principle  of  identity  and  simi- 
larity, or,  in  other  words,  on  the  first  canon  of  logic. 
The  method  of  agreement  is  based  on  observation,  and 
decides  which  of  two  similars  is  simpler,  clearer  or  more 
valuable.  The  method  is  always  positive,  never  nega- 
tive. There  is  a  comparison  of  A  with  B,  and  the  con- 
clusion is  merely  that  A  and  B  are  identical,  or  that 
B  is  not  like  A,  and  hence  has  none  of  its  qualities  or 
value.  Two  like  objects  have  the  same  value,  but  if 
they  are  unlike,  the  inherent  value  of  the  whole  lies  in 
only  one  of  them.  The  other,  a  nonessential,  is  thrown 
aside  as  spurious.  Interpretation  thus  simplifies  and 
brings  to  the  fore  the  great  objects  of  human  interest. 
Its  method  is  always  positive.  It  adds  to  social  values, 
enunciates  principles,  and  gives  simplicity  to  whatever 
it  is  applied.  The  evolution  of  thought  it  promotes 
retains  the  essence  of  each  stage  to  form  the  basis  of 

[871 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

the  next.  The  crude  beliefs  of  the  primitive  world  are 
refined  and  elevated,  until  they  finally  appear  so  dif- 
ferent from  what  they  were  that  they  seem  new  crea- 
tions. They  are,  however,  the  same  beliefs  in  a  new 
guise,  for  the  evolution  of  thought  has  been  positive 
except  where  it  has  been  disturbed  by  skepticism.  Had 
philosophers  used  positive  methods,  this  view  would 
have  been  clearly  established  long  ago ;  but  in  their 
haste  to  overthrow  theology  they  used  the  cruder  and 
faster  working  tools  of  skepticism,  with  the  result  that 
they  fashioned  weapons  which  discredited  their  own 
work  and  forced  science  into  an  illogical  position. 

Physical  science  deals  in  uniformities ;  social  science 
deals  in  values.  Which  is  the  older  viewpoint,  and 
which  helps  us  most  in  understanding  the  evolution 
of  thought  ?  It  is  so  generally  admitted  that  the  first 
stage  of  thought  is  theological  that  we  will  hardly  do 
wrong  to  begin  our  investigation  there.  Folklore, 
myths,  superstitions  and  creeds  are  so  plainly  matters 
of  belief  that  the  verification  they  found  in  the  primitive 
mind  must  have  been  based  on  their  usefulness.  All 
original  values  are  handed  down  from  generation  to 
generation  as  beliefs  formulated  in  creeds  and  moral 
codes.  The  acquisition  of  the  useful  thing  creates  a 
social  habit  which  in  turn  crystallizes  into  social  law. 
As  old  usages  sink  into  superstition,  new  ones  more 

[881 


THE   STAGES  OF   THOUGHT   DEVELOPMENT 

suited  to  progress  spring  up  to  support  the  social  fabric. 
Values  grow  in  every  society  and  form  the  test  of  prog- 
ress. The  metaphysician  tries  to  get  a  basis  for  these 
values  by  attaching  them  to  something  beyond.  This 
would  have  been  a  useful  process  if  he  had  not  com- 
bined it  with  skepticism  in  a  crude  and  forceful  attempt 
to  destroy  primitive  beliefs.  The  result,  however,  was 
confusion  and  the  need  of  a  new  start;  for  skepticism 
utilized  its  advantages  so  skillfully  that  it  discredited 
first  principles  of  philosophy  as  fully  as  it  did  old 
religious  beliefs. 

The  new  start  lacks  a  good  name  because  the  two 
names  often  applied  to  it  have  associations  that  mis- 
lead. To  call  it  utilitarian  is  to  associate  it  with  a 
narrow  type  of  morality ;  and  to  call  it  economic  brings 
to  mind  modern  business  problems  instead  of  those  of 
the  primitive  world.  In  a  broad  sense  economy  is 
the  relation  of  effort  to  return,  and  in  the  economic 
world  beliefs,  like  goods,  rise  in  value  as  they  increase 
the  surplus  of  reward  above  effort.  At  the  basis  of 
every  economy  are  two  laws :  the  law  of  parsimony 
and  of  the  uniformity  of  nature.  We  now  attribute 
the  uniformity  of  nature  to  science,  and  this  is  true 
if  we  think  only  of  the  modern  extensions  of  the  law 
that  have  given  it  universal  validity.  But  the  earlier 
examples  of  the  law  were  found  in  agriculture,  com- 

1891 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

merce  and  industry.  The  return  of  the  seasons,  the 
growth  of  crops  and  the  propagation  of  plants  and 
animals  taught  men  the  uniformity  of  nature  long 
before  laboratories  were  thought  of.  All  these  uni- 
formities were  capable  of  direct  observation,  and  were 
useful  in  pushing  men  over  from  a  nomad  state  to 
agriculture  and  commerce.  The  nomad  could  truly 
be  called  a  theologian  and  a  metaphysician,  while  the 
agriculturist  was  a  utilitarian  and  an  economist. 

Comte  was  wrong  in  saying  that  the  positive  stage 
of  thought  follows  the  metaphysical.  Had  he  lived  in 
our  day,  he  probably  would  have  made  the  pragmatic 
the  third  stage  instead  of  the  positive.  The  contrast 
between  the  metaphysical  and  pragmatic  is  clearer  and 
more  important.  The  metaphysical  judges  through 
causes  and  antecedents.  The  pragmatic,  through 
consequences.  This  change  in  thought  clearly  marks 
one  of  its  epochs.  In  social  science  economic  interpre- 
tation is  also  a  judgment  through  consequences,  and 
therefore  a  part  of  the  same  thought  epoch.  The  real 
contrast  is  with  the  historical  method,  judging  the  pres- 
ent through  its  antecedents.  Comte's  method  is  his- 
torical, and  thus  he  falls  into  the  errors  natural  to  ration- 
alism. It  may  be  a  question  what  he  would  do  if  he  had 
our  knowledge  and  mental  attitude.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  but  that  we  should  divide  the  development  of 

[90] 


THE   STAGES  OF  THOUGHT   DEVELOPMENT 

thought  into  different  stages  from  what  he  did  and  make 
the  order  of  its  development  social  instead  of  rational. 

There  is  also  in  his  plan  a  mixture  of  two  thought 
movements,  the  one  that  the  race  follows  in  its  uplift, 
and  the  other  that  the  individual  follows  in  his  growth. 
The  stages  in  race  progress  are  all  positive,  and  follow 
changes  in  the  social  attitude.  In  this  way  we  get  the 
theological,  the  metaphysical  and  the  pragmatic.  The 
individual,  however,  begins  in  an  epoch  of  faith,  after 
which  comes  an  epoch  of  depression  and  skepticism, 
and  this  in  turn  is  followed  by  an  epoch  of  idealistic 
realization.  Depression  and  skepticism  are  an  almost 
universal  stage  in  the  forward  movement  of  individual 
thought,  but  he  who  outgrows  it  may  pass  on  to  an 
idealism  that  gives  a  vision  of  remarkable  clearness 
and  power.  The  social,  however,  has  stages  neither  of 
skepticism  nor  of  idealism.  They  reflect  merely  a  per- 
sonal movement  of  thought,  which  becomes  a  source 
of  confusion  when  attempts  are  made  to  give  it  a 
social  basis.  Individuals  tend  to  become  idealistic, 
but  the  societies  of  which  they  are  a  part  move  steadily 
towards  the  pragmatic  goal.  The  forward  movement 
of  thought  is  thus  from  theology  through  metaphysics 
to  pragmatism.  The  epoch  of  science  comes  much  later, 
and  is  not  so  much  a  new  epoch  as  a  wider  extension 
and  a  fuller  appreciation  of  the  uniformity  of  nature. 

foil 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

The  oldest  and  best-established  uniformity  is  that 
between  effort  and  reward.  When  this  is  perceived, 
men  begin  to  judge  acts  by  their  consequences,  and  social 
values  arise,  displacing  the  primitive  beliefs  which 
recognize  no  causal  relation.  The  will  of  man  may  be 
or  may  not  be  itself  caused,  but  the  consequences  of 
acts  can  be  definitely  foreseen  and  measured.  The  first 
predictions  thus  relate  to  happiness  and  misery  and 
create  the  social  values  we  call  utilitarian.  This  early 
economic  stage  of  thought,  with  its  empirical  standards, 
did  not  abide.  Men  pressed  on  to  a  higher  level  not  by 
displacing  empiricism  but  by  transforming  its  cruder 
values  into  higher  forms.  Logic  is  a  device  to  test 
values.  It  gives  to  each  part  of  an  economic  whole  the 
value  that  makes  its  continuance  or  reproduction  pos- 
sible. The  law  of  parsimony  is  but  a  general  state- 
ment of  the  economic  law  of  the  greatest  gain  for  the 
least  effort.  Keep  economics  concrete  and  logic  ab- 
stract, and  the  two  seem  to  depend  on  separate  mental 
processes  and  predicate  the  existence  of  distinct  facul- 
ties. If,  however,  the  logical  process  does  not  affirm 
reality,  and  the  law  of  causation  is  a  social,  not  an  ob- 
jective fact,  it  has  nothing  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
process  of  valuation  the  economists  use  when  they  com- 
pare the  utilities  which  various  articles  possess.  Value 
measures  effort  through  product,  cause  through  conse- 

[92] 


THE   STAGES   OF  THOUGHT   DEVELOPMENT 

quence  and  the  object  through  the  feelings  it  evokes. 
Logical  values  impute  to  the  part  the  value  of  the 
whole.  The  laws  of  logic  are  thus  the  laws  of  imputing 
utility,  the  same  laws  that  the  economist  uses  to  measure 
utility  in  any  complex  act  of  production  or  consump- 
tion. To  judge  by  consequences  is  the  utilitarian  or 
moral  stage  of  progress;  to  judge  consequences  by 
their  antecedents  is  the  economic  or  logical  stage.  The 
one  gives  prominence  to  the  empirical  measures  of  value, 
while  the  other  uses  deductive  tests.  The  end  of  logic 
is  thus  to  test  the  imputation  of  value  following  the  use 
of  social  predicates.  The  belief  in  the  whole  implies 
a  belief  in  the  parts.  Every  right  imputation  increases 
efficiency,  while  every  wrong  imputation  creates  misery 
and  maladjustments.  Logic  thus  prevents  waste,  and 
is  the  first  form  of  the  conservation  of  energy.  We 
must  recognize  and  conserve  human  energy  before  we 
can  that  of  the  universe. 

Much  of  the  confusion  about  the  relation  of  logic 
to  social  facts  arises  from  the  overemphasis  of  space 
concepts.  Sensations  and  material  objects  relate  to 
space,  and  they  create  contrasts  more  definite  and  more 
easily  seen  than  those  of  time.  The  result  is  that  they 
have  received  greater  attention,  and  when  men  begin 
to  doubt  they  start  with  denying  time  relations.  The 
ultimates  of  the  universe  are  thus  shifted  over  into 

[931 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

space,  and  reality  is  defined  in  its  terms.  Exclude  the 
genetic  from  thought,  and  a  static  universe  is  manifest. 
Exclude,  however,  all  space  relations,  and  the  resulting 
categories  give  a  view  of  the  universe  that  cannot  be 
so  readily  unified,  and  if  pictured,  it  must  be  not  as  a 
mechanism  but  as  a  movement.  All  mechanisms  are 
spacial ;   time  is  a  process,  not  a  completed  whole. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  the  subordination  of  time  to 
space  which  has  taken  place  in  philosophy  when  we 
realize  how  it  has  been  helped  on  by  the  growth  of 
language.  The  older  substantives  are  spatial  concepts 
because  the  interests  of  the  primitive  man  are  material. 
Things  are  his  reals,  for  on  them  his  welfare  depends. 
He  thinks  of  time  through  the  modifications  it  makes 
in  things,  and  hence  the  words  he  uses  to  describe 
change  are  adjectives.  When  conscious  materialism 
begins  in  a  later  epoch,  this  state  of  the  language  favors 
the  contention  that  the  essence  of  things  is  material. 
All  primary  qualities  are  now  said  to  be  spatial.  Only 
the  extended  is  real.  In  this  way  time  relations  appear 
to  be  secondary  qualities  having  no  place  among  the 
ultimates  of  the  universe.  This  advantage  in  sug- 
gestive power  has  been  largely  lost  by  the  later  devel- 
opments of  language  due  to  the  increase  of  scientific 
knowledge.  Many  time  concepts  have  a  substantive 
form  of  expression,  so  that  we  may  think  in  terms  of  time 

[94] 


THE   STAGES  OF  THOUGHT  DEVELOPMENT 

almost  as  readily  as  in  those  of  space.  We  can  excuse 
Hume,  Kant  and  others  of  their  age  for  their  over- 
emphasis of  space,  but  the  same  emphasis  to-day  is 
due  merely  to  habit,  continuing  modes  of  thought  that 
should  be  modified  or  displaced.  With  our  improved 
language  it  is  no  more  difficult  to  think  in  terms  of 
energy  than  of  matter,  and  we  can  picture  the  world 
as  a  process  quite  as  readily  as  an  abstract  "thing  in 
itself."  For  the  purpose  of  contrast  I  shall  place  our 
leading  space  and  time  concepts  in  parallel  columns. 
This  will  help  the  reader  to  judge  which  are  to  him  the 
clearer  and  more  fundamental. 


Matter 

Form 

Position 

Perfection 

The  infinite 

The  real 

The  omniscient 

Structure 

Static 

Force 

A  thing  in  itself 

The  absolute 

God  as  creator 

Materialism 


Energy 

Motion 

Activity 

Evolution 

The  normal 

The  valuable 

The  supernormal 

Function 

Dynamic 

Will 

A  process 

The  genetic 

God  as  purpose 

Idealism 


95] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

The  spatial  terms  need  no  explanation,  but  it  may  be 
worth  while  to  bring  out  more  fully  the  time  element 
in  some  of  the  words  in  the  other  column.  The  normal 
is  the  present  of  that  which  has  had  a  past  and  will 
have  a  future.  It  is  thus  a  time  concept,  even  if 
it  perpetually  renews  itself  in  material  forms.  The 
supplement  to  the  normal  is  the  supernormal,  but  the 
line  between  the  two  must  not  be  drawn  in  the  same  way 
as  between  the  corresponding  space  concepts.  The 
supernatural  implies  being  completely  outside  of  nature, 
and  the  superhuman  is  divorced  from  organic  life,  but 
the  supernormal  is  natural  and  in  some  of  its  expres- 
sions it  may  be  human.  The  best  of  men  continually 
reach  out  beyond  the  normal  and  incorporate  in  them- 
selves some  of  the  supernormal.  The  normal  is  con- 
stantly rising  and  making  the  supernormal  a  part  of 
itself.  The  supernormal  thus  loses  on  one  hand  through 
the  growth  of  the  normal,  and  gains  on  the  other  through 
a  clearer  concept  of  the  process  by  which  the  universe 
unfolds  itself.  It  is  not  an  independent  whole,  but  a 
residual  always  losing  to  the  normal,  but  never  disap- 
pearing. This  residual  element  separates  time  con- 
cepts from  those  of  space.  Evolution  is  always  going 
on,  but  never  complete.  Processes  find  new  energy  to 
continue  them.  Unity  and  perfection  are  spatial. 
Time  is  full  of  residuals  that  block  their  attainment. 

[96] 


THE   STAGES  OF  THOUGHT   DEVELOPMENT 

The  stages  of  thought  thus  far  enumerated  are  due 
to  positive  evolution  based  on  interpretation  and  the 
use  of  the  canon  of  agreement ;  the  age  of  faith  is  thus 
transformed  into  the  age  of  dogmatic  assertion ;  this  is 
displaced  by  the  moral  stage,  where  acts  are  measured 
by  their  consequences  ;  and  then  comes  the  age  of  logical 
valuation  and  economic  deduction,  which  tests  the  impu- 
tation of  social  values  and  brings  out  clearly  the  rela- 
tion of  effort  to  result,  cause  and  consequence,  will  and 
achievement.  Social  values  are  thus  dissolved  into 
their  elements,  while  their  clear  ideas  and  ultimate 
predicates  are  measured  by  their  intrinsic,  and  not  by 
their  imputed  worth.  When  this  is  done,  the  basis  for 
the  age  of  experimentation  is  laid  and  the  second  canon 
of  logic,  the  method  of  difference,  can  be  used  to  test 
everything  not  bound  up  in  social  predicates.  Social 
units  never  can  be  tested  experimentally  because  the 
parts  cannot  be  isolated  from  their  wholes. 

Society  is  a  process,  not  an  objective  fact  open  to 
observation.  The  past  and  the  present  are  so  inti- 
mately related  that  the  one  cannot  be  understood 
without  a  knowledge  of  the  other.  The  traditions, 
habits  and  modes  of  thought  coming  from  the  past 
have  not  remained  unchanged,  so  that  they  give  us  a 
correct  account  of  past  events.  What  we  call  the 
past  is  not  the  pure  past  in  the  way  that  atoms  and 
a  [97] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

extension  are  pure  space.  The  past  is  made  by  the 
present,  or  at  least  so  reshaped  that  its  purity  as  a  past 
event  is  lost.  What  we  know  of  the  past  is  altered 
by  every  new  force  that  makes  the  present.  What 
made  yesterday  also  makes  to-day.  If  we  understand 
these  forces,  and  get  a  clear  view  of  the  normal  connect- 
ing the  past  with  the  present  and  running  through  both 
of  them,  the  main  elements  for  the  interpretation  of 
past  records  are  at  hand.  The  true  past  has  left  no 
record.  The  social  process  carries  along  nothing  but 
what  is  of  use  in  the  present,  and  that  it  remodels 
to  meet  present  needs.  The  valueless  drops  out  of 
memory,  is  lost  sight  of  by  the  historian  and  is  elimi- 
nated by  the  thought  processes  that  are  centered  on 
the  present.  We  must  know  the  present  to  know  the 
past,  for  only  through  its  laws  and  pressure  can  we 
discover  the  way  the  past  has  been  altered  to  meet  our 
needs.  These  facts  give  validity  to  the  economic 
interpretation  of  history  and  make  it  necessary  to  begin 
a  study  of  social  science  within  the  realm  of  economics. 
The  moving  values  of  to-day  are  economic,  and  through 
them  is  the  best  entrance  to  the  study  of  the  forces 
shaping  the  present  and  thus  determining  normal  life. 
So  much  for  the  general  principle.  Time  forces 
must  be  studied  in  the  present  and  not  in  their  records. 
The  present  of  the  past  is  its  values,  which  remain  the 

[98] 


THE   STAGES   OF  THOUGHT   DEVELOPMENT 

one  sure  test  of  how  past  activities  react  in  the  present. 
Records,  traditions,  words  and  thought  only  tell  us  how 
the  past  appears  in  the  present,  but  not  its  real  essence. 
The  constantly  repeated  is  the  true,  and  this  is  the 
normal.  Conditions  make  values,  values  make  motives, 
motives  shape  character  and  character  is  the  index  of 
normality.  All  the  real  is  thus  in  the  present  and  can 
be  observed  at  first  hand.  We  can  only  unfold  the 
present  by  starting  with  conditions  and  ending  with  a 
study  of  the  normal  life  that  matches  them.  Condi- 
tions, and  not  antecedents,  are  the  source  from  which 
the  social  sciences  arise.  Antecedents  are  thought, 
not  reality,  and  have  in  them  the  errors  that  our  thought 
processes  create  or  absorb  from  the  social  medium  in 
which  they  arise. 

The  beginnings  of  social  science  thus  being  in  present 
conditions,  economics  is  the  first  social  science  and  the 
basis  on  which  all  the  others  rest.  To  go  out  from  the 
present  practically  means  to  go  out  from  economics,  for 
it  is  the  science  of  normal  life  and  its  values.  If  all 
time  antecedents  are  appearances,  the  data  of  to-day's 
life  must  be  studied  to  get  the  key  by  which  past  records 
and  memories  can  be  understood.  There  is  another 
view,  however,  which  gives  the  same  results  without 
so  much  abstract  thinking.  The  traits  of  men  are 
either  natural  or  acquired.     Conditions  act  on  men 

[991 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

through  their  acquired  characters.  The  routine  of  life 
is  impressed  on  individuals  from  without  with  such 
force  that  the  natural  characters  are  suppressed.  We 
cannot  begin  with  a  study  of  natural  characters,  because 
they  are  revealed  to  us  only  in  such  mixtures  with 
acquired  traits  that  our  observations  have  little  value 
unless  we  have  first  measured  the  extent  and  activity 
of  the  acquired  characters.  Most  of  the  social,  as  well 
as  the  economic,  forces  lie  within  the  realm  of  acquired 
characters  and  give  them  their  dominance.  What  we 
think  to  be  natural  is  mainly  acquired.  Tradition  and 
economic  routine  mold  our  lives  so  early  and  firmly 
that  we  accept  their  impressments  as  a  part  of  our- 
selves. The  acquired  characters  must  therefore  be 
studied  first,  and  then  the  social  process  by  which  the 
acquired  traits  are  impressed.  Only  when  these  two 
are  thoroughly  understood  can  natural^  characters  be 
investigated  to  advantage.  They  are  a  residual  which 
in  real  life  becomes  isolated  enough  to  make  scientific 
study  possible  only  as  a  remnant  for  which  the  laws 
of  acquired  traits  can  give  no  explanation. 

The  peculiarities  of  religion  are  due  to  these  facts. 
It  is  not  an  instinct  nor  any  single  motive,  but  a  com- 
plex due  to  the  pressure  of  external  conditions  on  deep- 
seated  race  traits.  The  external  conditions  are  mainly 
economic;    the   internal  reactions  they   arouse   make 

[1001 


THE   STAGES   OF  THOUGHT   DEVELOPMENT 

social  psychology.  The  form  of  religion  in  any  age  is 
due  to  the  interaction  of  these  forces,  and  it  has  devel- 
oped as  men  have  become  more  conscious  pf  the  inherent 
opposition  between  the  pressure  that  creates  routine 
and  the  freedom  which  permits  a»  £ull ;  8X}>res3ioju  ;cf 
inherited  traits.  This  opposition  takes  on  a  social 
form  when  it  becomes  manifest  that  external  pressure 
lowers  vitality  and  eliminates  the  weak.  To  sink  to  a 
lower  level  of  vitality  is  degeneration.  To  reincorpo- 
rate the  weak  into  society  demands  their  regeneration. 
Degeneration  and  regeneration  are  thus  complementary 
themes,  and  from  their  union  comes  the  plan  of  salva- 
tion that  is  the  center  of  religious  thought. 

Religion  is  thus  a  natural  movement  based  on  social 
feeling,  and  focused  by  external  conditions.  It  is  an 
expression  of  a  reaction  against  conflict,  degeneration 
and  depravity.  God's  activity  is  the  complement 
of  men's  endeavors  to  restore  the  normal  and  to 
elevate  social  standards.  When  men's  depravity  and 
helplessness  were  appreciated  in  primitive  times,  a 
God  of  infinite  power  and  knowledge  became  a  neces- 
sary part  of  religious  thought. 

It  is  a  reversal  of  the  order  in  which  religious  ideas 
developed  to  make  religion  begin  with  God,  instead  of 
basing  it  on  the  natural  phenomena  out  of  which  it 
has  arisen.     The  problem  of  God  will  lose  its  difficulties, 

[101] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

if  men  once  become  familiar  with  the  laws  making  them 
fear  degeneration  and  hope  for  regeneration.  The 
key.  to  religion  lies  in  these  problems.  Having  ex- 
plained the  economic  pressure  creating  degeneration,  we 
must  next  treat  of  the  psychic  problems  that  arise  be- 
cause of  its  prevalence.  The  seemingly  sudden  change 
from  the  discussion  of  external  pressure  to  internal 
psychic  reactions  is  justified  by  the  really  close  relation 
that  exists  between  the  two.  The  social  psychology  of 
religion  is  either  a  group  of  acquired  traits  due  to  ex- 
ternal pressure  or  a  natural  reaction  against  it.  Neither 
element  can  be  studied  except  in  close  connection  with 
the  objective  conditions  that  create  them  and  arouse 
their  activity.  First  the  economics  of  religion  and  then 
its  psychology. 

When,  however,  the  proper  preliminary  studies  have 
been  made  and  the  laws  of  the  present  have  been 
thoroughly  investigated,  a  field  of  fruitful  inquiry  is 
opened  up  to  which  neither  economics  nor  a  knowledge 
of  the  social  process  gives  the  key.  The  routine  of 
life  imposed  by  external  conditions  suppresses  the 
natural  characters  and  makes  them  more  difficult  of 
study.  Only  the  strong  emotions  arouse  them  and 
make  them  dominant.  It  is  in  the  field  of  passion 
we  see  the  power  of  the  natural  traits  and  have 
them  vigorous  enough  in  their  manifestations  to  render 

[102] 


THE   STAGES  OF  THOUGHT   DEVELOPMENT 

their  study  profitable.  The  discipline  that  deals  with 
passion  and  emotion  is  religion,  and  for  this  reason  its 
study  becomes  the  second  in  order  of  the  social  sci- 
ences. Economics  emphasizes  objective  conditions  and 
mental  routine.  Against  these,  religion  is  a  revolt. 
Through  its  emphasis  of  passion  and  emotion,  it  brings 
into  prominence  the  residual  in  human  nature  that 
economics  neglects.  We  call  natural  traits  depravity 
when  their  activity  should  be  suppressed.  We  call 
them  inspiration  when  they  should  be  followed.  As 
we  become  religious,  the  natural  characters  are  evoked ; 
as  we  become  economic,  they  are  submerged  beneath  a 
life  of  routine.  The  two  disciplines  thus  supplement 
each  other  and  between  them  the  elementary  facts  of 
social  science  are  brought  into  the  light.  There  is  no 
other  entrance  to  social  science  so  fruitful  of  results  as 
that  which  puts  into  separate  fields  the  study  of  natural 
and  acquired  characters.  There  has  always  been  a 
crude  tendency  to  make  this  division  even  before  the 
basis  on  which  it  rests  was  clearly  seen.  Now,  however, 
it  is  possible  clearly  to  demark  the  two  fields,  and  to 
give  to  each  its  appropriate  place. 


[103] 


CHAPTER  VII 


MORBID  DEGENERATION 


* 


vn 


The  discussion  of  degeneration  has  passed  through 
so  many  phases  that  a  lack  of  definiteness  has  arisen  in 
the  use  of  the  word.  Various  problems  have  been 
brought  together  which  must  be  handled  separately 
before  clearness  of  thought  can  be  attained.  The 
primary  confusion  is  due  to  a  lack  of  differentiation 
between  cases  where  individuals  fall  below  the  possi- 
bilities of  their  heredity  and  those  where  two  types 
with  somewhat  different  heredity  are  mingled  in  one 
society.  We  call  thieves  and  prostitutes  degenerate 
because  they  lack  normal  traits.  Yet  they  may  have 
developed  their  heredity  as  fully  as  have  the  people 
with  whom  they  are  compared.  They  may  be  survivals 
of  an  earlier  condition  in  which  so-called  degenerate 
qualities  may  have  been  normal  attributes.  It  is 
better  to  call  these  persons  static  than  degenerate.  It 
will  then  appear  that  the  normal  individual  is  a  product 
of  evolution,  and  not  that  his  social  inferior  comes  into 
being  through  a  degeneration  in  type. 

The  prevailing  terminology  is  an  outgrowth  of  the 
old  concept  that  men  began  in  a  perfect  state  and 

[107] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

hence  that  present  deficiencies  are  degenerations.  It 
will  take  time  to  get  rid  of  this  primitive  concept,  and 
so  long  as  it  persists  the  prevailing  social  use  of  the 
term  will  obstruct  clearness  of  thought.  There  is  a 
concept  of  heredity  that  also  helps  to  keep  alive  this 
view  of  degeneration.  It  is  often  asserted  that  all 
differences  in  individuals  are  due  to  differences  in  the 
germ  cell  with  which  development  begins.  For  each 
character  manifested  at  maturity  there  is  said  to  be  a 
determinant  in  the  germ  cell  to  which  its  appearance 
is  due.  Heredity  builds  true;  hence  diversity  in 
results  shows  antecedent  differences.  Degeneration 
thus  comes  to  mean  a  lack  of  some  of  the  germinal 
elements  that  appear  in  normal  persons.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  degeneration  of  this  type  takes 
place.  A  comparative  study  of  animals  shows  that  it 
is  going  on  all  the  time.  Still,  it  may  be  doubted  if 
this  sort  of  change  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  prominent 
differences  manifest  in  human  beings.  It  is  a  process 
that  accounts  for  changes  in  type  rather  than  for 
those  found  within  a  given  type.  If  each  type  has  a 
normal  standard  about  which  it  varies,  the  deviations 
from  it  in  one  way  or  the  other  must  have  some  other 
cause  than  that  which  produces  new  types  through 
natural  selection.  We  might,  without  much  abridg- 
ment in  the  use  of  popular  terms,  call  those  germinal 

[108] 


MORBID  DEGENERATION 

differences  that  result  in  a  lower  type  of  organization 
abnormalities.  We  may  then  contrast  with  them 
maldevelopments  which  indicate  the  wrong  direction 
in  which  growth  processes  have  been  forced.  In  such 
a  contrast,  abnormalities  would  be  due  to  difference  in 
heredity ;  maldevelopments  to  external  agencies.  Ab- 
normalities are  also  negative,  since  the  abnormal  per- 
son lacks  in  his  heredity  some  determinant  that  normal 
people  have.  Maldevelopments,  on  the  contrary,  are 
positive  and  represent  a  growth  —  a  change  from  the 
normal  type  due  to  a  turning  of  vital  forces  in  a  wrong 
direction.  In  a  maldevelopment,  the  energy  that 
should  go  out  in  the  normal  direction  at  a  given  time 
goes  out  in  some  other  direction  or  at  a  premature  or 
overdue  period.  Maldevelopment  is  thus  a  problem 
of  energy  and  not  of  heredity.  If  this  contrast  be- 
comes clear,  the  two  ways  in  which  deviations  from 
the  normal  take  place  can  be  readily  understood. 

Another  way  of  illustrating  this  difference  is  to 
make  a  contrast  between  the  germinal  forces,  that 
develop  into  the  mechanism  by  which  life  processes 
are  carried  on,  and  the  nutritive  forces,  that  give  the 
organism  its  efficiency.  The  mechanism  of  life  comes 
from  the  germ  cell.  To  this  nothing  can  be  added  by 
the  growth  of  the  organism.  Nutrition  comes  from 
without.     It   is   constantly    absorbed   and   given   off. 

[109] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

Hence  its  presence  or  absence  at  critical  stages  of 
development  does  much  to  determine  the  direction  or 
lack  of  direction  in  the  subsequent  growth  of  the 
organism.  It  is  an  error  to  regard  a  germ  cell  as 
having  within  it  but  one  group  of  possibilities.  It  is 
more  in  accord  with  the  facts  to  say  that  development 
from  the  germ  cell  proceeds  in  a  certain  general  direc- 
tion within  limits  that  vary  as  the  external  conditions 
promote  or  retard  its  progress.  Heredity  is  a  reality, 
but  it  is  not  so  definite  nor  so  mechanical  as  is  generally 
supposed.  Nutrition  is  responsible  for  much  that 
passes  for  heredity.  Only  after  its  effects  have  been 
definitely  ascertained  can  the  real  mechanism  of  hered- 
ity be  understood.'  Why,  for  example,  does  each  or- 
ganism reach  maturity  and  finally  sink  into  old  age  ?  Is 
there  a  determinant  in  the  germ  cell  that  when  active 
checks  growth  ?  Does  the  mechanism  of  life  run  pro- 
gressively to  a  certain  point  and  then  refuse  to  act  ? 
Or  is  maturity  merely  a  state  of  maximum  nutrition 
and  old  age  a  running  down  because  nutrition  fails  ? 
To  state  the  problem  in  another  way,  Does  a  given 
organ  cease  to  grow  because  the  possibilities  of  its 
inherited  mechanism  have  become  exhausted,  or  does 
growth  end  because  nutrition  fails  when  the  energy 
of  the  organism  is  turned  in  other  directions?  The 
latter   is,    I  believe,  the   sounder  view.     Each   organ 

moi 


MORBID  DEGENERATION 

grows  while  nutrition  comes  its  way;  it  stops  grow- 
ing when  a  more  favored  part  absorbs  the  energy  that 
hitherto  made  its  growth  possible. 

There  is  no  mechanism  that  stops  growth  except  by 
turning  the  flow  of  energy  in  some  other  direction. 
The  organs  or  parts  develop  in  turn,  each  checking 
the  growth  of  its  predecessors  by  absorbing  the  energy 
they  have  previously  had.  If  new  organs  appear  at 
the  right  time,  the  growth  of  the  whole  organism  is 
normal.  If  the  new  organs  appear  sooner  or  later  than 
normal,  maldevelopments  arise.  In  such  cases,  the 
flow  of  nutrition  to  the  older  parts  is  either  extended 
beyond  the  normal  time  or  taken  from  them  before 
they  have  attained  their  normal  growth.  Maldevelop- 
ments are  thus  nutritive  in  origin  and  arise  whenever 
the  ordinary  sequences  of  development  are  disturbed. 
If  the  growth  of  an  organism  is  accelerated,  —  that  is, 
if  new  parts  appear  before  the  older  ones  have  attained 
their  normal  development,  —  the  latter  are  pre- 
maturely checked,  and  the  organism  is  maldeveloped. 
So  also  if  the  newer  parts  are  slow  in  development, 
their  predecessors  keeping  the  extra  nutrition  longer 
than  usual,  the  former  grow  in  unusual  ways.  Re- 
tardations and  accelerations  in  growth  thus  cause 
organisms  to  deviate  from  the  normal.  Heredity  has 
no  way  of  keeping  growth  along   normal  paths  except 

[1111 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

by  starting  new  organs  at  the  right  time.  Older  parts 
will  grow  until  nutrition  is  taken  from  them.  They 
cannot  reach  the  normal  standard  if  a  premature 
change  in  the  flow  of  energy  takes  from  them  the 
basis  of  growth.  Normality  is  thus  a  problem  of 
nutrition  and  not  of  heredity.  Acceleration  and  re- 
tardation in  growth  are  the  cause  of  maldevelopments. 
This  thought  merits  further  expansion,  because  if 
true  it  leads  to  important  results.  Growth  has  two 
conditioning  factors :  (1)  the  constitution  of  the  germ 
cell  with  its  effect  on  subsequent  development;  and 
(2)  nutrition,  which  coming  from  without  may  create 
states  of  surplus  or  of  deficit.  A  surplus  of  energy 
causes  parts  to  grow  longer  or  in  a  different  way  than 
they  would  if  the  surplus  were  less  or  if  it  had  been 
turned  in  other  directions.  These  overgrowths  are 
malformations,  judged  by  normal  standards.  They 
are  natural  growths,  however,  and  are  injurious  be- 
cause they  use  up  energy  which  could  be  more  use- 
fully expended  in  creating  newer  parts.  If  older  or- 
gans have  too  vigorous  a  growth,  the  newer  ones  are 
but  partially  developed  or  are  less  active  than  the 
older.  The  organism  thus  assumes  a  type  similar  to 
that  produced  by  a  lower  or  defective  heredity.  It 
shows  atavistic  traits,  not  because  of  a  defective  germ 
cell,  but  because  of  an  overgrowth  of  its  lower  organs. 

[112] 


MORBID  DEGENERATION 

A  shift  in  the  relative  growth  of  parts  reveals  at 
maturity  the  same  characteristics  that  come  from  a 
defective  heredity.  The  balance  of  an  organism  once 
disturbed,  subsequent  development  never  rights  itself. 
It  continues  along  abnormal  lines  just  as  if  this  direc- 
tion had  been  given  it  by  an  original  impetus  coming 
from  the  germ  cell.  Defective  heredity  and  mal- 
developments  thus  give  the  same  results  and  have 
the  same  marks.  They  lower  the  general  tone  of  the 
organism,  submerge  its  higher  traits  and  make  promi- 
nent the  characters  of  its  primitive  ancestors.  Re- 
tardations are  thus  overgrowth  of  the  older  parts  that 
check  the  upward  movements  of  an  organism.  There 
seems  to  be  a  lack  of  the  higher  faculties  or  only  a 
partial  development  of  them.  This,  be  it  remembered, 
is  due  not  to  any  failure  in  heredity,  but  to  the  dwarf- 
ing influence  of  an  overgrowth  of  the  older  parts. 
The  drop  in  the  scale  of  existence  is  not  a  permanent 
one;  for  if  the  overflow  of  energy  to  lower  organs  is 
stopped,  normal  development  is  resumed.  In  any  case, 
the  next  generation  will  not  be  affected  unless  the  ex- 
ternal conditions  causing  overgrowth  are  repeated. 
Acquired  characters  have  no  vigor  apart  from  the 
conditions  that  produce  them. 

In  contrast  with  retardations  due  to  overgrowth, 
accelerations  cause  energy  to  flow  too  rapidly  from 

[1131 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

lower  to  higher  parts.  The  lower  parts  are  dwarfed 
instead  of  the  higher.  An  earlier  maturity  results 
with  all  the  vital  organs  more  or  less  deficient  in  their 
development.  Each  organ  falls  short  of  its  full  develop- 
ment in  ways  that  can  plainly  be  observed.  Yet  we 
regard  the  organism  as  more  advanced  because  early 
maturity  gives  an  appearance  of  superiority.  Bright 
children  are  usually  classed  higher  than  their  more 
slowly  developing  comrades.  The  mental  powers  are 
especially  stimulated  by  this  acceleration,  and  to 
them  we  give  undue  weight  in  determining  the  rela- 
tive rank  of  individuals.  A  lack  of  nutrition  checks 
the  growth  of  a  part  prematurely  and  if  severe  causes 
actual  decay.  The  renewal  of  energy  starts  the 
growth  of  higher  organs  and  leaves  the  lower  ones  in 
an  incomplete  form.  A  series  of  changes  are  thus 
made  with  more  than  normal  rapidity,  and  a  pre- 
mature development  results,  followed  by  an  equally 
premature  old  age.  The  marks  of  acceleration  are 
thus  the  same  as  those  of  old  age.  The  resulting 
mental  powers  may  for  a  time  indicate  superiority, 
but  this  superiority  is  temporary.  Persons  so  endowed 
must  therefore  be  classed  as  degenerates,  even  though 
they  come  up  to  social  standards  and  do  not  show  the 
tendency  toward  vice  and  crime  that  is  so  often  mani- 
fest in  those  whose  development  is  retarded  through 

[114] 


MORBID  DEGENERATION 

the  overgrowth  of  lower  faculties.  In  neither  case 
has  normality  been  reached,  and  by  both  the  level  of 
humanity  is  lowered. 

Heredity  has  no  mechanism  that  determines  the 
rate  of  progress.  Parts  do  not  stop  growing  because 
of  some  vital  limitation  coming  from  the  germ  cell. 
So  long  as  nutrition  is  abundant,  growth  continues. 
The  only  check  to  growth  is  a  deficit  in  the  nutritive 
supplies.  New  organs  stop  the  growth  of  older  ones 
by  draining  off  their  supply  of  vital  energy.  If  the 
check  comes  at  the  right  time,  we  call  the  part  normal ; 
but  if  premature  or  delayed,  the  balance  of  growth  is 
disturbed  and  degeneration  sets  in.  Degeneration  is 
not  therefore  defective  heredity,  but  growth  out  of 
balance.  Heredity  determines  the  direction  of  prog- 
ress. The  rate  of  growth  as  contrasted  with  its  direc- 
tion is  mainly,  if  not  solely,  due  to  the  supply  of  nu- 
trition. A  deficit  causes  parts  to  lag  behind  their 
normal  growth;  a  surplus  pushes  them  ahead  of  it. 
Both  tendencies  are  usually  found  in  the  same  organ- 
ism. By  the  law  of  compensation,  an  overgrowth  in 
one  direction  leads  to  a  meagerness  in  growth  in  others. 
This  fact  should  not  cause  confusion  in  the  study  of 
degeneration,  because  its  two  causes  are  easily  dis- 
tinguished and  have  readily  observed  effects.  Over- 
growths we  call  morbid ;    for  accelerations  or  the  pre- 

[1151 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

mature  stoppage  of  growth  the  best  term  is  senility. 
Described  in  this  way  we  get  ready  objective  tests  of 
the  kind  of  degeneration  any  organism  undergoes.  If 
we  remember  that  any  growth  beyond  the  normal 
standard  is  wrong  growth,  the  morbid  becomes  merely 
an  extra  supply  of  energy  destroying  the  normal 
balance  of  the  organism.  That  morbid  growth  is 
cured  by  the  draining  of  this  extra  energy,  by  strenu- 
ous exercise  or  by  dieting  shows  that  its  basis  is  in 
nutrition  and  not  in  heredity.  Senility  is  likewise  a 
problem  of  nutrition.  There  is  no  natural  old  age. 
Its  source  is  always  in  some  unnecessary  restriction  of 
vital  processes.  Organisms  are  naturally  immortal, 
not  mortal. 

I  have  avoided  the  moral  stigmata  of  degeneration 
because  they  are  the  effects  of  the  physical  characteris- 
tics that  have  been  described.  Every  kind  of  moral 
degeneration  usually  accompanies  some  kind  of  phys- 
ical degeneration  and  is  a  function  of  it.  The  pres- 
sure that  disturbs  the  normal  balance  of  an  organism 
creates  morbidity  in  some  parts  and  senility  in  others. 
There  are  nevertheless  two  distinct  types  of  immoral 
action  conforming  to  the  two  kinds  of  degeneration. 
Morbid  degeneration  shows  itself  in  emotionalism  and 
an  excess  of  passion.  It  is  this  type  of  immorality 
that  first  strikes  the  attention  because  of  its  naked 

[116] 


MORBID  DEGENERATION 

opposition  to  social  ends.  Emotionalism  and  passion 
reveal  an  existence  below  the  social  level,  and  no  society 
can  hold  together  that  does  not  exert  a  strong  pres- 
sure to  keep  them  in  subjection.  They  do  not,  how- 
ever, constitute  the  only  manifestation  of  the  anti- 
social spirit.  The  egoist  with  self-centered  desires 
undermines  the  social  spirit  quite  as  effectively  as  the 
passion  of  the  morbid  degenerate.  The  line  between 
the  selfish  and  the  social  is  not  fixed  by  heredity  nor 
by  the  constitution  of  the  mind.  It  is  imposed  by  the 
necessities  of  social  existence.  The  sharper  the  pres- 
sure, the  more  clearly  defined  is  the  contrast  between 
the  two,  and  the  more  effective  is  the  urgency  with 
which  the  demands  of  the  ego  present  themselves.  It 
is  often  claimed  that  selfishness  is  a  normal  motive 
and  that  the  social  spirit  is  in  some  way  derived  from 
it.  No  such  derivation  is  possible,  for  selfishness  is  a 
disintegrating,  not  a  constructive,  force.  It  is  easy  to 
go  from  the  social  to  the  non-social,  for  this  is  the 
path  of  degeneration;  but  there  is  no  road  from 
selfishness  to  generosity.  The  social  ego  contrasts 
society  with  nature.  The  self-centered  ego  contrasts 
society  with  itself.  The  distribution  of  products 
rather  than  their  acquisition  from  nature  thus  gets 
first  place,  and  all  is  subordinated  to  gratifications 
that  meet  intense  momentary  wants. 

[117] 


CHAPTER  VIII 


SENILE  DEGENERATION 


vm 


The  preceding  discussion  should  make  clear  the 
variety  of  uses  to  which  the  word  "  degeneration  "  has 
been  put.  Progress  consists  in  relating  these  uses  to 
one  another  by  separating  the  fundamental  from  the 
casual  and  by  giving  the  right  emphasis  to  elements 
that  are  likely  to  be  overlooked.  It  is  easy  to  see 
why  defective  heredity  should  have  received  early 
attention,  for  the  abnormalities  it  produces  can  be 
readily  measured.  Such  studies  were  necessarily  first 
in  order  of  time,  for  without  a  clear  understanding  of 
the  relations  of  higher  to  lower  organisms  no  scientific 
research  in  defects  and  abnormalities  could  be  made. 
This  knowledge,  however,  does  not  solve  the  prob- 
lems of  degeneration.  It  only  clears  the  way  for  more 
careful  study.  There  are  external  factors  in  degenera- 
tion, as  well  as  those  of  heredity,  and  they  produce, 
not  merely  reversion  to  lower  types,  but  changes  more 
truly  deserving  the  name  of  degeneration.  Of  these 
objective  causes,  nutrition  is  the  most  prominent.  Its 
effects,  favorable  and  unfavorable,  open  up  a  field  of 
investigation  as  important  as  the  influences  producing 

[121] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

atavistic  traits.  Disturbances  in  nutrition  throw 
organisms  out  of  balance.  In  subsequent  stages  of 
development  some  parts  have  more,  and  some  less, 
than  the  normal  degree  of  growth.  If  growth  is 
superfluous  or  ill-directed,  a  part  so  affected  is  morbid ; 
if  it  has  less  than  the  normal  growth,  it  is  senile.  Mor- 
bidness is  primarily  an  overflow  of  energy;  senility  a 
loss  of  vital  power.  The  one  leads  to  disease,  the  other 
to  decay.  They  are  both  found  in  abnormal  persons, 
because  an  overflow  of  energy  in  one  direction  leads  to 
its  diminution  in  others.  The  marks  of  the  two,  how- 
ever, are  so  distinct  that  they  can  readily  be  separated 
and  studied.  Of  the  two,  morbidness  is  more  closely 
allied  to  defective  heredity,  and  hence  the  stigmata  of 
the  two  are  practically  the  same.  Defective  heredity 
is  the  more  deep-seated;  the  morbidness  of  over- 
nutrition  shows  itself  in  a  stunted  development  of  the 
higher  faculties.  Its  cause  is  an  arresting  of  the 
normal  diversion  of  surplus  energy  from  the  lower  to 
the  higher  organs.  Morbidness  ends  in  disease  when 
the  local  surplus  becomes  unmanageable;  it  creates 
mental  abnormalities  through  indirect  effects  on  the 
higher  powers.  Disease,  hysteria  and  insanity  are  its 
most  pronounced  manifestations;  but  it  has  so  many 
minor  symptoms  that  its  abnormal  effects  cannot  be 
related  to  their  cause  without  the  most  careful  study. 

[1221 


SENILE  DEGENERATION 

However,  so  much  has  been  done  in  this  field  that  a 
restatement  is  scarcely  needed.  Morbidness  and  defec- 
tive heredity  are  overemphasized  elements  in  the 
study  of  degeneration.  They  need  further  investiga- 
tion much  less  than  a  clear  demarcation  from  other 
forms  of  degeneration  not  so  well  known. 

If  cases  of  defective  heredity  are  isolated  from  those 
in  which  degeneration  is  due  to  objective  factors,  the 
stigmata  of  each  can  be  plainly  recognized.  When 
causes  are  objective,  the  later,  more  complicated 
hereditary  qualities  will  be  more  affected  than  the 
earlier,  more  simple  ones.  When  growth  is  not  pro- 
gressive, we  may  be  sure  some  objective  factor  has 
come  in  to  deflect  it  from  its  normal  course.  If  a 
child  resembles  a  distant  ancestor  in  all  stages  of  its 
development,  we  may  assume  that  a  real  atavism  has 
occurred  and  that  the  cause  lies  in  the  germ  cell.  But 
if  the  reversion  is  only  in  the  later  stages  of  growth  or 
is  there  more  pronounced  than  in  earlier  ones,  it  is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  the  growth  of  the  person  is 
out  of  balance  and  that  its  causes  are  objective.  An- 
cestral resemblance  in  such  cases  will  be  partial,  either 
on  the  side  of  morbid  growth  or  of  premature  arrests 
in  development.  Surplus  and  deficit  of  nutrition  are 
thus  the  objective  causes  of  degeneration,  and  their 
physical  stigmata  are  a  one-sided  growth  or  arrest  of 

[123] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

growth  that  deviates  more  widely  from  the  normal  in 
higher  than  in  lower  stages.  Morbidness  in  a  part  is 
the  physical  mark  of  surplus  nutrition.  Premature 
arrest  of  development  is  likewise  a  sure  sign  of  deficient 
nutrition.  This,  when  continued,  creates  a  condition 
of  senility.  The  objective  causes  and  physical  stig- 
mata of  degeneration  thus  seem  easy  of  recognition 
and  detection.  To  complete  the  study,  however,  we 
must  note  also  the  mental  stigmata  of  degeneration. 
In  at  least  one  aspect,  it  is  easy  to  do  this.  The  con- 
nection between  morbidness  and  emotionalism  has 
often  been  pointed  out.  Morbidness  is  the  overgrowth 
of  the  lower  faculties  and  the  dwarfing  of  the  higher. 
Emotionalism  is  waste  energy  going  out  in  activity 
instead  of  growth.  Had  the  higher  powers  not  been 
arrested  in  growth,  this  energy  would  have  been 
diverted  into  useful  channels.  The  emotions  would 
then  have  ceased  to  be  active  or  at  least  have  been 
kept  under  control. 

A  clearer  idea  of  emotionalism  may  be  gained  by 
referring  to  its  physical  basis.  Irritability  and  con- 
tractibility  are  the  two  elementary  manifestations  of 
organic  life.  Irritability  is  activity  without  an  end. 
There  is  change  and  often  intense  excitability  without 
any  useful  reaction.  Contractibility  may  be  said  to  be 
organized   irritability.     The   same   energy    that   in   a 

[124] 


SENILE  DEGENERATION 

disorganized  part  creates  irritability  in  a  normally 
organized  part  effects  some  definite  useful  end.  The 
upward  change  is  thus  from  irritability  to  contraction. 
If  this  higher  outlet  of  energy  is  created,  the  emotional 
manifestation  of  irritability  diminishes  or  disappears. 
We  are  scarcely  cognizant  of  the  working  of  a  normal 
part.  There  is  no  waste  energy  for  emotional  mani- 
festations. If  this  be  true  of  the  upward  tendencies 
of  an  organism,  the  reverse  would  follow  in  the  case 
of  degeneration.  The  part  acts  imperfectly,  and  con- 
traction degenerates  into  mere  irritation.  Surplus 
energy  is  kept  from  its  natural  outlet  and  manifests 
itself  in  emotion,  which,  if  strong,  becomes  hysteria. 
Emotion  is  thus  the  effect  of  waste  energy  and  appears 
when  morbid  changes  in  lower  organs  check  normal 
activity.  It  grows  with  degeneration  and  disappears 
beneath  the  changes  that  evoke  normal  growth. 

Emotionalism,  then,  is  the  mental  sign  of  morbid- 
ness and  of  surplus  energy  with  no  effective  outlet. 
What  is  the  corresponding  mark  of  the  arrest  of  de- 
velopment caused  by  a  deficit  of  energy?  Here  is  a 
field  in  which  little  has  been  done,  and  in  making  a 
start  the  same  difficulty  is  encountered  that  obstructed 
progress  in  the  study  of  morbid  degeneration.  Its 
fundamental  contrast  shocks  because  it  unsettles 
popular  beliefs.     To  say  that  genius  and  insanity  are 

[125] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

allied  states,  and  that  the  great  men  of  the  past  have 
been  unbalanced  rather  than  superior  minds,  seems  to 
border  on  absurdity.  Yet  until  this  plain  truth  has 
been  driven  home  the  doctrine  of  degeneration  cannot 
get  a  hearing.  The  criterion  in  this  case  is  not  whether 
genius  is  useful  or  is  worthy  of  admiration.  Both  of 
these  facts  may  readily  be  admitted.  We  may  go 
even  further  and  say  that  genius  is  indispensable; 
that  without  its  rise  the  history  of  the  world  would 
be  a  series  of  ignoble  events.  The  real  test  is  whether 
a  genius  is  an  elevation  above  the  normal  or  a  deviation 
from  it.  If  all  the  world  were  made  on  his  plan, 
would  there  be  a  rise  or  a  fall  in  the  scale  of  human 
existence  ?  Only  when  we  answer  this  question  can  we 
recognize  the  peculiar  qualities  that  ally  the  genius, 
of  superlative  social  value,  to  the  insane.  Society 
cannot  move  upward  by  acquiring  the  physical  and 
mental  traits  of  the  genius  any  more  than  it  could  by 
approximating  those  of  the  insane.  It  is  not  his  effect 
on  heredity  that  gives  the  genius  his  place,  but  the 
effect  he  has  on  society.  He  disappears  and  leaves 
no  lineal  descendant;  but  the  laws  he  created,  the 
victories  he  won,  the  inventions  he  made,  the  books 
he  wrote  or  the  example  he  set  are  a  precious  heritage 
in  which  all  participate.  The  gains  that  come  through 
genius  are  in  the  field  of  acquired  traits,  and  are  handed 

[1261 


SENILE  DEGENERATION 

down  from  generation  to  generation  as  a  social  heri- 
tage, but  not  through  heredity.  His  relations  to  the 
insane  are  of  no  social  consequence.  Neither  he  nor 
they  are  of  the  normal  group  who  pass  on  our  physical 
heredity  to  coming  generations.  How  normal  people 
become  supernormal  is  a  radically  different  problem 
from  telling  how  victories  are  won  or  inventions  made. 
The  one  is  a  problem  of  heredity;  the  other  belongs 
to  the  history  of  civilization.  As  civilization  advances 
by  social  means  more  than  by  changes  in  heredity,  a 
decline  in  heredity  may  go  along  with  an  increase  of 
civilization  and  culture.  This  is  what  happens  when 
progress  comes  through  heroes  instead  of  through  the 
rise  of  normal  citizens.  It  is  a  well-attested  generali- 
zation that  heroes  come  when  the  nation  they  succor 
is  in  a  state  of  decline.  They  are  thus  the  index  of  a 
degeneration  in  race  traits  even  though  they  give  a 
compensation  in  higher  civilization. 

With  these  facts  and  analogies  in  mind  it  will  be 
easier  to  approach  the  problem  of  the  mental  stigmata 
of  an  arrest  of  development.  At  the  start  a  generali- 
zation must  be  made  similar  to  that  affirming  the 
close  kinship  of  genius  and  insanity.  Genius  is  a  form 
of  insanity ;  in  like  fashion  reason  is  a  mark  of  the  senile. 
I  mean  by  this  that  the  growth  and  increasing  domi- 
nance of  the  reasoning  faculty  involve  a  sapping  of  the 

[127] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

vital  forces.  Just  as  thegenius  is  insane,  so  may  it 
be  said  that  the  great  thinkers  —  the  founders  and  pro- 
moters of  intellectual  systems  —  suffer  from  wasting 
disease  that  drains  their  vitality  and  forces  them  out  of 
the  channels  of  normal  growth.  They  show  the  marks 
of  accelerated  growth,  have  meager  physical  powers, 
and  lack  the  plasticity  of  thought  that  normal  people 
enjoy.  The  thinker  is  born  old;  like  John  Stuart 
Mill,  he  has  no  youth.  The  rational  and  the  senile  are 
so  closely  allied  that  any  mark  of  the  one  can  readily 
be  found  in  the  other.  They  are  both  arrests  of  de- 
velopment due  to  a  drain  on  the  vital  powers.  Neither 
is  normal,  nor  does  either  mark  the  line  along  which 
race  progress  moves.  The  thinker,  like  the  genius,  is 
worthy  of  all  praise ;  but  it  is  a  civilization  of  acquired 
traits  that  he  molds,  not  the  race  progress  that  comes 
through  improved  heredity.  He  helps  progress  by  a 
social  uplift  that  others  enjoy,  not  by  leaving  descend- 
ants to  reap  what  he  has  sown.  The  latter  —  not  the 
praises  of  society  —  is  the  real  test  of  a  normal  life. 

We  are  so  accustomed  to  laud  reason  as  the  culmi- 
nation of  human  powers  that  an  opposing  view  seems 
absurd,  and  to  question  its  supremacy  seems  to  un- 
dermine morality  as  well  as  rationalism.  These  ob- 
jections have  a  common  origin.  The  superiority  of 
reason  is  based  on  a  contrast  between  the  emotional 

[1281 


SENILE  DEGENERATION 

and  the  rational.  A  long  race  struggle  has  established 
this  supremacy  and  the  morality  that  goes  with  it. 
That  the  rationalist  is  less  likely  to  indulge  in  emotional 
vices  may  readily  be  granted.  So,  also,  it  may  be  freely 
admitted  that  calculated  indirect  action  is  more  ef- 
fective than  the  emotional  and  direct  variety.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  the  superiority  of  reason  over  emotion 
that  is  questioned  in  this  view.  It  is  urged  merely  that 
reason  is  not  a  final  stage  of  human  development ;  that 
future  progress  in  race  qualities  does  not  find  its  goal 
in  the  dominance  of  reason. 

To  get  this  thought  clearly  before  the  reader,  we  must 
refer  again  to  the  contrast  between  natural  and  acquired 
characters.  Civilization  is  objective,  and  its  growth 
depends  upon  the  ascendancy  of  acquired  traits. 
Race  progress,  however,  depends  on  improvement  in 
natural  characters.  If  race  progress  is  checked  by 
growth  of  civilization,  we  have  degeneration  of  phy- 
sique accompanied  by  social  improvements.  This  is 
what  happens  with  the  dominance  of  rationalism. 
Mental  progress  is  an  economy;  race  progress  is  a 
growth.  The  increase  of  economy  is  limited,  while  the 
growth  in  energy,  if  kept  along  normal  lines,  may  be 
perpetual.  The  dominance  of  economy  indicates  a 
diminution  of  energy ;  while  it  brings  real  gains,  it  is  a 
mark  of  physical  decline.  That  the  rational  attitude 
t  [129] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

is  an  index  of  decline  in  energy  is  illustrated  by  the 
increasing  hold  it  has  on  men  as  they  grow  old.  When 
a  man  passes  the  prime  of  life,  physical  vigor  declines. 
Economy  thus  becomes  more  prominent,  until  in  old 
age  it  is  supreme.  If  rationalism  and  senility  grow 
together,  it  suggests  that  they  have  a  common  origin. 
That  senility  is  a  waning  of  energy,  everyone  knows. 
If  it  can  be  shown  that  growth  in  thinking  powers  has 
the  same  origin,  many  mysteries  hitherto  unsolved  can 
be  explained. 

The  plastic  cell  or  organ  has  within  it  many  possi- 
bilities of  activity.  At  the  same  time  there  is  a  lack  of 
definiteness  in  the  direction  activity  may  take.  As 
maturity  approaches,  possible  directions  of  activity 
decrease  in  number  and  grow  in  definiteness.  The 
useful  movements  are  often  repeated  and  each  repe- 
tition brings  greater  ease  of  execution;  less  useful, 
sporadic  acts  become  more  and  more  difficult. 
Energy  thus  flows  along  fixed  lines  and  activity  be- 
comes determined.  As  the  flow  of  energy  diminishes 
with  age,  activity  falls  into  ruts.  Varied  activity 
becomes  increasingly  difficult,  and  ultimately  im- 
possible. Lack  of  choice  is  thus  a  lack  of  energy 
and  plasticity.  As  old  age  approaches,  the  line  of 
least  resistance  is  so  well  established  that  there  is  no 
difficulty  in  forecasting  the  conduct.     Failure  of  energy 

nsoi 


SENILE  DEGENERATION 

is  the  cause  of  the  determinism  of  old  age,  not  any  set 
direction  to  activity  given  to  the  organism  by  its 
heredity.  Every  cell  gets  at  birth  a  plasticity  and 
susceptibility  that  is  lost  only  as  energy  fails. 

Few  would  deny  these  facts,  I  think,  if  they  were 
applied  only  to  energy  in  its  bodily  form.  The  prin- 
ciple is  too  patent  to  be  gainsaid.  Objection  is  more 
likely  to  arise  when  it  is  urged  that  thought  is  a  con- 
sequence of  bodily  activity,  that  it  follows  the  same 
laws  and  is  limited  by  the  same  conditions.  Perhaps 
this  cannot  be  proved  by  direct  observation ;  but  it  can 
at  least  be  shown  that  changes  take  place  in  thought, 
as  old  age  approaches,  analogous  to  those  that  ac- 
company declining  energy.  Belief  is  active  and  easy 
in  youth :  the  viewpoint  is  fixed  in  old  age.  When 
maturity  is  reached  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  to 
change  opinions,  and  in  old  age  it  is  practically  im- 
possible to  do  so.  This  suggests  that  plasticity  in 
thought  and  action  have  the  same  basis,  and  that  they 
grow  and  decline  under  similar  conditions.  Opinions 
are  not  unchangeable  because  of  their  logic,  but  because 
the  brain  cells  that  form  the  physical  basis  have  lost 
their  plasticity,  and  hence  cannot  make  new  combi- 
nations. The  once  accepted  must  be  retained  because 
there  is  a  failure  of  surplus  energy  to  force  new  associ- 
ations.    Ideas  become  inseparable  in  thought  because 

[131] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

the  mind  has  not  the  energy  to  sever  them.  Unity 
of  ideas,  therefore,  is  no  evidence  of  the  unity  of  under- 
lying phenomena,  nor  does  it  afford  any  test  of  the 
constitution  of  the  mind.  The  ability  to  make  dis- 
tinctions is  merely  an  index  of  the  amount  of  effective 
energy  the  organism  possesses,  and  of  the  plasticity 
of  its  cells.  If  the  number  of  inseparable  ideas  grows 
with  age,  and  if  there  is  no  difference  in  the  power  ex- 
erted over  the  mind  by  late  acquired  and  early  acquired 
associations,  there  is  no  reason  why  explanations  should 
be  sought  for  one  group  that  are  plainly  not  needed 
for  the  other.  The  pressure  of  a  deficit  unifies  the 
action  of  each  subordinated  organ,  and  the  degree  of 
definiteness  increases  as  this  pressure  grows.  Instinc- 
tive action  is  an  extreme  form  of  this  pressure.  Here 
the  activity  of  a  group  of  nerve  centers  is  so  fully 
determined  that  one  well-recognized  action  follows 
their  awakening.  We  think  of  fixed  ideas  as  a  stigma 
of  the  insane ;  yet  all  of  us  have  fixed  ideas  stamped 
on  our  thinking.  The  difference  is  that  our  fixed  ideas 
are  useful  and  theirs  are  injurious.  There  is  no  dif- 
ference, however,  in  the  mode  of  acquiring  them  or  of 
the  mechanism  under  which  they  act. 

Determined  action  and  fixed  ideas  are  not  the  prod- 
uct of  any  mechanism  of  heredity,  nor  are  they  due 
to  the  constitution  of  the   mind.     They  have  their 

[132] 


SENILE  DEGENERATION 

origin  in  objective  conditions  that  act  through  the 
pressure  created  by  a  deficit  of  energy.  It  is  not  the 
completeness  of  the  germinal  elements  in  heredity,  but 
the  lack  of  them,  that  makes  determinate  action  pos- 
sible. A  moth  does  not  fly  towards  a  light  because  of 
an  inherited  mechanism  impelling  this  action.  If  its 
mechanism  were  more  complete  it  could  fly  away  from 
the  light  as  easily  as  to  approach  it.  The  action  of  light 
and  heat  make  up  for  the  defects  of  heredity,  and 
impel  a  definite  action  where  otherwise  no  fixed  re- 
action would  take  place.  The  simple  reactions  due  to  a 
deficit  are  equally  objective,  and  help,  as  do  tropisms, 
to  make  up  for  the  incompleteness  of  heredity.  On  a 
simple  heredity  it  is  thus  possible  to  build  a  complex 
organism  that  meets  the  most  varied  conditions.  We 
do  not  need  mechanisms  when  objective  forces  can  be 
made  to  effect  the  same  ends. 


183] 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  WILL 


tf 


IX 


The  problem  of  religion  is  to  make  clear  the  relation 
of  degeneration  to  the  will,  and  to  show  how  the  evils 
of  degeneration  may  be  replaced  by  upbuilding  tenden- 
cies. Degeneration  is  almost  universal,  because  every 
disturbance  in  the  balance  of  growth  and  all  defects 
in  nutrition  depress  the  individual  affected  below  his 
normal  level.  Subsequent  growth  does  not  remedy 
these  defects,  but  tends  to  exaggerate  them.  If  de- 
velopment is  retarded,  morbid  degeneration  sets  in, 
which  ends  in  emotionalism,  hysteria  or  insanity.  If 
development  is  accelerated,  senile  degeneration  results. 
This  carries  with  it  rigidity  of  parts  and  dominance 
of  instinctive,  imitative  and  egoistic  tendencies.  With 
heredity  and  the  nutritive  processes  left  to  themselves, 
an  organism  can  scarcely  fail  to  fall  into  one  or  the 
other  of  these  pitfalls.  Some  other  force  must  be 
evoked  if  the  narrow  path  of  normal  progress  is  to  be 
followed  to  a  stable  goal  in  a  higher  life.  What  is  this 
force  and  how  does  it  effect  its  ends  ? 

Action  is  either  the  result  of  antecedent  conditions 
working  from  the  outside,  or  it  is  merely  the  expression 

[137] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

of  some  internal  reaction.  Acts  are  determinate,  not 
because  of  any  general  law  of  universal  causation,  but 
because  some  evolutionary  process  has  eliminated 
less  effective  ways  of  procedure.  Determinism  is  a 
goal,  not  a  first  principle.  We  reach  it  by  growth 
and  change,  not  through  primary  forces  or  predeter- 
mined causes.  It  has  as  many  forms  as  there  are 
independent  sources  of  activity,  and  we  become  wholly 
determinate  only  as  all  of  these  are  harmonized  and 
coordinated. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  determinism  so  prominent 
that  they  cannot  fail  to  attract  attention.  Biologic 
determinism  covers  the  whole  range  of  heredity.  Or- 
ganic change  follows  definite  laws,  and  its  principles 
are  capable  of  definite  enunciation.  The  germ  cell  has 
various  potentialities  that  work  themselves  out  in 
organic  development  and  become  manifest  in  every 
normal  being.  Were  all  characters  natural  and  all 
acts  instinctive,  there  would  be  no  field  left  indeter- 
minate by  biologic  evolution.  The  contrast  of  natural 
and  acquired  characters  is  a  recognition  that  there  are 
many  acts  not  directly  controlled  by  heredity.  Ac- 
quired characters  must  of  necessity  have  some  other 
source  and  they  grow  in  importance  as  organisms 
rise  in  the  scale  of  being.  They  indicate  some  form 
of    external    determinism  which  supplements   or    dis- 

[138] 


THE  WILL 

places  the  biologic  determinism  of  lower  organisms. 
I  cannot  enter  an  exhaustive  discussion  of  external 
determinism ;  but  one  aspect  of  it  is  so  prominent  that, 
if  not  the  sole  form,  it  may  be  taken  as  a  type  of  all 
others.  Economic  determinism  acts  through  nutrition 
and  other  external  objects  that  each  organism  must 
exert  itself  to  secure.  The  principle  of  economy  is 
back  of  all  acquired  traits,  activities  and  knowledge. 
Their  force,  however  exerted,  makes  the  economic 
determinism  that  stands  in  contrast  with  the  biologic 
determinism  imposed  by  heredity.  The  two  are  domi- 
nant forces  in  man's  determinate  life;  but  they  are 
not  the  sole  factors.  The  third  is  the  will.  Its  work- 
ings cannot  be  understood  until  the  earlier  and  more 
objective  forms  of  control  have  their  activity  explained. 
To  call  an  act  one  of  will  when  the  forces  of  biologic 
selection  or  economic  pressure  are  operative,  confuses 
what  otherwise  would  be  a  plain  problem.  If  these  two 
great  forces  cover  the  whole  field,  there  is  no  will  in 
any  sense  worth  investigating.  The  will  is  a  reality 
when  there  are  acts  free  from  the  pressure  of  either  of 
these  forces.  If  we  can  get  beyond  heredity  and  beyond 
the  pressure  of  economic  events  there  is  a  reality  to 
freedom  that  it  is  worth  a  struggle  to  realize. 

What,  then,  is  the  essence  of  these  two  great  forces, 
and  how  can  we  know  when  we  have  passed  beyond  the 

[139] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

realm  of  their  activity?  Biologic  determinism  is  the 
tendency  in  organic  life  to  repeat  the  stages  of  develop- 
ment through  which  predecessors  have  gone.  This 
constant  repetition  is  the  essence  of  biological  heredity ; 
and  in  so  far  as  it  is  active,  determinate  action  results. 
Economic  determinism,  however,  is  due  not  to  a  posi- 
tive, but  to  a  negative  principle.  Regular  action  is 
acquired  as  any  part  is  brought  under  the  pressure  of  a 
deficit.  Plastic  action  is  indeterminate  and  may  move 
in  any  direction.  Lessen  the  plasticity  and  action 
becomes  more  fixed  in  kind  and  less  open  to  variation 
in  its  results.  Complete  determinism  arises  when  a 
long-standing  deficit  has  reduced  action  to  its  simplest 
form.  Senile  life  loses  all  spontaneity,  and  a  routine 
is  established  as  complete  as  that  due  to  organic  he- 
redity. Biologic  determinism  is  static,  for  its  results 
never  vary  except  under  morbid  influences.  Economic 
determinism  may  be  retrogressive,  for  the  pressure  of 
deficit  lowers  the  tone  of  an  organism  and  forces  it  out 
of  the  normal  path.  No  matter  how  great  the  economy, 
and  hence  the  immediate  advantage,  loss  of  energy 
and  of  plasticity  have  no  compensations  that  keep  an 
organism  from  stagnation  and  decay.  The  best  that 
could  come  from  complete  biologic  and  economic  deter- 
minism would  be  a  static  condition.  We  must  look 
elsewhere  for  the  principles  of  progress.     These  lie  in 

[140] 


THE  WILL 

some  indeterminate  field  outside  the  province  of  these 
two  great  forces. 

A  closer  examination  reveals  the  missing  element 
and  shows  how  it  works.  What  checks  the  growth  of 
the  lower  parts  of  an  organism  and  thus  makes  for  the 
the  appearance  of  higher  powers  is  not  any  result  of  the 
principles  of  heredity  nor  of  any  germ  determinant 
that  limits  growth.  It  is  the  appearance  of  new 
organs  turning  surplus  energy  in  other  directions  that 
keeps  older  parts  true  to  their  normal  development. 
Parts  remain  normal  only  when  they  are  under  the 
pressure  of  a  deficit.  Then  only  does  biologic  deter- 
minism keep  their  growth  in  the  right  direction  and 
economic  determinism  force  them  to  function  in  useful 
ways.  No  organ  will  grow  normally  and  become  a 
useful  agent  in  survival  with  a  surplus  of  energy  to 
disturb  the  regularity  of  its  action.  Normal  growth 
and  activity  continue  only  so  long  as  new  parts  appear 
to  drain  off  this  surplus  through  the  indeterminate 
activity  which  youth  and  plasticity  stimulate.  The 
useful  parts  are  the  older  ones  acting  under  the  pressure 
of  deficit.  It  is  the  mere  activity  of  the  newer  part, 
not  its  direction,  function  or  regularity,  that  aids  the 
organism. 

Indeterminate  action  is  thus  an  essential  element  in 
normal  growth.     Without  it,  the  organism  degenerates 

[141] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

either  in  a  morbid,  or  in  a  senile  direction.  It  gives  to 
the  partially  formed  and  more  plastic  higher  powers  a 
function  in  the  place  of  what  would  otherwise  be  mere 
waste.  We  must,  however,  call  it  indeterminate  with 
a  qualification.  It  is  indeterminate  in  relation  to  sur- 
vival, but  not  in  relation  to  distant  ends  and  better 
adjustment.  Without  the  activity  it  promotes,  future 
normal  growth  would  be  prevented,  and  the  possibility 
of  better  adjustment  denied.  It  can,  therefore,  be 
called  telic  determinism ;  for  it  creates  adjustments  by 
opening  up  the  line  of  future  progress  and  by  keeping 
organisms  true  to  it.  The  formless  activity  of  to-day 
through  the  growth  of  still  higher  parts  is  put  under  the 
pressure  of  deficit.  Activity  thereby  becomes  fixed  in 
direction  and  determinate  in  purpose.  Each  newer 
part  in  turn  presses  its  predecessors  into  practical  use 
and  takes  on  itself  the  function  of  regulating  them 
through  new  expressions  of  indeterminate  action  that 
exhaust  the  stock  of  surplus  energy. 

This  office  of  using  up  surplus  energy  and  thus  pro- 
moting the  normal  activity  of  lower  parts  is  the  primary 
function  of  the  will.  It  is  not  an  immaterial  something, 
nor  a  form  of  higher  thought,  but  is  the  active  expres- 
sion of  a  partially  formed,  newer  organ,  with  much 
plasticity  and  of  no  immediate  use.  The  will  is  not 
the  source  of  clear  definite  thought,  nor  is  it  the  place 

[1421 


THE  WILL 

where  controlling  motives  arise.  Thoughts  come  from 
the  intellect :  motives  arise  through  the  emotions. 
These  are  both  within  the  realm  of  determinate  action. 
They  result  from  the  action  of  the  older  and  less  plastic 
parts  from  which  surplus  of  energy  has  been  withdrawn. 
Volition  keeps  growth  normal.  When  this  happens, 
the  much  admired  constituents  of  thought  and  activity 
work  out  their  normal  destiny,  keep  mankind  progres- 
sive and  make  its  collective  efforts  telic.  We  move 
forward,  not  by  conscious  individual  efforts  directed 
toward  survival,  but  by  the  social  results  of  activity 
that  has  no  immediate  end.  If  pure  thought  and 
utilitarian  motives  absorbed  all  of  our  energy,  progress 
would  cease  and  degradation  begin. 

The  will  is  thus  the  expression  of  a  movement  from 
plastic  to  definite  action,  taking  place  when  the  higher 
centers  are  forming.  We  should  think  of  mental 
activity  not  as  the  result  of  a  definitely  constituted 
organ  with  specific  and  well  defined  parts,  but  rather  of 
a  series  of  organs,  some  newly  and  partially  made,  some 
normal  and  others  in  process  of  decay.  Older  parts  are 
gradually  thrown  off  or  absorbed.  Newer  parts  in- 
crease in  the  regularity  and  effectiveness  of  their  acts 
as  their  growth  rounds  them  out  and  makes  them 
capable  of  performing  the  functions  of  older  decaying 
parts.     The  rise  of  a  species  in  the  scale  of  being  de- 

[143] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

pends  on  keeping  up  this  series  of  changes  by  discarding 
old  parts  and  by  reducing  new  ones  to  regular  and  useful 
forms  of  activity.  The  changes  are  progressive  so  long 
as  new  parts  absorb  the  surplus  energy  and  force  their 
predecessors  into  a  compact  group  with  related  activities. 
Two  difficulties  prevent  a  clear  concept  of  the  will. 
The  first  is  that  it  is  thought  of  as  immaterial  and  hence 
without  the  physical  background  of  other  faculties. 
The  second  is  that  we  confuse  moral  judgments  with 
volitions.  With  passion  and  intellectual  activity  we 
recognize  the  relation  between  the  mental  state  and  its 
physical  antecedents.  By  this  means,  passion  and 
intellect  can  be  readily  contrasted  and  their  province 
made  clear.  The  will  has  no  such  method  of  recogni- 
tion, and  hence  it  is  confused  with  matters  of  habit,  of 
passion,  of  intellect  or  any  other  propensity  that 
happens  for  the  moment  to  command  attention.  This 
indefiniteness  must  be  set  aside  in  the  interest  of  clear 
thought.  We  must  think  of  the  physical  antecedents 
of  the  will  as  clearly  as  we  do  of  other  native  powers 
and  faculties.  This  antecedent  is  surplus  energy. 
Without  vigor  all  acts  are  routine  not  involving  volition. 
The  will  is  mind  made  active  by  surplus  energy ;  the 
intellect  is  the  mind  acting  under  a  deficit ;  passion  is 
the  mind  controlled  by  its  inherited  mechanisms. 
The  intellect  gets  its  force  through  the  acquired  char- 

[144] 


THE  WILL 

acters  that  are  objective  in  their  origin.  Passion  is  a 
matter  of  heredity.  It  is  the  surplus  of  energy  above 
the  demands  of  heredity  and  environment  that  makes 
volition  possible.  Volition  should  therefore  be  asso- 
ciated with  strenuous,  and  not  with  moral,  acts.  Most 
moral  acts  are  habits  and  do  not  involve  our  highest 
powers.  Although  valuable,  they  give  no  index  of  the 
uplift  that  presses  society  forward  to  new  goals.  It  is 
the  telic  tendencies  of  surplus  energy  that  produce  epoch- 
making  social  changes.  The  best  measure  of  this 
force  is  to  be  had  in  sports,  athletic  contests  and  sudden 
emergencies  that  call  forth  all  the  powers  of  a  man. 
It  is  the  will  of  the  athlete,  not  his  physical  powers, 
that  gives  him  the  victory.  If  we  looked  to  him  for 
example  of  volition,  instead  of  looking  to  the  moral 
recluse,  we  should  have  no  difficulty  in  separating  acts 
of  volition  from  those  of  the  intellect. 

Determinate  action  is  not  fixed  in  amount,  but  varies 
with  the  energy  of  a  man  and  the  plasticity  of  his  brain 
cells.  Men  may  be  said  to  have  two  wills,  the  one  a  will 
to  believe,  which  manifests  itself  when  they  feel  energetic, 
and  the  other  a  will  to  criticize,  which  is  potent  when 
they  lack  energy.  A  surplus  of  energy  puts  them  in 
one  mood,  while  a  deficit  evokes  the  other.  Most  men 
shift  back  and  forth  from  one  mood  to  the  other  as 
their  surplus  energy  varies  and  their  health  improves  or 
l  [145] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

fails.  It  breaks  no  law  to  change  from  one  of  these 
conditions  to  the  other,  since  the  cause  lies  either  in 
objective  conditions,  a  nervous  shock  or  some  new 
inspiration.  Men  are  less  determinate  in  youth  than 
in  old  age,  and  also  less  so  in  action  than  in  thought. 
The  young  of  each  generation  are  forced  to  think  in 
old  forms  by  their  elders,  while  their  activities  are  shaped 
by  their  own  experience.  Thought  is  thus  more  deter- 
minate than  activity,  and  from  this  difference  arises 
the  struggle  between  belief  and  doubt,  so  much  empha- 
sized by  religious  experience. 

Freedom  is  not  the  power  to  do  what  one  pleases,  but 
the  power  to  throw  off  depression  and  abnormalities. 
It  demands  not  the  absence  of  control  over  individual 
acts,  but  the  power  of  a  thorough  regeneration.  Voli- 
tion, rightly  understood,  is  the  antecedent  of  regenera- 
tion, not  of  acts  performed  by  the  parts  of  the  brain 
and  body  that  have  acquired  definite  functions.  Its 
essence  is  the  exciting  of  activity  among  a  new  group  of 
brain  cells,  and  the  doing  there  of  acts  hitherto  per- 
formed in  an  older  part.  If  all  the  brain  had  definite 
functions  set  by  heredity,  no  change  of  this  sort  could 
be  made.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  men  in  their  ordinary 
actions  use  but  a  fraction  of  their  brain  cells,  only  this 
fraction  will  be  definitely  enough  organized  to  be  the 
seat  of  regular  functions.      The  unused  cells  can  be 

[1461 


THE  WILL 

made  active  by  the  presence  of  surplus  energy,  and  this 
activity  once  begun  may  replace  that  of  older  parts 
with  well  defined  functions.  The  possibility  of  regen- 
eration exists  if  mental  activity  can  be  transferred  from 
one  part  of  the  brain  to  another.  Such  a  change 
demands  surplus  energy,  plastic  cells  and  some  ex- 
traordinary event  to  fix  the  attention  and  to  arouse 
activity. 

When  these  three  are  in  conjunction,  marked  trans- 
formations of  nervous  activity  and  of  mental  concepts 
result.  The  social  process  is  so  much  more  dominant 
in  thought  than  is  heredity,  that  when  a  break  is  once 
made,  a  thorough  reconstruction  of  ideas  and  motives 
is  possible.  Regeneration  does  not  alter  heredity. 
It  uses  hereditary  forces  in  a  new  way  to  modify  the 
action  of  the  social  process  that  controls  thought.  It 
is  no  more  a  violation  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  than 
a  mutation  is  a  deviation  from  organic  law.  Any 
striking  combination  of  events  makes  changes  in  devel- 
opment that  perpetuate  themselves  and  thus  prevent 
a  return  to  the  former  equilibrium.  Regeneration  is 
an  extraordinary  event,  but  not  in  any  way  marvelous. 
It  is  supernormal,  but  not  supernatural.  Men  do  not 
violate  the  laws  of  nature  by  rising  above  the  normal 
any  more  than  they  do  when  they  sink  below  it.  Voli- 
tion is  more  than  activity.     It  is  activity  among  plastic 

[1471 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

cells  forced  on  by  the  action  of  surplus  energy.  By 
making  will  the  psychic  antecedent  of  regeneration 
instead  of  an  immaterial  entity,  religion  avoids  an 
impassable  philosophic  barrier,  and  realizes  an  oppor- 
tunity to  verify  its  claims  by  evidence  that  no  careful 
thinker  will  reject. 


1148 


CHAPTER  X 

CHARACTER 


It  is  an  error  to  think  of  the  mind  as  having  a  definite 
constitution  either  in  a  material  or  in  an  immaterial 
sense.  It  is  not  a  unit  with  definite,  predetermined 
expressions,  but  is  a  series  of  developing  functions 
forced  into  an  imperfect  unity  by  organic  growth  and 
external  pressure.  In  the  growth  of  any  being,  the 
earlier  parts  or  stages  are  constantly  disappearing 
through  disuse,  metamorphosis  and  other  means  of 
organic  transformation.  In  their  places  come  new 
organs  that  do  in  better  ways  the  acts  performed  by 
their  disappearing  predecessors  in  the  chain  of  organic 
growth.  Life  and  its  functions  are  at  no  time  confined 
to  any  one  of  these  links,  but  are  aggregated  in  several 
of  them.  A  moving  equilibrium  is  created  that,  with 
losses  and  gains,  takes  the  organism  upward  through 
the  series  of  changes  demanded  by  its  destiny.  Each 
new  link  has  in  it  the  same  inherited  possibilities. 
It  has  neither  more  nor  less  than  its  predecessors  had, 
but  antecedent  growth  and  external  pressure  force  it  to 
take  on  peculiar  functions  that  complement  those  of 
other  organic  parts.  Its  potentialities  are  thus  devel- 
[1511 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

oped  or  suppressed.  With  no  other  heredity  than  its 
predecessors,  it  may  grow  in  new  ways  and  manifest 
distinctive  qualities. 

Mind,  as  we  find  it  in  human  beings,  has  qualities 
that  have  developed  at  these  stages  or  levels.  Three  of 
these  stages  are  so  apparent  that  they  can  readily  be 
distinguished.  The  lowest  level  is  seen  mainly  in  the 
instincts  and  emotions;  the  second  is  the  intellect; 
the  third  is  the  will.  Of  these  the  intellect  is  the  normal 
level,  for  through  it  our  effective  adjustments  are  made. 
The  instinctive  and  emotional  level  is  plainly  sub- 
normal, for  if  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  controlled  by  its 
impulses,  we  degenerate.  The  will  is  the  supernormal 
level.  It  is  here  that  new  adjustments  and  fresh 
thought  take  their  rise.  It  differs  from  the  lower 
levels  not  in  kind  nor  in  its  possibilities,  but  in  the  fact 
that  it  is  more  plastic  and  that  much  of  its  activity  is 
still  indeterminate.  Its  primary  function  is  to  be 
active,  not  to  perform  specific  tasks  directly  advan- 
tageous in  survival.  By  absorbing  surplus  energy  it 
keeps  the  lower  faculties  normal  and  thus  adds  to  their 
effective  power.  This  indeterminateness  is  the  cause 
of  the  effectiveness  of  the  lower  organs.  It  thus  gives 
the  appearance  of  a  greater  regularity  of  action  than 
exists.  Only  in  the  subnormal  or  degenerating  parts 
is  the  reign  of  law  complete.     Elsewhere  there  is  plas- 

[152] 


CHARACTER 

ticity  and  indefiniteness  of  action  and  of  results.  This 
is  the  essence  of  growth  and  from  it  the  genetic  concept 
of  life  takes  its  rise. 

This  view  of  the  mind  could  readily  be  illustrated  in 
many  ways,  but  the  concept  is  clear  enough  for  present 
purposes.  Indeed,  to  some  it  may  too  clearly  point  to  the 
conclusion  that  it  is  at  bottom  the  old  material  view  of 
life  so  often  rejected  by  the  leaders  of  religious  thought. 
There  is  an  element  of  truth  in  this,  —  enough  to  con- 
fuse many  readers,  —  but  there  is  also  an  important  dif- 
ference. The  material  concept  of  the  mind  originated 
when  chemistry  was  the  leading  science.  Using  its  prin- 
ciples as  analogies,  psychologists  separated  the  contents 
of  the  mind  into  elements  similar  to  those  found  in 
chemical  analysis.  The  mind  was  thought  of  as  a  cru- 
cible in  which  strange  results  sprang  from  a  few  ele- 
ments. In  this  way  a  definiteness  of  construction  was 
given  to  the  mind  that  was  satisfying  in  its  complete- 
ness, but  it  failed  to  give  a  clew  to  the  mind's  real  origin 
or  functions.  A  static  mind  built  from  external  ele- 
ments, and  a  genetic  mind  constantly  rebuilt  by  its  own 
forces  and  antecedents,  are  radically  different  concepts. 
A  genetic  mind  has  material  elements,  but  they  are 
subordinate  to  the  mental  life  and  are  constantly  rebuilt 
by  it.  This  life  comes  from  these  elements,  but  is  not 
of  them.     The  genetic  always  has  some  indeterminate 

[153] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

factors  permitting  the  reshaping  of  the  whole  as  its 
growth  advances.  Older  parts  give  way  to  newer  ones, 
molded  not  by  the  material  elements  in  their  predeces- 
sors, but  by  their  mental  life.  In  each  new  growth  the 
physical  is  less  dominant  and  the  mental  more  nearly 
supreme.  We  cannot  escape  the  material,  but  we  need 
not  be  controlled  by  it. 

The  genetic  view  of  mind,  instead  of  setting  up  con- 
cepts and  deducing  principles  antagonistic  to  religion, 
emphasizes  the  same  facts  and  reaches  the  same  con- 
clusions. Both  emphasize  an  indeterminate  element 
in  conduct.  Through  this,  choices  are  made  and  the 
possibility  is  afforded  of  reconstructing  thought  and  mo- 
tive in  ways  that  make  for  higher  life.  They  also  have 
in  common  the  fact  that  control  by  the  will  is  mainly 
through  acquired  traits  and  sentiments.  If  all  forces 
acting  on  the  will  were  natural  and  predetermined,  there 
could  not  be  the  prevailing  emphasis  on  the  educating 
and  strengthening  of  the  will  now  found  in  religious  litera- 
ture. It  makes  this  same  thought  emphatic  to  say  that 
the  will  is  plastic  and  is  shaped  by  present  conditions, 
not  by  predecessors  in  time  and  space.  There  is  also 
a  like  emphasis  on  the  danger  and  prevalence  of  degen- 
eration. Through  retardation  the  lower  levels  of  the 
mind  may  remain  too  strong  to  be  controlled  by  their 
legitimate  masters  in  the  more  plastic  parts  of  the  mind ; 

[1541 


CHARACTER 

or  through  premature  acceleration  the  intellect  may  so 
fully  control  the  emotions  that  a  selfish  mental  attitude 
asserts  itself.  Finally,  and  most  important,  is  the 
thought  of  regeneration  by  which  the  old  passes  away 
and  the  new  comes  to  its  full  vigor.  To  be  born  again 
is  an  old  religious  theme.  The  genetic  organism  is  con- 
stantly being  reorganized.  Older  parts  fall  into  decay 
or  are  cast  off.  Newer  parts  take  over  the  functions  of 
their  predecessors.  In  other  ways  and  under  new  con- 
ditions they  restore  what  is  lost  and  elevate  the  whole 
organism  to  a  higher  plane.  The  genetic  mind  has  its 
levels  as  well  as  the  organism  of  which  it  is  a  part.  In 
normal  growth  the  lower  ones  are  constantly  repressed, 
and  decay  through  disuse.  There  is  thus  a  shifting 
of  control  to  the  will ;  the  mind  in  consequence  is  made 
over  fully  enough  to  be  the  psychical  expression  of  the 
new  birth  sought  by  religion. 

This  viewpoint,  whether  taught  by  religion  or  psy- 
chology, emphasizes  the  importance  of  character.  If 
the  higher  levels  of  the  mind  were  not  plastic,  if  their 
nature  were  predetermined  by  the  germ  cell  or  by  the, 
structure  of  the  lower  levels,  our  acts  would  be  the  re- 
sults of  past,  not  of  present  conditions.  Without  plas- 
ticity there  could  be  no  growth  in  character.  Hence 
there  could  be  no  way  for  education  to  mold  or  for  re- 
ligion to  regenerate.     Growth  in  character  is  possible 

[155] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

to  the  extent  that  the  acquired  powers  of  the  will  domi- 
nate over  natural  traits.  The  lower  levels  of  thought  and 
action  whose  activities  are  predetermined  must  be  sup- 
pressed ;  their  structure  must  waste  away  through  dis- 
use and  their  energy  be  absorbed  in  the  newer  activities 
of  the  will.  The  decay  of  the  old  and  predetermined 
must  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  formation  of  acquired 
traits  in  the  plastic  parts  of  the  brain.  The  will  be- 
comes definite  in  its  action  by  assuming  the  functions 
that  in  cruder  ways  the  lower  levels  of  the  mind  have 
hitherto  performed. 

This  transfer  of  function  and  control  is  the  essence  of 
every  uplift.  When  we  see  its  effects  we  call  it  growth 
in  character,  and  we  think  of  some  immaterial  change 
as  its  cause.  Could  we  measure  the  physical  changes  in 
the  structure  of  the  brain  as  readily  as  we  note  their 
effects  on  the  activity  of  men  we  would  see  that  the  one 
is  as  real  as  the  other  and  that  both  are  indications  of  the 
reconstructive  process  accompanying  normal  growth. 
The  old  decays ;  the  new  increases  in  definiteness.  It 
takes  on  itself  the  burden  of  organic  control  and  the  re- 
sponsibility for  the  continuance  of  vital  processes.  It 
matters  little  whether  we  think  of  these  changes  as  men- 
tal or  physical;  as  growth  in  character  or  in  organic 
function.  The  vital  point  is  :  the  decay  of  the  old  and 
the  growth  of  the  new,  the  loss  of  control  naturally  pre- 
[156] 


CHARACTER 

determined  and  the  gain  in  control  through  acquired 
traits,  the  transfer  of  functions  from  old,  well  estab- 
lished parts  to  those  that  are  plastic  and  fresh. 

By  these  means  the  well-recognized  levels  of  the  mind 
get  the  order  of  their  importance  reversed.  The  natu- 
rally dominant  emotions  and  instincts  become  subor- 
dinated to  the  acquired  traits  of  the  will.  On  the  lower 
level,  the  emotions  and  the  instincts  are  an  expression 
of  the  predetermined  direction  in  which  its  activity 
moves.  They  are,  however,  in  a  process  of  decay.  The 
organism  would  lose  its  adjustment,  if  other  forms  of 
determined  action  were  not  devised.  The  intellectual 
level  lies  in  the  mental  powers  created  by  the  pressure 
of  deficit.  Its  objective  expression  is  the  social  process 
that  supplements  mental  activity,  rounds  out  its  limita- 
tions and  makes  the  laws  that  give  force  to  all  of  its  ex- 
pressions. What  the  instincts  and  emotions  are  to  the 
organic  level,  and  the  social  process  is  to  the  intellectual 
level,  character  is  to  the  will.  It  changes  plasticity  and 
mere  activity  into  definite  reactions  which  create  adjust- 
ments and  replace  the  control  formerly  exercised  by  the 
emotions  and  intellect.  There  is  in  this  change  nothing 
new.  All  that  is  peculiar  to  will-power  lies  in  the  con- 
stitution of  any  organic  part.  The  same  change  of  func- 
tion from  lower  to  higher  levels  has  often  before  taken 
place.     Decay  and  growth  have  always  been  active. 

[1571 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

The  new  is  plastic  and  the  old  doomed  to  decay.  The 
difference  is  not  in  this,  but  in  the  completeness  of  the 
changes  involved.  From  an  almost  complete  state  of 
predeterminateness,  in  which  natural  characters  and 
external  pressure  are  dominant,  a  new  control  arises 
that  is  largely  plastic.  In  so  far  as  it  is  predetermined, 
conditions  are  made  by  the  pressure  of  the  social  process 
to  a  far  greater  degree  than  by  organic  antecedents. 
Emotions  and  instincts  are  thus  displaced  by  abstract 
mental  concepts  and  social  ideals.  These  are  the  mold 
in  which  character  is  shaped.  A  man  of  will  should 
have  no  natural  emotions  or  inherited  instincts  strong 
enough  to  control  him.  Their  decay  is  the  condition 
on  which  his  strength  of  character  depends. 

If  the  will  is  a  mental  level  and  character  an  index  of 
the  reconstructions  by  which  activities  are  controlled, 
a  new  importance  is  given  to  the  relation  of  higher  to 
lower  levels  and  to  the  means  by  which  transferences  of 
control  from  one  to  another  are  carried  through.  It 
now  becomes  necessary  to  trace  the  physical  antecedents 
of  thought.  The  decay  or  disuse  of  organs  must  precede 
the  reconstruction  of  mental  life.  The  shifting  of 
growth  from  one  part  of  an  organism  to  others  must  re- 
organize the  mental  phenomena  their  activity  evokes. 
As  the  instincts  and  emotions  arise  from  the  level  where 
decay  and  reconstruction  are  most  evident,  it  is  to  them 

[158] 


CHARACTER 

we  must  turn  in  looking  for  the  connection  between 
mental  facts  and  vital  processes.  To  most  writers  the 
emotions  and  instincts  seem  unrelated.  Discussions 
throw  little  light  either  on  the  relations  of  instincts  and 
emotions  to  each  other  or  to  the  underlying  vital  mech- 
anism. I  have  found  but  one  writer  l  who  recognizes  a 
direct  connection  between  instincts  and  emotions.  The 
relation  he  finds  is  not  the  same  as  suggests  itself  to 
me,  but  the  start  he  makes  is  an  intelligent  one.  Mr. 
McDougall  thinks  that  each  of  the  principal  instincts 
presupposes  some  kind  of  emotional  excitement,  so  that 
its  activity  is  always  accompanied  by  the  emotion  pe- 
culiar to  it.  The  emotion,  if  I  understand  him  rightly, 
is  the  mental  expression  of  those  organic  facts  whose  ef- 
fects we  call  instinctive.  Instinct  and  emotion  would 
then  grow  and  decay  together,  and  be  strong  or  weak 
from  the  same  group  of  vital  conditions.  To  me,  an- 
other connection  seems  more  probable.  I  would  say 
that  instead  of  growing  and  decaying  together,  the 
growth  of  emotion  is  an  index  of  decay  in  the  instinct  it 
accompanies. 

To  make  my  meaning  clear  and  to  give  a  clew  to  my 
reasoning,  I  shall  first  state  the  general  principle  on 
which  it  is  based.  An  instinct  is  the  mark  of  effective 
activity ;  a  condition  in  which  energy  goes  out  fully  in 

*Se«  McDougall,  "Social  Psychology,"  Chap.  III. 
[159] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

activity.  The  instinctive  act  is  the  most  perfect  of  or- 
ganic adjustments,  and  in  it  the  amount  of  work  done  is 
proportionate  to  the  energy  at  the  disposal  of  the  past. 
Were  all  acts  instinctive,  mental  phenomena  might  be 
clear,  but  they  would  not  be  emotional.  The  instinct 
to  keep  an  upright  position  under  normal  conditions 
hardly  enters  into  consciousness.  When  it  is  so  weak- 
ened that  we  fear  a  fall,  it  may  be  the  source  of  a  strong 
emotion. 

I  would  not  say  with  Mr.  McDougall  that  a  dog  barks 
in  pursuit  of  game  because  it  has  a  social  instinct,  but 
because  its  whole  energy  is  not  used  up  in  the  pursuit. 
The  aroused  but  unused  energy  flows  over  to  other  cen- 
ters and  awakens  their  activity.  It  is  an  old  saying  that 
barking  dogs  never  bite.  I  would  interpret  this  to 
mean  that  a  biting  dog  is  more  instinctive,  and  that  all 
his  energy  goes  out  in  activity.  The  instinct  of  the 
barking  dog  partially  fails,  and  the  aroused  energy  is 
used  up  in  barking  instead  of  biting.  The  domesti- 
cated dog  has  degenerated  from  the  earlier  condition, 
where  energy  and  activity  were  coordinated.  Energy 
flows  as  in  olden  times,  but  the  partial  disuse  of  his  or- 
gans of  pursuit  makes  an  overflow  of  energy  that  is  ex- 
hibited in  other  parts  as  emotion.  A  squirrel  that 
buries  nuts  lacks  emotion  about  them.  The  activity 
runs  its  course  instinctively,  with  so  close  a  correspond- 

[160] 


CHARACTER 

ence  between  energy  and  activity  that  no  surplus  re- 
mains to  generate  feeling.  The  instinct  of  flight  is  not 
of  necessity  accompanied  by  fear.  If  the  instinct  works 
perfectly,  there  is  no  emotion.  The  act  of  flight  absorbs 
the  energy  and  puts  the  animal  in  a  position  free  from 
danger.  It  is  the  imperfect  working  of  the  instinct  that 
evokes  fear.  This  emotion  has  its  seat,  not  in  the  cen- 
ters made  active  in  flight,  but  in  other  parts  to  which 
the  overflow  of  energy  goes. 

The  use  of  the  emotion  is  that  it  arouses  these  related 
parts  and  forces  them  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  instinc- 
tive activities.  Under  emotion,  either  the  whole  organ- 
ism acts,  or  many  more  of  its  powers  are  made  effective 
than  is  the  case  where  an  act  is  purely  instinctive. 
Emotional  activity  is  more  complex  than  instinctive 
action.  It  arises  when  the  organic  mechanisms  are  being 
displaced  by  the  more  conscious  coordinations  of  the 
higher  centers.  The  old  must  to  some  extent  decay  to 
permit  this  change.  The  less  effective  action  of  the  old 
leaves  free  a  fund  of  energy  that  is  used  up  in  arousing 
related  parts.  The  resulting  emotion  concentrates  the 
attention  on  the  instinctive  act  and  brings  to  its  aid  the 
whole  conscious  force  of  the  organism.  The  newer  parts 
thus  become  trained  to  do  the  work  of  their  decaying 
predecessors  and  action  is  raised  to  a  higher  level 
through  the  increase  of  its  conscious  elements.  Emo- 
m  [161] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

tion  is  thus  the  mental  sign  of  waste  energy.  Instinct 
indicates  efficiency.  When  it  alone  operates,  the  poten- 
tial energy  of  the  part  and  the  amount  of  work  done 
exactly  correspond.  While  emotion  is  waste  energy, 
it  is  of  use  in  arousing  related  parts  and  in  centering  the 
attention  on  the  instinctive  act,  thus  bringing  the  whole 
organism  into  action.  As  a  stage  in  development  emo- 
tion indicates  that  older  parts  are  decaying,  and  that 
their  activity  is  being  taken  over  by  the  higher,  more 
plastic  centers. 

Emotion  has  a  suggestive  power  that  makes  the  activ- 
ity of  newly  formed  organs  definite.  These  in  conse- 
quence follow  more  closely  in  the  line  of  their  predeces- 
sors. It  is  this  suggestive  power  that  gives  the  emotions 
their  greatest  power.  In  every  organic  transition  due  to 
the  creation  of  new  parts  and  the  decay  of  the  old  they 
bind  the  two  together,  keep  up  the  continuity  of  the  or- 
ganism and  shape  the  new  in  harmony  with  the  old. 
They  cease  to  operate  only  when  the  reorganization  is 
so  complete  that  the  whole  energy  of  the  organism  might 
go  out  in  new  ways  as  effectually  as  in  the  old.  This 
point,  however,  never  comes ;  for  the  process  of  recon- 
struction and  advance  is  continuous.  There  is  always 
decay  to  create  emotion,  and  there  are  always  new  parts 
for  it  to  direct.  It  is  thus  shifted  from  part  to  part  and 
expresses  itself  in  new  ways  in  each  epoch  of  organic 

[1621 


CHARACTER 

growth.  Its  emphasis  on  organic  needs  is  the  primary 
force  that  arouses  the  will  to  action.  Were  it  the  only- 
force,  the  problem  of  the  will  would  be  simple.  Each 
new  part,  as  it  developed  in  determinateness,  would  re- 
peat the  selfsame  activities  to  which  its  predecessors 
were  accustomed.  The  opposing  force  comes  from  what 
we  call  character.  Impulses  and  passions  are  natural 
emotions  whose  direction  is  determined  by  the  organs  in 
which  they  arise.  The  character  elements  are  senti- 
ments that  stand  in  close  relation  to  the  intellect,  where 
acquired  traits  take  their  rise.  These  sentiments  are 
social  in  origin.  On  them  we  rely  to  stem  the  tide  of 
rising  impulse  and  passion. 

To  explain  the  will  is  to  show  how  these  newly  ac- 
quired sentiments  dominate  in  men  over  the  more 
powerful  impulses  that  through  heredity  control  the  or- 
ganism. We  get  a  solution  of  this  difficulty,  not  by  think- 
ing of  the  will  as  an  immaterial  force,  but  as  a  plastic 
expression  of  forces  determinate  only  in  so  far  as  they 
have  been  organized  as  social  sentiments.  When  a  con- 
flict comes  between  acquired  sentiments  and  natural  im- 
pulses, the  will  acts  with  the  sentiments  and  against  the 
impulses.  To  say  this  is  not  to  restate  the  problem  in 
other  words,  but  to  divide  it  into  two  parts.  The  moral 
education  of  a  man  might  be  complete  and  his  social  sen- 
timents strong.     Yet,  if  he  had  no  surplus  energy  to 

[163] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

reenforce  them,  they  would  be  powerless  in  a  conflict 
with  impulse  and  passion.  The  indeterminate  forces 
of  the  will  are  an  index  of  surplus  energy.  If  men  were 
normal,  every  lower  part  would  be  under  the  pressure  of 
deficit.  All  surplus  energy  would  be  concentrated  in 
the  plastic  parts  as  a  reserve  force  to  be  used  when  the 
sentiments  arouse  its  activity.  What  the  strength  of 
the  moral  sentiments  is,  and  what  is  the  amount  of  sur- 
plus energy,  are  two  distinct  problems.  The  one  de- 
pends on  education  and  the  other  on  the  physical  nor- 
mality of  the  man.  There  can  be  no  effective  volition 
if  surplus  energy  is  absent.  Its  action,  if  present,  would 
be  indeterminate  without  the  growth  of  moral  senti- 
ments. If  it  acts  with  the  acquired  sentiments  and 
against  natural  impulses,  we  can  be  sure  that  normal 
people  will  act  right  if  properly  educated.  It  becomes 
doubly  sure  in  the  case  of  degenerates  that  they  will  act 
from  impulse  and  not  from  education.  Hence  the  need 
of  the  opposition  to  degeneration  which  is  the  essence 
of  religious  activity. 


[164] 


CHAPTER  XI 
INSPIRATION 


s 


XI 


The  most  difficult  of  religious  topics  is  yet  to  be  dis- 
cussed. It  is  difficult,  not  from  any  intrinsic  reason,  but 
because  religious  people  distrust  scientific  analysis.  If 
one  religiously  inclined  states  his  experience,  he  finds 
that  he  has  gained  nothing  by  a  frank  confession.  He 
will  more  likely  feel  a  loss  of  self-respect  by  recognizing 
the  similarities  between  what  to  him  is  sacred  and  what 
is  plainly  a  degenerate  state  in  those  with  whom  he  is 
compared.  Inspiration  is  an  emotional  state  and  shows 
the  peculiarities  of  other  emotions.  Abnormalities  do 
not  follow  distinct  laws  of  their  own.  They  are  merely 
exaggerations  which,  because  of  their  striking  features, 
can  be  more  easily  studied  than  can  the  less  obtrusive 
normal  phenomena  from  which  they  are  differentiated 
and  derived.  The  road  to  the  knowledge  of  the  normal 
is  through  the  abnormal.  Only  after  the  abnormal 
symptoms  of  emotion  are  well  understood  can  they 
be  separated  from  religious  emotions  and  the  ways 
pointed  out  by  which  the  latter  may  be  developed. 

If  inspiration  is  normal  and  not  a  fancy,  it  is  possible 
to  show  how  its  force  and  its  frequency  may  be  in- 

[167] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

creased.  What  is  more  important,  it  is  possible  to  help 
others  develop  inspirational  moods  and  to  get  the  advan- 
tage that  flows  from  them.  At  present  our  methods  of 
propagating  religious  ideas  are  sadly  deficient.  Until 
other  means  are  found  of  helping  people  to  intensify 
their  spiritual  convictions,  religion  will  continue  in  the 
state  of  decline  so  evident  in  recent  years.  Any  cause 
fights  a  losing  battle  that  does  not  win  converts.  Our 
vital  experience  dies  with  us  unless  revived  by  others. 
It  ceases  to  have  value  as  evidence  unless  it  be  made  a 
matter  of  heritage.  We  must  therefore  analyze  reli- 
gious feelings  to  get  the  key  to  their  revival  in  others. 
Seeming  losses  will  be  transmuted  into  gains  if  in  the 
end  sound  methods  of  propagating  religious  feeling  are 
found  and  used. 

To  realize  this  advantage,  we  must  utilize  the  genetic 
concept  of  the  mind  which  has  been  presented.  The 
mind  is  not  a  unit  with  an  innate  constitution  and  a 
multitude  of  derived  consequences.  It  is  a  series  of 
growths,  each  with  the  same  organic  background. 
These  function  in  different  ways  because  of  differences 
in  antecedent  conditions  and  external  pressure.  There 
are  plastic  indeterminate  parts,  and  those  falling  into 
decay.  Every  one  has  a  normal  level  where  action  is 
effective,  a  subnormal  level  where  degeneration  has  be- 
gun, and  a  supernormal  level,  —  too  plastic  to  have  its 

[168] 


INSPIRATION 

action  predetermined  and  too  incompletely  formed  to 
displace  its  predecessors  in  their  useful,  well-established 
acts.  The  forward  movements  of  the  organism,  how- 
ever, consist  in  displacing  these  decaying  parts  or  in 
limiting  the  scope  of  their  activity.  This  process  in- 
creases the  functions  and  definiteness  of  action  of  the 
newer  parts.  Thus  readjustments  to  the  environment 
are  made  and  a  high  standard  of  efficiency  attained. 

This  view  assumes  practical  value  when  we  regard 
the  will  as  the  supernormal  element,  thus  separating 
it  from  the  intellectual  process  of  which  it  is  usually 
regarded  a  part.  The  will  thus  becomes  the  seat  of  sur- 
plus energy,  the  only  part  in  the  normal  man  where 
surplus  dominates.  The  instincts  and  animal  emotions 
are  in  a  state  of  organic  decay  while  the  intellect  is 
under  the  pressure  of  deficit.  The  action  of  the  will 
thus  has  distinguishing  characteristics  which  enable  us 
to  determine  what  are  true  volitions  in  contrast  with 
the  impulses  coming  from  the  lower  organs.  Both 
types  of  action  figure  in  consciousness.  They  seem  so 
much  alike  that  we  think  of  all  action  as  willed.  They 
differ  radically,  however,  in  their  background.  Im- 
pulses come  from  below  and  are  marked  by  their  organic 
origin,  or  they  arise  from  the  external  pressure  that 
evokes  the  action  of  the  intellect.  In  the  one  case 
they  are  instincts,  emotions  and  passions ;  in  the  other 

[1691 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

they  are  utilities  having  force  through  the  values  they 
create.  In  both  cases  action  is  determinate  and  readily 
referable  to  the  external  causes  in  which  it  originates. 
These  organic,  economic  and  social  impulses  make  up 
the  great  mass  of  our  acts.  We  should  contrast  them  in 
their  totality  with  true  volitions  which  come  from  the 
will  and  hence  are  free  from  the  pressure,  organic  or  ex- 
ternal, that  makes  them  measurable  forces. 

The  first  essential  in  grasping  this  contrast  is  to  real- 
ize that  volition  takes  its  rise,  not  in  reason,  but  in  sur- 
plus energy.  The  will  does  not  act  on  experience  or 
proof,  but  from  a  primary  impulse  aroused  by  free  energy. 
Its  usefulness  is  not  in  what  it  does,  but  in  the  absorp- 
tion of  energy  that  keeps  the  lower  organs  normal  by 
forcing  them  to  work  under  a  deficit.  The  start  of 
volition  is  thus  in  energy;  its  end  is  in  a  sentiment. 
Any  repeated  act  gains  emotional  power,  and  thus  an 
impulse  is  generated  that  acts  like  other  impulses  in  a 
steady,  persistent  manner  toward  given  ends.  At  any 
moment  the  force  of  the  will  lies  in  the  sentiments  that 
its  repeated  acts  have  formed.  So  long,  then,  as  surplus 
energy  flows  normally  through  the  will,  there  is  a  growth 
of  acquired  sentiments  and  an  increase  in  their  domi- 
nance over  natural  impulses.  Once  check  the  flow  of 
surplus  energy  and  character  degenerates.  Control 
then  becomes  emotional  or  intellectual.     In  the  latter 

[1701 


INSPIRATION 

case,  senile  traits  steadily  increase  until  old  age  comes 
on,  with  its  rigidity  of  thought  and  action.  Volition 
is  thus  a  definite  process,  beginning  in  surplus  of  energy 
and  ending  in  sentiments.  If  this  be  granted,  we  can 
hope  to  explain  what  gives  volitions  their  direction. 

First  of  all,  I  shall  enunciate  a  principle  that  will 
clarify  our  view  of  essentials.  Reason  has  no  direct 
influence  on  the  will.  Its  influence  is  corrective,  not 
formative.  Volition  makes  sentiments  and  through 
them  beliefs.  Reason  chooses  between  beliefs,  but  it 
originates  nothing.  It  merely  decides  between  thoughts 
and  opinions  already  formed.  Reason  is  an  expression 
of  deficit  and  gets  its  force  by  weeding  out  what  some 
more  original  power  creates.  Between  the  many  dif- 
ferent directions  in  which  indeterminate  activity  goes 
out,  it  forces  choices  which  make  volition  seem  to  be  its 
product  instead  of  its  superior.  In  the  virgin  soil  of  a 
plastic  mind  beliefs  grow  lavishly.  They  are  not  the 
result  of  evidence  nor  of  experience,  but  of  rapid  organic 
growth.  To  act  is  to  believe.  In  this  state  of  mind 
the  young  go  along  until  they  stumble  on  some  limita- 
tion arising  from  lack  of  energy.  Then  beliefs  begin 
to  clash.  The  weaker  go  to  the  wall,  for  they  are  least 
capable  of  resisting  the  pressure  of  deficit.  When  we 
pride  ourselves  in  getting  the  greatest  return  for  the 
least  effort,  we  are  plainly  under  the  pressure  of  want 

[171] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

and  far  from  that  primal  state  where  energy  dominates. 
The  utilitarian  cramps  our  concepts  so  much  that  we 
lose  sight  of  our  earlier,  more  energetic  state.  We  even 
go  so  far  as  to  esteem  personal  relics  of  it  as  marks  of 
degeneration.  These  latter  states  are  more  effective, 
but  they  are  neither  higher  nor  primal.  We  must  look 
in  some  other  quarter  than  reason  to  find  their  source. 
It  is  also  plain  that  if  surplus  energy  and  its  plastic 
manifestations  are  the  source  from  which  new  thought 
arises,  children  are  more  normal  than  their  elders. 
Their  simple  faith  is  nearer  the  source  of  inspiration 
and  of  new  thought  than  is  the  logic  of  later  years. 
With  them  to  think  is  to  act.  Simple  suggestion  is 
transformed  into  action  by  the  force  of  the  surplus 
within  them.  To  act  is  to  create  a  sentiment  in  favor 
of  the  action.  This  tends  toward  its  repetition  and 
increase  in  power.  Suggestion  is  thus  the  intermediary 
between  surplus  energy  and  sentiment.  It  is  the  force 
that  gives  direction  to  the  activities  of  the  will  and 
gradually  transforms  them  from  indeterminate  to 
determinate  action. 

It  is  customary  to  think  of  suggestion  as  a  lower, 
rather  than  a  higher,  power.  This  is  because  it  was  first 
brought  into  prominence  by  the  study  of  degenerate 
types.  It  is  regarded  as  a  force  appearing  when  the 
normal  action  of  the  higher  faculties  is  interrupted. 

11721 


INSPIRATION 

This  fact  should  not  cause  us  to  disparage  its  origin,  but 
should  help  us  to  classify  the  various  forms  of  suggestion 
and  thus  bring  them  into  contrast  with  the  pressure  of 
deficit  that  all  intellectual  action  manifests.  Where 
plasticity  and  surplus  exist,  suggestion  forestalls  the 
rational  process  which  acts  with  precision  only  when 
plasticity  and  surplus  fail.  The  degenerate  goes  wrong 
not  because  the  power  arousing  action  is  of  a  low 
nature,  but  because  his  ill-balanced  condition  makes 
adjustive  acts  impossible.  The  child  who  is  led  by 
suggestion  would  also  be  eliminated  but  for  the  pro- 
tection of  his  elders.  Even  the  man  of  genius  is  not 
safe  unless  he  keeps  himself  out  of  places  where  the 
struggle  for  life  is  severe.  Suggestion  is  not  so  perfect 
a  tool  as  reason,  but  it  is  the  original  shaping  power  in 
plastic  minds.  When  it  leads  to  the  creation  of  senti- 
ments it  is  a  potent  force  for  progress,  the  only  one  that 
moves  in  the  right  direction.  When  new  situations 
stimulate  an  unexpected  and  extraordinary  manifesta- 
tion, or  when  an  unforeseen  social  situation  arises, 
reason,  forethought  and  prudence  fail  to  give  a  solution. 
Suggestion  must  replace  them.  The  narrow,  safe  path 
of  reason  is  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  the  diverging 
paths  of  suggestion.  These  often  lead  into  difficulty, 
but  they  may  also  open  the  road  to  a  better  life. 
Two  forms  of  suggestion  are  obviously  useful.  Or- 
[173] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

ganic  suggestion  is  the  power  over  our  plastic  higher 
faculties  exercised  by  the  definite  impulses  of  our  lower 
nature.  It  is  suggestion  that  in  the  decay  of  older 
organs  induces  the  newer  ones  to  take  on  their  activity. 
There  would  be  no  link  between  the  old  and  the  new 
by  which  normal  progress  arises  if  this  force  of  sugges- 
tion were  not  felt  and  its  dictates  followed.  Social 
suggestion  is  equally  prominent.  We  see  it  on  its  bad 
side  when  a  mob  overthrows  social  law  and  eagerly 
follows  ways  that  are  crude  but  energetic.  We  see  it, 
however,  much  more  frequently  on  its  good  side  when 
it  strengthens  social  usage  and  keeps  men  within  the 
bounds  of  law  and  morality.  For  much  of  the  good 
men  do  they  can  give  no  adequate  reason.  The  influ- 
ence of  others,  through  precept  and  example,  deter- 
mines acts  more  frequently  than  men  realize.  If  we 
were  careful  to  distinguish  suggestion  from  reason,  the 
dominance  of  suggestion  even  in  normal  men  would 
be  evident.  It  directs  surplus  energy  toward  its  ends 
and  is  never  absent  except  when  men  fall  into  the  grip 
of  old  age. 

From  the  standpoint  of  religion  neither  of  these  well- 
recognized  forms  of  suggestion  is  of  use.  They  are 
more  likely  to  repress  religious  expression  than  to  evoke 
its  higher  manifestations.  Organic  suggestion  gives 
force  to  passions.     Social  suggestion  strengthens  rou- 

[1741 


INSPIRATION 

tine  discipline  in  ways  that  kill  the  spirit,  even  though 
it  may  save  the  letter  of  the  law.  The  prophet  who 
seeks  inspiration  subdues  organic  suggestion  by  a 
meager  diet,  and  avoids  social  suggestion  by  a  life  of 
solitude.  In  this  he  is  wise,  for  both  organic  and  social 
suggestion  must  be  displaced  before  natural  suggestion 
can  begin  its  forceful  but  disruptive  activity.  All 
men  feel  the  stimulating,  suggestive  power  of  nature. 
They  realize  that  their  best  thoughts  are  evoked  when 
under  its  influence.  Given  surplus  energy  as  a  condi- 
tion, and  nature  as  an  environment,  these  forces  are  at 
a  maximum  that  guide  and  elevate  our  thought.  Senti- 
ments are  thus  created  that  become  a  bulwark  against 
depression  when  routine  living  is  once  more  resumed. 
It  is  this  state  that  is  the  essence  of  inspiration.  When 
we  feel  it  our  religious  sentiments  grow.  As  a  result 
we  are  raised  above  the  normal  and  substitute  distant 
for  immediately  useful  ends. 

It  would  be  useless  to  analyze  religious  inspiration 
unless  we  also  show  ways  by  which  consciously  to  attain 
it.  The  transformation  of  inspiration  from  an  acciden- 
tal to  a  social  force  depends  on  the  creating  of  regular 
avenues  of  approach.  The  full  development  of  this 
province  is  a  task  larger  than  I  can  undertake,  but  there 
are  some  facts  whose  bearing  is  so  plain  that  they  should 
not  be  neglected.  Suggestion  is  an  offshoot  of  surplus 
[175] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

energy.  When  vital  forces  are  at  a  minimum  or  on  a 
downward  curve,  all  energy  is  exhausted  in  performing 
the  mechanical  operations  that  sustain  life.  Under 
these  conditions  the  instincts,  emotions,  rational 
thought  and  like  expressions  of  deficit  dominate  too 
fully  to  permit  any  waste  of  energy  along  untried  lines. 
An  upward  curve  of  energy  gives  the  freedom  from 
mechanical  control  that  makes  volition  possible,  and 
favors  conditions  that  evoke  suggestion.  Most  men 
are  subject  to  irregularities  in  their  supply  of  energy. 
Sickness,  disaster,  bad  food,  and  many  other  conditions 
produce  this  result.  In  consequence,  most  men  at 
intervals  pass  from  one  extreme  to  the  other.  Down- 
ward curves  bring  doubt,  fear  and  depression ;  upward 
curves  create  men  anew  and  give  the  higher  powers  an 
unwonted  supply  of  energy.  It  is  during  the  domi- 
nance of  the  upward  movement  that  suggestion  is 
potent  and  new  beliefs  are  readily  formed.  The  many 
plans  of  recent  origin  for  the  suppression  of  pain  and 
the  inculcation  of  invigorating  belief  have  their  bases 
in  this  thought,  even  if  the  mode  of  expressing  it  is  so 
immaterial  that  the  physical  background  of  the  mind 
is  ignored.  To  keep  the  thought  of  pain  out  of  the 
mind  when  depression  tends  to  make  it  vivid,  and  to 
utilize  the  early  epochs  of  recovery  for  presenting 
suggestive  ideas,  are  two  rules  that  work  wonders  in 

[176] 


INSPIRATION 

rebuilding  the   higher  life   among   those   temporarily 
depressed. 

The  apparent  miracles  of  new  types  of  belief  are 
readily  explained  if  the  relation  of  suggestion  to  surplus 
energy  is  once  understood.  Prominent  as  are  these 
cases,  they  are  less  significant  than  the  working  of  the 
same  principle  in  normal  people,  in  their  periods  of 
growing  vigor.  Natural  suggestion,  with  its  power  of 
inspiration,  comes  to  them  in  times  of  energy ;  it  pushes 
them  into  a  contact  with  nature  by  its  propelling  force. 
All  men  might  feel  its  promptings  if  surplus  energy 
were  not  so  freely  used  in  the  pursuit  of  material  ends 
or  of  social  dominion.  We  get  inspiration  when  we  cut 
down  our  wants  and  isolate  ourselves,  not  because  these 
ends  are  bad,  but  because  they  exhaust  energy.  It  is 
stored-up  energy  that  brings  on  states  of  inspiration. 
We  can,  therefore,  create  inspiration  just  as  we  can 
avoid  the  thought  of  pain.  In  the  reconstruction  these 
two  changes  bring  is  the  hope  of  religion  and  the  promise 
of  a  better  life. 


[177 


CHAPTEE  XII 


HISTORIC  OR  STATE  RELIGION 


« 


XII 


I  have  kept  in  the  background  the  actual  develop- 
ment of  religion,  because  the  thread  of  human  progress 
is  lost  in  a  recital  of  confusing  facts  and  present  creeds. 
Our  first  task  has  been  to  outline  the  basal  ideas  on 
which  religion  rests.  We  must  now  bring  these  ideas 
into  harmony  with  religion  as  we  find  it  expressed  in 
historic  institutions  and  voiced  by  prevailing  religious 
sentiment.  Natural  and  historic  religion,  instead  of 
being  harmonious  growths,  seem  to  be  antagonistic 
tendencies.  They  have  little  in  common  but  a  name. 
The  causes  of  this  divergence  are  not  hard  to  find ;  and 
if  they  are  once  clearly  presented,  the  conciliation  of 
the  two  becomes  possible,  even  if  its  realization  is 
remote.  The  essential  difference  arises  from  the  fact 
that  natural  religion  is  an  expression  of  surplus  energy, 
while  historic  religions  have  assumed  their  well-known 
forms  under  the  pressure  of  deficit.  Had  the  history 
of  national  resources  been  different,  religion  would  have 
become,  not  an  expression  of  sorrow,  but  of  joy. 

These  evils  and  the  race  antagonisms  they  provoke 
made  each  nation  a  coherent  group  and  forced  men  to 

[181] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

subordinate  themselves  to  the  needs  of  the  state.  The 
duty  of  sacrifice  was  in  its  origin  political,  and  becomes 
religious  only  because  of  the  close  union  between  the 
two.  The  fierce  struggle  for  national  independence 
evoked  sacrifice  just  as  it  did  bravery,  and  the  two 
qualities  grew  together  as  national  conflicts  increased  in 
violence  and  frequence.  Sacrifice  becomes  a  virtue 
only  under  the  pressure  of  want,  and  must  have  as  a 
background  the  presence  of  war,  famine,  disease  and 
national  disorder.  Historic  religion  is  state  religion 
because  it  reflects  the  ideas  imposed  by  race  conflicts 
and  emphasizes  the  virtues  they  bring  forth. 

We  may  well  regard  the  historic  and  the  prehistoric 
epochs  as  stages  in  economic  development  from  which 
two  types  of  religion  have  risen.  By  this  I  do  not 
mean  that  there  ever  was  a  natural  man  of  the  kind 
Rousseau  pictures,  nor  even  a  natural  religion  like  that 
of  the  theologians.  Both  of  these  concepts  present 
man  as  he  would  be  in  a  naturally  Utopian  environ- 
ment, or  in  a  developed  economic  regime.  If  we  would 
picture  with  any  accuracy  the  prehistoric  man,  we  must 
strip  away  all  traits  acquired  in  this  advanced  regime 
and  all  political  and  moral  advantages  flowing  from  it. 
This  process,  if  thoroughly  applied,  would  give  results 
so  peculiar  as  to  have  little  value.  We  cannot  recon- 
struct or  revive  the  natural  man.  To  bring  him  back 
[182] 


HISTORIC  OR  STATE  RELIGION 

would  be  a  loss,  not  a  gain.  Yet  there  are  elements  in 
this  early  situation  so  clear  and  striking  that  to  neglect 
them  would  make  history  unexplainable  and  give  a 
wrong  interpretation  to  human  nature.  By  making 
prominent  the  traits  that  survive,  instead  of  emphasiz- 
ing the  details  of  the  long  epoch  in  which  these  traits 
arose,  we  falsify  history  and  present  an  artificial  man. 
But  we  do,  by  this  means,  reach  the  essence  of  man's 
progress.  The  description  of  a  long  series  of  events  in 
many  changing  environments  would  obscure  this 
progress  and  defeat  our  purpose.  Natural  characters 
reflect  a  single  possible  environment.  This  we  should 
try  to  reconstruct,  even  if  the  effort  yields  a  mere 
Utopia. 

The  essentials  of  this  pictured  prehistoric  state  should 
be  thought  of  in  terms  of  health  rather  than  in  those  of 
welfare.  Man's  constitution  shows  that  he  is  a  long- 
lived  being.  For  his  development  there  must  have  been 
a  period  when  the  natural  span  of  life  was  more  fully 
realized  than  in  the  recent  past.  Disease  in  its  present 
forms  is  a  result  of  historic  conditions.  Especially  is 
this  true  of  the  great  epidemics  that  have  so  much 
shortened  life.  Filth  comes  mainly  through  overcrowd- 
ing; contagious  diseases  could  not  have  antedated  it. 
When  the  world  was  sparsely  populated  and  the  natu- 
ral surplus  large,   a  mature  old  age  must  have  been 

[1831 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

the  general  expectation.  Infant  mortality  was  doubt- 
less large ;  but  this  would  not  have  much  influence  on 
social  organization  if  this  dangerous  period  was  fol- 
lowed by  a  long  period  of  vigorous  manhood.  Old  age 
would  also,  as  with  animals,  quickly  lead  to  death. 
The  young  and  vigorous  would  thus  set  the  pace  and 
shape  social  and  religious  usages.  Then  youth  and 
vigor  were  long  and  old  age  short ;  now,  youth  is  but 
a  passing  moment  and  old  age  an  enduring,  hopeless 
epoch.  With  us  the  senile  hand  is  on  every  institution 
and  influences  every  social  event.  It  is  not  to  be  won- 
dered that  religion  has  reflected  this  change  and  has 
become  a  thing  of  age  and  grief. 

The  economic  conditions  of  early  times  also  empha- 
sized joy  above  sorrow.  Nature  was  irregular  in  the 
bestowal  of  its  gifts.  Periods  of  abundance  and  want 
followed  each  other  with  great  frequency.  But  when 
nature  gave,  it  gave  freely.  Periods  of  plenty  were 
free  from  worry.  They  became  the  occasions  of  great 
festivals  that  aided  much  in  shaping  early  institutions. 
Memory  dwelt  on  the  joy  of  living  during  its  best  mo- 
ments, rather  than  on  the  reviving  of  the  evils  incident 
to  periods  of  want.  Distress  and  woe  must  become 
chronic  before  they  mold  social  thought.  This  can  hap- 
pen only  after  the  social  surplus  has  been  appropriated 
by  dominating  groups.     So  long  as  all  participate  in 

[184] 


HISTORIC  OR  STATE  RELIGION 

the  surplus  their  lives  will  be  shaped  by  its  pleasures. 
Chronic  poverty  is  due  to  a  pressure  which  could  not 
have  been  felt  before  historic  institutions  deprived  the 
poor  of  their  share  of  the  free  gifts  of  nature. 

Religion  under  these  conditions  becomes  the  inspiring 
uplift  of  life,  not  a  preparation  for  death.  It  arose  and 
expanded  with  the  increased  vitality  of  spring,  with  the 
freshening  influences  of  outdoor  life,  with  the  songs  and 
festivals  of  the  harvest,  with  the  sports  and  amusements 
of  public  gatherings,  with  the  joy  of  victory  and  the 
pleasures  of  prosperity.  Some  of  this  religion  has  re- 
mained in  a  subdued  form  and  has  become  a  part  of 
modern  life;  but  most  of  it  was  crushed  out  in  the 
struggle  of  later  religions  to  reduce  life  to  a  simple  moral 
basis.  In  the  pagan  times  it  still  held  a  place,  for 
morality  had  not  yet  been  differentiated  from  public 
life.  But  to  the  Hebrew  prophets  it  became  idolatry, 
and  was  swept  aside  in  the  endeavor  to  secure  a  clearer 
concept  of  God,  a  purer  morality  and  greater  social 
justice. 

Had  economic  conditions  been  normal  and  had  a 
long,  prosperous  life  been  the  reward  of  right  action, 
the  new  morality  might  have  been  blended  with 
existing  social  institutions.  Each  would  thus  have 
felt  increased  vigor.  Health,  prosperity,  justice,  mo- 
rality and  the  joy  of  life  could  have  been  blended  into 

[185] 


THE   SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

a  higher  harmony,  of  which  religion  would  have  been 
the  best  expression.  The  economic  shortcomings  of 
the  localities  in  which  civilization  arose  did  not  permit 
this.  Western  Asia  was  in  a  state  of  physical  decline 
during  the  period  when  its  civilization  was  forming. 
A  reduction  of  rainfall  was  coupled  with  a  type  of 
agriculture  that  wasted  resources.  Nation  after  nation 
became  the  seat  of  civilization,  only  to  go  down  before 
the  pressure  of  want  brought  on  by  reduced  rain 
supply  and  bad  use  of  the  soil.  The  resort  to  irriga- 
tion gave  only  temporary  relief,  for  in  the  end  the 
crushing  power  of  failing  resources  makes  futile  even 
the  best  of  plans.  A  secondary  result  of  these  condi- 
tions was  a  constant  unrest  of  nations  with  resulting 
feuds  and  wars.  No  nation  can  have  a  normal  growth 
with  poverty-stricken  neighbors  trying  to  displace  it. 
War,  therefore,  became  the  glory  of  nations,  and 
pillage  was  more  honorable  than  industry.  To  these 
evils  were  added  the  great  plagues  arising  from  the 
increasing  contact  with  semitropical  regions.  Famine, 
war  and  disease  became  scourges,  making  life  so  inse- 
cure as  to  seem  worthless.  With  the  terrors  of  death 
ever  imminent,  it  was  inevitable  that  religion  should 
reflect  the  change.  A  future  life  and  its  rewards 
became  the  compensation  for  the  trials  and  suffering 
bound  up  with  present  existence. 

[186] 


HISTORIC  OR  STATE  RELIGION 

In  the  midst  of  these  changes,  and  reflecting  the 
ideas  that  sprang  from  them,  the  Jewish  nation  arose 
and  became  the  mold  in  which  modern  religion  took 
its  form.  Judea  was  an  isolated  valley  with  enough 
resources  to  create  a  national  life,  yet  not  large  enough 
to  resist  invasion.  The  growth  of  commerce  brought 
tropical  diseases  from  which  the  land  would  have 
been  exempt  if  the  earlier  isolation  could  have  been 
preserved.  But  worst  of  all  was  the  steady  increase  in 
the  extent  and  duration  of  periods  of  drought.  These 
led  to  famine  and  destitution,  which  became  objects  of 
anticipation  and  dread.  Under  these  conditions  men 
were  powerless.  The  prophet  had  only  to  persist  in  his 
prediction  of  disaster  to  have  some  one  of  the  great 
national  evils  —  war,  pestilence  and  famine  —  come  to 
his  aid  and  establish  his  reputation.  It  is  hard  to  con- 
ceive of  evils  worse  than  those  steadily  augmenting 
during  the  period  of  Jewish  history,  or  in  which  men 
could  be  more  helpless.  Morality  could  delay,  but  it 
could  not  prevent  the  inevitable  downfall  that  the 
whole  region  had  to  face.  The  prophets  chose  the 
only  road  open  to  salvation.  But  even  this  could  do 
no  more  than  relieve  the  momentary  pressure  on 
individuals  or  on  localities.  The  general  decline  and 
the  growing  disorder  went  on  unabated. 

The  general  demoralization  of  the  Roman  epoch 
[187] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

was  the  natural  fate  of  regions  thus  afflicted.  Declin- 
ing resources,  contagious  disease  and  war  could  not 
but  destroy  the  basis  on  which  long  life  and  prosperity 
depend,  and  take  from  people  the  accompanying  joys 
of  living.  Roman  history  is  that  of  an  age  when 
dominant  races  lived  on  plunder  and  pillage.  Each 
military  epoch  exhausted  the  stored  wealth  of  preced- 
ing years  and  forced  the  people  into  viler  and  more 
slavish  conditions.  Diminishing  resources  compel  men 
to  resort  to  exploitation  and  to  shorten  life  by  its 
oppressions. 

The  Christian  epoch  brought  no  permanent  relief. 
It  had  to  face  the  same  economic  conditions  and  be 
molded  by  them.  In  some  respects  it  made  matters 
worse ;  for  the  general  expectation  of  an  early  millen- 
nium led  men  to  accept  evils  that  would  have  brought 
immediate  revolt  without  the  hope  of  the  life  to  come. 
Christianity  did  not  bring  a  new  philosophy  of  life 
nor  furnish  the  starting  point  for  a  revolt  against 
oppression.  It  did  not  even  lead  to  a  revival  of  old 
morality,  such  as  was  to  be  found  in  the  religion  of 
the  prophets.  In  its  theology,  the  old  philosophy  of 
deficit  had  a  stronger  hold  than  with  the  pagan  nations. 
The  prophets  were  men  from  the  country.  They  were 
inspired  by  the  natural  suggestion  that  goes  with 
great   vitality.    The   new   leaders   were   men   of   the 

[188] 


HISTORIC  OR  STATE  RELIGION 

cities,  with  no  natural  background  to  arouse  revolt 
against  its  misery  and  vice.  The  conditions  they  saw 
were  to  them  an  inevitable  result  of  man's  depravity ; 
and  they  were  led  by  this  belief  to  an  even  worse  view 
of  life  than  their  predecessors.  Exploitation  had  no 
social  traditions  to  check  it,  and  disease  baffled  the 
knowledge  of  the  day.  Famine  and  pillage  could  end 
only  in  poverty.  The  consequent  loss  of  national 
spirit  demoralized  men  so  much  that  their  natural 
resistance  to  oppression  failed  to  assert  itself. 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  Christianity 
succumbed  to  this  pressure  and  became  the  medium 
through  which  old  ideas  were  strengthened  and  propa- 
gated. Sacrifice  was  ennobled,  and  the  primitive 
thought  of  an  atonement  was  so  vividly  presented  that 
the  sayings  and  spirit  of  Christ  were  dimmed.  The 
church  made  no  break  in  the  continuity  of  the  old 
social  thought  and  life.  It  had  no  institutions  other 
than  those  grafted  on  it  from  the  heathen  world,  no 
philosophy  that  reflected  its  founder's  thought.  The 
power  of  defeat,  the  growing  dread  of  death  and  the 
emphasis  of  sacrifice  warped  its  institutions  until  they 
expressed  the  reverse  of  what  Christ  taught.  Nor 
have  organized  revolts  and  secessions  from  the  church 
affected  much.  Protestantism  was  a  political  and 
economic  revolt  from  the  South.    The  new  school  of 

[189] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

theologians  were  more  pronounced  advocates  of  the 
old  thought  than  were  their  predecessors.  The  breach 
between  God  and  man  was  made  broader  and  more 
formidable  than  ever.  Pictures  of  future  misery  got  a 
new  emphasis,  history  was  ransacked  to  show  man's  help- 
lessness, sacrifice  was  extolled  as  the  cardinal  virtue, 
and  hardship  as  the  only  road  to  morality  and  character. 
This  is  the  philosophy  of  deficit  expanded  and  aug- 
mented. There  was  no  break  in  the  continuity  of 
historic  religion.  Protestantism  is  merely  its  fulfill- 
ment and  goal.  The  old  grind  of  misery,  with  its 
resulting  theory  of  life,  was  destined  to  persist  until  a 
new  basis  for  civilization  arose  in  the  growing  surplus 
of  Northern  nations.  Germany  and  England  were 
outside  the  region  of  drought  and  failing  resources. 
With  their  rise  a  reorganization  of  political  institutions 
began  to  conserve  instead  of  destroy  liberty,  health 
and  capital.  This  steady  stream  of  prosperity  has 
created  new  modes  of  thought  and  undermined  the 
old  philosophy  of  deficit  so  long  the  terror  of  man- 
kind. Prosperity,  liberty  and  cooperation  furnish 
a  principle  more  potent  than  the  dread  of  want.  When 
we  accept  it,  we  shall  rebuild  on  safe  foundations,  and 
make  religion  a  higher  expression  of  manhood  than 
it  could  become  while  state  religions  and  ascetic  morality 
suppressed  the  vigor,  joy  and  freedom  of  normal  life. 

[1901 


CHAPTEE  XIII 


SOCIAL  RELIGION 


9 


XIII 

In  the  preceding  chapter  I  have  contrasted  two 
types  of  religion.  Both  have  a  basis  in  objective  con- 
ditions, and  elements  of  each  must  be  present  in  all 
organized  religious  manifestations.  Natural  religion 
—  the  religion  of  vigor  and  joy  —  springs  out  of  the 
surplus  of  nature  and  the  plasticity  of  youth.  It 
shows  itself  where  material  conditions  are  stable  and 
long  life  is  the  reward  of  effective  action.  Primitive 
religion  in  its  social  aspects  was  of  this  type.  From 
it  we  can  infer  what  would  have  been  its  force  and 
character  if  growth  had  not  been  interrupted  by  the 
strenuous  events  of  later  times.  Historic  religion  does 
not  spring  from  these  conditions  of  surplus,  but  from 
a  deficit.  The  nations  that  were  to  shape  religion 
lived  in  regions  where  resources  were  failing  and  dis- 
ease on  the  increase.  To  these  evils  were  added  race 
hatreds  and  instability  of  government  that  brought 
on  wars,  with  resulting  pillage  and  destruction.  Re- 
ligion was  forced  to  reflect  these  changes.  In  the 
regions  where  these  evils  were  greatest,  a  body  of  doc- 
trine and  practice  grew  up  that  has  since  then  been 
o  [1931 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

expressed  in  religious  institutions.  Drought,  disease, 
war  and  other  evils  of  a  state  of  deficit  being  domi- 
nant in  Western  Asia  while  our  religion  was  forming, 
we  must  turn  to  these  regions  to  discover  the  forces 
that  compelled  religious  thought  to  develop  as  it  did. 
The  lack  of  a  clear  demarcation  between  church  and 
state  forced  religion  to  become  a  mere  adjunct  to 
patriotism  and  to  express  its  needs.  The  difficulty  of 
maintaining  national  independence  led  to  a  similar 
subordination  of  the  individual  to  the  state,  and  forced 
the  emphasis  of  valor  and  self-sacrifice  as  virtues. 
The  resulting  changes  in  thought,  feeling  and  education 
have  passed  on  from  age  to  age  and  from  nation  to 
nation  with  increasing  emphasis,  until  they  have 
colored  all  religious  expression.  Ages  of  failing  re- 
sources have  made  men  feel  that  life  is  not  worth 
living,  that  virtue  has  no  reward  except  beyond  the 
grave. 

Despite  clearness  and  power,  state  religions,  with 
their  emphasis  on  individual  sacrifice,  have  never  been 
able  fully  to  satisfy  the  religious  instinct  of  men. 
There  has  been  a  constant  tendency  to  revert  to  a 
natural  religion  in  which  joy,  liberty  and  inspiration 
were  prominent.  This  struggle  has  been  especially 
keen  in  the  Northern  nations  where  stable  economic 
resources  enabled  men  to  displace  many  of  the  sources 

ri94i 


SOCIAL  RELIGION 

of  misery  that  depressed  the  Southern  nations.  Were 
state  religion  and  natural  religion  to  fight  out  the 
battle  for  supremacy  in  nations  where  the  dominance 
of  man  over  nature  is  nearly  complete,  there  is  little 
doubt  of  the  outcome.  Natural  religion  would  assert 
itself  and  profoundly  modify  present  religious  institu- 
tions. But  there  is  little  likelihood  of  such  a  struggle. 
The  contest  will  not  be  so  much  between  these  con- 
testants as  between  them  and  another  type  of  religious 
expression.  State  religion  is  a  result  of  war  and 
want:  natural  religion  arises  out  of  contact  with 
the  surplus  and  vigor  of  nature;  social  religion  is 
quite  as  clearly  based  on  the  thought  of  peace  and 
plenty.  A  religion  of  joy,  a  religion  of  sacrifice  and 
a  religion  of  service  are  contrasted  ideals,  each  domi- 
nating in  its  own  fitting  circumstances. 

The  religion  of  service  could  have  no  better  exposition 
than  in  the  teachings  of  Christ.  What  we  need  is 
not  to  formulate  a  clear  statement  of  it,  but  to  find 
conditions  and  institutions  to  make  it  effective.  Chris- 
tianity in  this  sense  is  not  an  historic  institution.  It 
is  an  ideal  that  has  fought  a  losing  battle  with  state 
religions,  encrusted  in  historic  institutions  and  made 
vigorous  by  the  failures  of  men  in  ages  of  disease  and 
want.  The  sayings  of  Christ  seem  Utopian  even  to 
those  influenced  by  them.     To  the  mass  of  men  they 

[195] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

are  meaningless,  because  they  are  not  impressed  by 
such  striking  pictures  as  those  enforcing  a  religion  of 
sacrifice.  To  be  a  hero,  to  struggle  for  victory,  to  die 
for  one's  country,  have  vivid  meaning.  They  give  an 
impetus  to  activity  which  the  truer  but  less  picturesque 
ideas  of  service  do  not  arouse. 

It  is  difficult  to  associate  Christ  with  a  purely  social 
religion  because  His  teachings  have  been  overshadowed 
by  the  striking  events  of  His  death.  For  this  reason 
we  do  not  see  the  fundamental  opposition  between 
what  He  taught  and  what  His  death  has  been  made 
to  teach.  If  Christ's  doctrines  had  been  handed  down 
to  us  by  a  Plato  instead  of  a  Paul,  or  by  one  who 
knew  only  of  His  life  and  not  of  His  death,  Christ  to 
us  would  be  a  social  leader,  preaching  isalvation  only 
in  terms  of  love,  cooperation  and  service.  Salvation 
through  sacrifice,  especially  through  a  blood  atone- 
ment, would  be  a  repugnant  doctrine  from  the  dread 
of  which  He  wished  to  free  the  world.  There  is  noth- 
ing more  paradoxical  in  history  than  the  rise  of  the 
dogma  that  a  gulf  is  placed  between  God  and  man, 
which  can  be  bridged,  not  by  love,  but  only  by  the 
death  of  one  who  strove  to  fill  the  gap  in  the  other 
way.  This  glaring  antinomy  in  religious  thought 
must  be  removed  before  social  religion  can  be  put  on 
a  sound  basis.     If  Christ's  doctrine  be  that  of  salva- 

[1961 


SOCIAL  RELIGION 

tion  through  love,  the  path  is  open  to  reconstruct 
religion  in  ways  that  meet  modern  needs.  If  this  is 
not  His  view,  a  vague,  perhaps  hopeless,  epoch  of 
religious  confusion  must  lie  ahead. 

Bible  readers  fail  to  realize  the  opposition  existing  be- 
tween the  accounts  of  Christ's  life,  teaching  and  aims 
and  those  of  His  death.  If  the  last  chapters  of  each 
of  the  gospels  were  omitted,  if  we  could  see  Him  as  the 
disciples  must  have  seen  Him  before  they  were  in- 
fluenced by  His  death,  we  should  certainly  view  Him 
as  a  man  who  believed  in  humanity  and  expected  its 
elevation  to  purity  and  morality  through  love,  peace 
and  service.  A  purer  social  religion  could  not  have 
been  preached  than  that  He  presented.  Such  of  His 
sayings  and  parables  as  have  reached  us  all  emphasize 
this  view.  Yet  Paul,  influenced  more  by  His  death 
than  by  His  life,  drew  from  this  life  a  meaning  and 
gave  to  it  a  theological  setting  that  stands  in  strange 
contrast  to  what  must  have  been  an  earlier  view  of 
His  life  and  teaching.  The  disciples  were  rightly 
offended  with  this  presentation,  until  they  were  drawn 
into  the  social  atmosphere  that  made  Paul  and  subse- 
quently made  the  Christian  church.  I  make  this  con- 
trast, not  to  discredit  Paul  and  the  church,  but  to 
explain  them.  Paul's  interpretation  was  a  social 
necessity.     On  no  other  basis  could  the  church  have 

[1971 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

grown.  Yet,  with  all  its  force  and  clearness,  this 
interpretation  misrepresented  Christ  in  many  funda- 
mental points  and  gave  a  renewed  vigor  to  doctrines 
He  opposed. 

To  see  the  truth  of  these  statements  the  social  con- 
ditions and  mental  attitude  of  Paul's  age  must  be 
pictured.  Centuries  of  famine,  disease  and  war  had 
broken  down  the  national  life  of  the  peoples  over 
which  Rome  ruled  and  had  blotted  out  the  hopes, 
moral  and  social,  that  had  come  from  earlier  times. 
A  religion  was  needed,  dissociated  from  prevalent 
failures  and  disasters  from  which  there  was  no  hope 
of  relief.  That  the  world  is  a  place  of  misery  is  not  a 
doctrine  of  Christian  origin;  it  was  but  a  common- 
place thought  in  the  age  that  gave  birth  to  Christi- 
anity. Such  also  was  the  doctrine  of  a  gulf  between 
God  and  man.  War,  famine  and  other  evils  in  this 
view  come  from  God  and  are  indications  of  His  dis- 
pleasure. To  picture  a  new  way  of  reconciling  God 
was  the  only  escape  from  these  difficulties  that  har- 
monized with  current  religious  thought.  A  hope  was 
thus  created  that  did  wonders  in  an  age  when  evil 
and  fear  were  dominant.  By  itself  Christ's  social 
philosophy  would  have  gone  down  in  the  chaos  of 
universal  ruin.  Paul's  hope  and  faith  did  what  Christ's 
teachings  alone  could  not  have  done.     The  Christian 

[198] 


SOCIAL  RELIGION 

church  under  his  guidance  reconstructed  society  and 
made  the  modern  renaissance  of  thought  possible. 
Christ's  death  was  thus  of  saving  importance  to  the 
race.  There  is  a  practical  groundwork  for  the  doc- 
trine of  the  atonement  that  cannot  in  the  abstract  be 
given  it.  His  death  raised  humanity  from  the  lowest 
position  into  which  men  could  fall,  and  permitted  a 
shifting  of  the  base  of  civilization  to  other  regions  with 
stable  institutions. 

The  early  Christians  were  in  the  midst  of  the  de- 
pressing events  accompanying  the  downfall  of  civili- 
zation. The  hopeless  outlook  forced  on  them  the 
belief  that  a  betterment  must  come  from  without  and 
not  from  within  this  civilization.  Who  could  believe 
in  works  at  a  time  when  every  endeavor  ended  in 
dismal  failure  ?  Christ's  resurrection  turned  men's 
thoughts  away  from  their  misery  and  awakened  the 
hope  of  a  speedy  second  coming  through  which  evil 
was  to  be  displaced  and  an  age  of  peace  and  love  in- 
augurated. With  this  new  faith,  every  war,  plague, 
famine  or  other  disaster  was  taken  as  an  indication  of 
the  end  of  the  natural  regime  and  the  approach  of  the 
new  epoch.  The  more  the  tribulations,  the  nearer  the 
redemption.  The  passing  of  twenty  centuries  has 
changed  this  outlook.  Civilization  is  no  longer  cen- 
tered in  regions  of  waning  resources  and  of  increasing 

[199] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

misery.  The  new  regions  have  no  fear  of  drought 
and  famine;  disease  has  been  checked  and  life  pro- 
longed. Civilization  has  overcome  the  obstacles  that 
blocked  its  path  in  Western  Asia.  A  long  upward 
movement  is  in  prospect,  instead  of  the  rapid  plunge 
into  ruin  that  seemed  inevitable  in  the  first  century. 
We  should  alter  our  conception  of  Christ  to  fit  this 
situation.  The  second  coming  will  mark  the  fulfill- 
ment of  the  hopes  of  civilization,  art  and  science,  not 
their  failure.  The  social  philosophy  of  Christ  will  thus 
triumph  over  the  cruder  concepts  of  His  death.  The 
unity  and  peace  of  the  world  will  come,  instead  of  its 
destruction.  The  crucifixion  was  a  temporary  ex- 
pedient which  hastened  the  changes  that  make  Christ's 
social  ideals  workable.  Christ's  life  was  for  the  world. 
His  death  was  for  His  age  and  its  civilization. 

At  the  end  of  two  thousand  years  the  striking  result 
of  Christianity  has  been  the  shifting  of  civilization 
from  the  South  to  the  North.  The  economic  signifi- 
cance of  this  lies  in  the  growing  resources  of  the  North 
in  comparison  with  their  decrease  in  the  South.  In 
the  new  region  there  was  too  much  rather  than  too 
little  rain;  and  a  better  food  supply  was  afforded  by 
the  cereals  of  the  North  than  by  the  root  crops  of  the 
South.  The  North  of  Europe  could  not,  however,  have 
risen  to  its  present  commanding  position  without  an 

[200] 


SOCIAL  RELIGION 

impetus  from  the  South.  Had  the  Northern  region 
been  completely  isolated,  its  rise  would  have  depended 
entirely  on  its  internal  resources.  Its  civilization 
would  have  been  limited  to  arts,  foods  and  material  of 
its  own  origin,  and  its  people  could  scarcely  have 
risen  above  a  state  of  savagery.  While  the  North 
had  the  climate  that  makes  prosperity  permanent,  it 
had  indigenous  few  of  the  crops  or  animals  on  which  a 
great  civilization  depends.  These  were  from  Western 
Asia,  or  at  least  came  north  with  Southern  civilization. 
To  an  equally  great  degree  did  the  arts,  trades  and 
ideas  of  civilized  life  come  from  the  Southern  races. 
These  could  not  have  developed  in  the  cold  North,  or 
at  least  would  have  been  absent  for  ages.  Northern 
prosperity  is  thus  a  union  of  Northern  resources  and 
Southern  arts,  foods,  animals,  tools  and  culture.  Had 
the  two  failed  to  blend,  there  would  have  been  an 
insurmountable  obstacle  to  the  continuance  of  culture. 
Only  five  regions  had  conditions  favorable  for  great 
civilization :  China,  India,  Western  Asia  including  the 
Mediterranean  basin,  North  Europe  and  America. 
India  and  China  were  already  filled  with  a  teaming 
population  and  had  not  in  themselves  the  elements 
for  further  progress.  America  could  not  be  reached, 
and  probably  could  not  have  been  utilized  until  after 
the   transformations   that  the   rise   of   civilization  in 

[201] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

North  Europe  would  make.  America,  even  more 
strikingly  than  North  Europe,  was  a  land  of  resources. 
But  it  likewise  lacked  the  adjuncts  in  native  food, 
animals  and  arts  that  permit  their  utilization.  The 
only  hope  of  a  permanent  civilization  lay  in  its  trans- 
ference to  North  Europe.  The  prospect  of  this  would 
seem  hopeless;  for  to  the  people  of  the  South  the 
Northern  races  seemed  as  savage  as  the  Indians  do  to 
us.  For  ages  Northern  tribes  had  been  pressing  south, 
and  with  them  in  their  natural  state  nothing  but 
brutality  could  follow  their  dominance. 

If  the  transference  of  civilization  had  not  been 
accompanied  by  the  rising  missionary  spirit  of  the  early 
Christians,  it  is  easy  to  picture  what  would  have 
happened  to  Southern  civilization.  Its  resources  would 
have  continued  to  fall  off,  the  ravages  of  disease  would 
have  increased,  and  war  would  have  become  increasingly 
brutal  and  destructive.  A  situation  like  that  in  Arab 
countries  would  ultimately  have  arisen  and  have 
remained  permanent.  The  rise  and  decline  of  Mo- 
hammedanism showed  what  could  happen  to  any 
civilization  that  has  its  base  in  the  dry  regions  of  the 
South.  Under  these  conditions,  Christianity  might 
have  created  a  Spain,  but  it  could  hardly  have  done 
better.  The  dogmatism  of  arid  regions  would  cer- 
tainly have  prevented  the  rise  of  science,  and  without 

[202] 


SOCIAL  RELIGION 

it  any  amount  of  resources  could  yield  nothing  but 
failure. 

The  natural  obstacle  to  the  progress  of  civilization 
lay  in  a  doubly  contradictory  situation.  The  only 
place  where  civilization  could  begin  its  rise  must  fail 
because  of  the  niggardliness  of  its  economic  situation; 
the  regions  where  its  permanence  was  possible  lacked 
the  cultural  conditions  for  its  rise.  The  miracle  of 
civilization  consists  in  the  solving  of  this  contradiction 
by  uniting  abundant  resources  with  the  arts  and  cul- 
ture making  them  available.  This  I  believe  is  a  fair 
interpretation  of  twenty  centuries  of  Christian  prog- 
ress, measured  by  to-day's  standards.  Only  when  it  is 
substituted  for  the  defective  view  of  the  first  century 
can  Christianity  be  placed  on  a  firm  basis. 

There  are  bound  up  in  Christian  thought  two  dis- 
tinct plans  of  salvation.  The  orthodox  view  has  the 
degenerate  conditions  of  the  Roman  world  as  a  back- 
ground. It  appeals  to  the  emotional  type  of  man 
these  conditions  produced.  If  instead  of  saying  Christ 
died  for  sinners  we  say  He  died  to  redeem  the  degen- 
erate, we  put  the  problem  of  this  religion  in  a  scientific 
form.  Its  emotional  awakening  creates  character  and 
evokes  motives,  causing  the  spiritual  to  dominate  over 
the  degenerative  forces  of  a  world  of  deficit.  It  was 
this  religion  that  gave  new  life  to  the  Roman  world 

[203] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

and  supplied  the  impetus  carrying  civilization  from 
the  pessimistic  South  to  the  optimistic  North.  It  is 
almost  a  universal  religion  because  degeneration  is  so 
widespread  and  its  emotional  psychology  so  deep- 
seated.  It  must,  however,  be  regarded  as  a  temporary 
necessity,  approved  as  a  last  resort  and  not  as  a  chosen 
plan.  It  does  not  reflect  the  religion  of  the  normal 
man,  nor  does  it  manifest  the  social  spirit  of  Christ's 
teachings.  Another  and  purer  religion  lies  in  the 
background.  This  is  obscured  in  the  Old  Testament 
by  the  devices  of  priests,  and  in  the  New  by  the  enthu- 
siasm of  Paul's  disciples.  The  normal  life  of  a  stabler 
civilization  is  helping  us  to  reconstruct  it  and  to  put 
in  practice  doctrines  distinctly  Christ's.  The  Holy 
Spirit  He  promised  is  with  us  as  the  social  spirit.  In 
it  we  have  a  natural  guide  to  conduct  and  an  effective 
stimulus  to  cooperative  action. 

This  view  does  not  detract  from  the  dignity  and 
beauty  of  Christ's  death,  but  adds  to  it.  When  He 
cried,  "My  God,  why  hast  thou  forsaken  me?"  did  He 
regard  the  forsaking  to  consist  in  His  physical  death 
or  in  the  failure  of  His  social  philosophy  ?  If  He  were 
in  earnest  about  His  teaching,  He  could  hardly  have 
thought  its  failure  of  little  importance,  compared  with 
His  life.  And  yet  the  conventional  view  makes  Him 
forget  His  gospel  in  His  hour  of  agony  and  think  of 

[204] 


SOCIAL  RELIGION 

its  pain.  It  will  not  wrench  nor  weaken  the  story  of 
the  Passion  to  set  aside  this  interpretation,  and  to 
have  Christ  dread  the  cross,  not  because  it  meant  a 
physical  death,  but  because  it  would  revive  and  seem 
to  put  His  stamp  of  approval  on  a  religion  He  con- 
demned and  hoped  to  replace.  To  die  to  save  civili- 
zation would  have  had  no  meaning  to  the  early  Chris- 
tians who  felt  keenly  the  need  of  a  reconciliation  with 
God.  To  us,  however,  the  false  light  in  which  Christ 
let  Himself  be  put  by  a  striking  death  is  but  an  exem- 
plification of  His  doctrine  of  service.  His  real  mission 
will  be  fulfilled  by  a  second  coming  to  which  the  first 
is  but  preliminary.  Meanwhile  the  basis  of  endur- 
ing progress  has  been  secured.  In  this  we  can  not 
only  participate,  but  can  promote  by  the  social  service 
which  His  life  so  amply  illustrates. 


[205] 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  SOCIAL  MISSION  OF  THE  CHUECH 


0 


XIV 


The  preceding  discussion  has  revealed  an  economic 
environment  and  a  body  of  psychic  reactions  that  afford 
new  principles  of  religious  activity  which  should  make 
religion  an  active  force  and  give  its  plan  of  salvation 
a  background  worthy  of  consideration.  Degeneration 
and  regeneration  are  realities ;  the  power  to  resist  the 
one  and  to  gain  the  other  is  equally  real  and  must 
have  a  place  in  every  scheme  of  social  progress.  A 
deficit  of  energy  brings  degeneration:  a  surplus  of  , 
energy,  evoking  will  power,  leads  to  regeneration. 
Enthusiasm  and  missionary  spirit  come  with  the  growth 
of  physical  vigor.  We  can  expect  it  to  develop  a  re- 
ligious expression  if  the  thought  of  redemption  can  be 
put  in  a  social  setting.  As  a  plan  of  progress,  religion 
emphasizes  the  incorporation  of  the  weak  into  society. 
If  the  degenerate  cannot  be  aroused,  strengthened  and 
made  normal,  if  on  the  contrary  he  must  be  eliminated, 
religion  will  have  no  place  in  the  Utopia  toward  which 
we  are  moving.  Progress  by  elimination  and  progress 
through  redemption  are  opposing  concepts,  one  of 
which  must  be  proved  wrong  by  the  trend  of  events. 
p  [2091 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

If  Christians,  adhering  to  an  unsocial  concept  of  religion, 
fail  to  show  that  redemption  for  the  masses  is  attain- 
able, they  must  not  find  fault  if  the  ideal  of  an 
unsocial  superman  displaces  that  of  service.  The 
social  plan  of  redemption  will  be  tested  in  this  century 
as  the  hope  of  personal  salvation  was  tested  by  the 
facts  and  conditions  of  the  first  century.  A  new 
missionary  movement  is  demanded  in  our  age.  To  suc- 
ceed, this  must  have  the  vigor  and  clearness  of  thought 
that  Paul  gave  to  the  first  extensions  of  Christ's  in- 
fluence. The  impress  of  past  centuries  has  put  modern 
religion  in  as  helpless  a  condition  to  meet  present  emer- 
gencies as  the  Jewish  religion  was  in  the  first  century. 
The  work  that  Christ  began  could  not  be  fully  devel- 
oped in  the  early  centuries  because  of  adverse  economic 
conditions.  It  can,  however,  be  successfully  com- 
pleted now  because  favorable  environing  conditions 
have  replaced  race  antagonisms  with  a  spirit  of  social 
cooperation.  This  has  opened  the  road  to  social  re- 
generation as  contrasted  with  social  elimination.  To 
meet  this  new  situation  is  the  religious  need  of  the 
day.  Success  or  failure  are  alternatives  that  will  make 
Christianity  dominant  or  will  displace  it  as  an  encum- 
brance to  progress. 

There  are  many  analogies  between  the  present  situa- 
tion and  that  which   Christianity  faced  at  its  birth. 

[2101 


THE  SOCIAL  MISSION  OF  THE  CHURCH 

The  present  crisis,  although  of  another  character,  is 
fully  as  grave  as  that  of  the  first  century.  Disease, 
famine,  war  and  failing  resources  made  impossible  an 
advance  in  civilization  in  the  Southern  regions,  then 
its  center.  A  new  region  must  be  opened  up  and  new 
races  must  be  elevated  from  barbarism  into  the  position 
of  standard-bearers  of  culture.  To-day,  we  have  no 
fear  of  war,  famine,  disease  or  failing  resources.  The 
advance  in  knowledge  has  guarded  men  against  these 
evils ;  but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  civilization  must 
be  extended  to  other  regions  and  races,  or  it  will  go 
down  as  it  did  at  Rome.  Prosperity  checks  the  birth 
rate  and  promotes  race  suicide  to  such  a  degree  that  if 
new  races  cannot  be  raised  to  take  the  place  of  those 
dying  out,  there  will  be  a  decline  in  civilization  to  the 
level  existing  before  the  rise  of  Christianity.  All  of  the 
earlier  missionary  efforts  will  be  in  vain  unless  methods 
are  devised  to  arouse  new  classes,  races  and  nations 
with  the  same  success  with  which  our  ancestors  were 
awakened  in  earlier  epochs  by  the  prevailing  forms  of 
religious  propagation.  If  laborers  remain  outside  the 
church,  if  immigrants  are  not  assimilated  into  our  na- 
tional life,  or  if  we  fail  to  do  for  Africa,  India  and  China 
what  the  early  Christian  missions  did  for  our  German 
ancestors,  a  slow  but  certain  death  awaits  the  church, 
no  matter  what  may  be  its  success  in  other  fields.     No 

[2111 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

headway  is  possible  unless  there  come  modifications 
of  attitude  and  doctrine  that  will  make  the  church  a 
force  among  races  and  classes  it  at  present  fails  to 
reach. 

Our  condition  can  be  most  simply  and  clearly  con- 
trasted with  that  of  the  first  century  in  terms  of 
the  economic  stages  of  progress.  In  early  times, 
men  were  in  a  pain  economy.  This  means  that 
their  energies  were  much  more  fully  directed  to  the 
avoiding  of  enemies  and  dangers  than  to  the  pro- 
duction of  goods.  The  primitive  man  was  weak  in 
comparison  with  the  energetic  animals  surrounding 
him.  He  had  to  escape  from  them  rather  than  fight 
them.  Fear  was  thus  a  dominant  motive.  Enjoy- 
ment came  only  in  the  intervals  between  the  dangers 
that  beset  his  path.  These  conditions  and  the  mental 
attitude  that  accompanies  them  were  exaggerated  by 
the  environment  of  the  race  during  the  period  of  Rome's 
decline.  Disease,  famine,  war  and  unstable  government 
tend  to  make  fear  prominent  as  a  motive.  It  keeps 
the  effects  of  these  evils  constantly  before  men  and 
forces  them  to  endure  long  epochs  of  suffering  and 
want.  Experience,  history  and  long-standing  psychic 
reactions  all  united  in  emphasizing  the  same  facts  and 
in  creating  the  same  mental  atmosphere.  To  men 
molded    by  these   conditions    the   early  centuries   of 

[212] 


THE  SOCIAL  MISSION  OF  THE  CHURCH 

missionary  endeavor  were  directed.  The  gospel  of  fear, 
then  advanced,  matched  the  conditions,  the  civiliza- 
tion and  the  thought  processes  with  which  men  were 
familiar.  The  twentieth  century,  however,  differs  from 
the  first  in  that  a  pleasure  economy  has  displaced 
the  pain  economy  then  prevailing.  The  thoughts 
and  activities  of  men  are  now  turned  toward  the 
pleasures  of  life.  Those  activities  have  become  su- 
preme that  help  men  to  increase  their  joys.  It  is 
true  the  advance  has  not  gone  far  enough  completely 
to  set  aside  want,  war  and  disease ;  but  at  least  enough 
progress  has  been  made  to  protect  most  men  from 
their  evils.  They  seldom  rise  to  the  point  where 
they  disturb  our  regular  activities  and  the  flow  of 
pleasurable  goods  that  follow. 

The  movement  in  this  direction  has  gone  far  enough 
to  enable  us  to  see  both  the  advantages  and  the  evils 
by  which  it  is  accompanied.  The  good  lies  in  our 
security,  our  pleasures  and  our  freedom  from  want 
and  disease;  the  bad  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  pursuit 
of  pleasure  does  not  arouse  the  energies  nor  concen- 
trate them  enough  to  keep  men  normal  nor  to  make 
them  progressive.  Our  economic  wants  do  not  awake 
men's  activity  in  the  forceful,  direct  way  that  the  fear 
of  enemies,  of  nature  or  of  disease  did  in  earlier  times.  A 
pleasure  economy  fails  at  the  point  where  the  older 

[2131 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

pain  economy  was  most  successful.  Concentrated 
attention,  quick  and  forceful  action,  a  willingness  to 
submit  to  discipline,  a  love  of  local  usages  and  an  en- 
thusiasm for  national  ends  came  as  a  part  of  the  regu- 
lar reactions  of  a  life  controlled  by  danger  and  pain. 
The  seeker  for  economic  goods,  freed  from  these  long- 
standing evils,  shows  no  such  qualities.  He  is  not  as 
eager  to  work  as  he  was  to  fight,  nor  will  he  submit 
to  the  industrial  discipline  he  would  accept  without 
question  if  he  were  a  soldier.  He  works  carelessly, 
shows  little  desire  for  efficiency  and  will  not  limit  his 
use  of  goods  so  as  to  preserve  his  health. 

I  do  not  wish  to  charge  economic  materialism  with 
all  the  evils  that  are  to-day  becoming  manifest.  Our 
vice  and  crime  are  due  to  a  degeneration  that  has  its 
causes  largely  in  the  past.  A  pleasure  economy  would 
ultimately  displace  the  tendencies  that  end  in  vice  and 
crime.  Its  real  evils  do  not  lie  here,  but  in  the  lack 
of  concentration  of  activity  that  keeps  men  normal 
and  thus  tends  to  make  the  race  progressive.  We 
need  strong,  vivid  ends  for  our  activity  as  much  as 
ever,  and  there  is  nothing  in  material  wants  that 
arouses  them.  If  they  come  in  our  new  civiliza- 
tion, they  will  appear  in  motives  a  pleasure  economy 
has  no  tendency  to  promote. 

The  results  of  this  failure  of  a  pleasure  economy  to 
[2141 


THE  SOCIAL  MISSION  OF  THE  CHURCH 

arouse  motives  and  to  set  definite  ends  clearly  before 
men  are  reflected  in  the  devices  at  present  used  to 
make  men  effective.  Society  still  resorts  to  old  methods 
to  create  discipline  and  to  generate  activity  even  when 
it  relies  on  utilitarian  motives  to  supply  our  economic 
needs.  A  compromise  has  been  worked  out  by  which 
the  motives  of  a  pleasure  economy  are  supplemented 
by  the  driving  power  of  the  old  regime,  in  the  form  of 
fear.  Pain  is  not  now  prominent  enough  to  concen- 
trate men's  energies;  but  fear,  as  contrasted  with 
actual  pain,  has  lost  little  of  its  force.  It  lies  back  of 
the  discipline  and  concentration  of  energy  now  mani- 
fested both  in  individual  and  in  national  activities. 
The  advanced  nations  seldom  feel  the  miseries  of  war ; 
yet  the  fear  of  war  is  the  prominent  motive  in  national 
effectiveness.  Patriotism  manifests  itself  in  fortifying 
the  Panama  Canal  and  in  building  huge  warships  more 
readily  than  in  conserving  our  forests  or  in  lengthening 
human  life.  Each  nation  centers  its  activities  on 
preventing  a  corresponding  progress  on  the  part  of 
others  and  can  be  stimulated  to  extraordinary  energy 
only  by  the  constantly  reappearing  dread  of  foreign 
aggression.  No  political  motive  has  arisen  that  will 
unite  a  nation  and  arouse  its  latent  energies  compa- 
rable with  the  effect  of  a  foreign  war  or  even  the  fear 
of  one.     Men  who  would  not  submit  to  an  industrial 

[215] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

discipline  of  ten  hours  a  day  will  accept  a  much  severer 
military  discipline  without  a  murmur.  They  have  their 
characters  built  up  by  war  or  the  fear  of  it  in  a  way 
that  no  industrial  program  could  enforce. 

The  present  religious  program  also  gets  its  power 
through  fear.  Without  a  vivid  concept  of  future  pun- 
ishment the  church  would  fail  in  the  discipline  it  holds 
over  its  members.  Its  morality  is  largely  built  upon 
unseen  relations  that  could  not  be  made  effective  if  fear 
were  not  a  prominent  motive.  The  same  basis  is  found 
for  the  motives  causing  the  accumulation  of  capital. 
Capitalism  is  often  viewed  as  primarily  the  result  of 
production  on  a  large  scale.  Yet  the  discipline  that 
creates  qualities  so  definitely  associated  with  it  comes 
from  saving,  which  in  turn  is  evoked  by  the  fear  of 
future  want.  As  soon  as  men  lose  their  fear  of  pov- 
erty, they  cease  to  save  and  will  no  longer  submit  to 
the  discipline  that  makes  capitalists  a  force  and  gives 
to  industry  its  present  form.  Capitalism  will  die  out 
much  more  readily  through  the  loss  of  discipline  that 
follows  the  cessation  of  saving  than  through  any  revo- 
lution its  opponents  may  provoke.  Nor  are  the  social- 
ists on  any  other  basis  than  the  classes  they  would  dis- 
place. Class  antagonism  and  the  fear  of  oppression 
are  as  prominent  elements  in  the  discipline  they  evoke 
as  is  the  fear  of  want  among  the  capitalists,  the  fear 

[216] 


THE  SOCIAL  MISSION  OF  THE  CHURCH 

of  war  among  patriots  or  the  fear  of  the  future  among 
religious  people. 

There  is  no  discipline  worth  considering  in  education, 
in  morality  or  in  political  life  that  is  not  the  outcome 
of  aroused  fear.  A  physical  emancipation  from  want 
has  come,  |but  no  psychic  emancipation  from  fear. 
Until  we  understand  what  this  means  we  can  get  no 
measure  of  the  changes  that  separate  the  first  century 
from  the  twentieth.  The  concentration  of  energies 
is  as  important  as  ever;  but  no  method  of  bringing  it 
about  or  of  creating  a  new  form  of  discipline  has  yet 
been  devised  to  replace  the  motives  of  fear.  These 
are  a  psychic  inheritance  from  the  distant  past,  and 
they  reflect  an  attitude  hostile  to  future  progress. 
Through  the  discipline  of  fear  we  may  be  able  to  hold 
our  own,  but  never  to  escape  from  our  present  complex 
economy  into  a  real  peace  economy  where  social  motives 
instead  of  social  antagonisms  control.  A  peace  econ- 
omy must  be  more  than  a  Utopia  of  satisfactions.  It 
must  create  a  discipline  more  rigid  than  that  of  fear  and 
give  to  men  that  concentration  of  energies  which  evokes 
their  best  powers.  Society  cannot  become  telic  until 
our  psychic  powers  are  reshaped  to  meet  present  con- 
ditions. No  amount  of  material  progress  can  com- 
pensate for  mental  stagnation. 

The  economic  basis  of  a  peace  economy  is  readily 
[2171 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

understood,  and  is  fairly  well  worked  out.  Economic 
wants  generate  efficiency,  and  efficiency  demands  co- 
operation. The  three  combined  give  us  wealth  and 
prosperity.  The  psychic  reactions  of  men  in  a  peace 
economy  are  hard  to  present,  because  so  little  advance 
has  been  made  in  breaking  from  the  discipline  that  fear 
generates.  It  will  seem  like  mere  theory  to  offer  a  con- 
trasted scheme,  but  there  is  no  other  way  in  which  the 
needs  of  progress  can  be  set  forth.  The  first  step  is  to 
realize  that  a  peace  economy  does  not  demand  a  new 
group  of  psychic  qualities,  but  merely  a  change  in  the 
dominance  of  qualities  already  formed.  It  would  be  a 
long,  tedious  process  to  make  the  changes  involved,  if 
they  had  to  be  created  by  evolution.  If,  however, 
the  need  is  not  a  creation,  but  a  change  in  the  dominance 
of  opposing  groups  of  characters,  the  transference  of 
mankind  from  a  pain  to  a  peace  economy  may  be 
worked  out  in  a  relatively  short  period.  Fear  reactions 
are  no  more  fundamental,  no  more  deeply  ingrained, 
than  are  the  social  impulses  to  which  they  stand  op- 
posed. The  social  life  of  men  has  run  along  parallel 
with  their  misery  and  fears,  and  both  phases  of  psychic 
development  have  had  a  long  period  in  which  to  grow. 
Primitive  life  shifted  men  from  one  group  of  conditions 
to  the  other,  thus  making  the  one  group  or  the  other, 
for  the  time  being,  dominant.     We  have  thus  a  double 

[2181 


THE   SOCIAL  MISSION  OF  THE   CHURCH 

psychic  nature  only  single  phases  of  which  are  mani- 
fested at  a  given  time.  An  economy  with  a  surplus 
tends  to  make  us  social ;  an  economy  of  deficit  arouses 
conflict  and  gives  a  dominance  to  pain  reactions.  The 
problem  of  social  advance  is  thus  on  its  material  side 
to  keep  out  of  conditions  of  deficit  and  to  get  within  the 
realm  of  surplus.  On  its  psychic  side,  however,  the 
problem  is  to  keep  our  social  nature  dominant,  and  to 
suppress  the  fear  reactions  that  nature  has  implanted. 
How  then,  in  a  realm  like  the  present,  partially  of 
surplus  and  partly  of  deficit,  can  we  make  the  social 
within  us  permanently  dominant  ?  —  this  is  the  problem 
that  religion  has  to  solve. 

The  starting  point  of  this  movement  must  lie  in 
economics,  because  our  economic  interests  give  the 
most  obvious  motive  for  becoming  social.  Economic 
desires  create  interest  in  objects  and  the  means  of 
obtaining  them.  We  may,  therefore,  say  that  desire 
leads  to  interest,  and  interest  to  knowledge  and  effi- 
ciency. The  measure  of  knowledge  and  efficiency  is 
twofold.  Nationally,  it  is  wealth;  individually,  it  is 
health.  As  nations  grow  wealthy  and  men  become 
healthy,  we  may  be  sure  knowledge  and  efficiency  are 
on  the  increase,  and  that  a  movement  has  been  started 
in  the  direction  of  universal  peace.  National  peace 
makes  men  wealthy;  mental  peace  makes  them 
[219] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

healthy.  I  make  this  contrast  between  the  national 
and  individual  measures  of  progress  because  they  are  so 
often  confused.  By  the  old  standard,  men  thought 
God  was  with  them  when  they  and  their  families  pros- 
pered. This  crude  measure  was  good  enough  for  primi- 
tive epochs,  but  to-day  progress  demands  not  indi- 
vidual wealth,  but  a  large  social  surplus  utilized  for 
the  good  of  society.  As  an  individual  measure,  health 
is  much  better  than  wealth.  Social  health  cannot 
exist  without  social  wealth,  but  it  may  well  exist  with- 
out large  fortunes.  Moreover,  when  we  have  social 
wealth,  the  higher  test  of  progress  is  health.  This, 
measured  statistically,  means  longevity.  No  test  is  so 
good  as  a  low  death  rate  and  a  long  working  period. 
Health,  wealth  and  efficiency  are  the  basis  of  normal 
life.  When  we  have  these,  we  may  be  sure  that  degen- 
eration, depravity,  vice  and  crime  will  cease  to  be 
bars  to  social  progress.  A  society,  dominantly  normal 
in  its  attributes,  will  thus  replace  the  present  one.  In 
this  a  new  group  of  social  usages  and  traditions  will 
grow  up  in  favor  of  peace.  The  normal  man  is  emo- 
tionally social.  There  is,  consequently,  in  him  a  con- 
flict between  his  social  emotions  and  the  habits,  tra- 
ditions, philosophy  and  logic  impressed  upon  him  by 
deficit  and  fear.  All  acquired  traits  have  had  their 
origin  in  the  ages  of  deficit  in  which  humanity  has 

[220] 


THE  SOCIAL  MISSION  OF  THE  CHURCH 

lived.  They  harmonize  with  the  psychic  fears  these 
ages  have  generated.  The  motive  for  their  upbuilding 
is  lost  when  fear  and  pain  cease  to  control  men,  and  the 
crust  they  have  formed  in  thought  and  habit  is  sure  to 
be  broken  by  the  rise  of  social  emotions.  The  conflict 
that  disturbs  the  mental  peace  of  men  is  between  this 
crust  of  acquired  tradition  and  the  newly  aroused  emo- 
tions. The  result  is  a  regeneration,  a  new  birth,  or 
whatever  name  men  apply  to  the  radical  reconstruc- 
tion of  thought  and  activity  following  the  transference 
of  dominance  from  emotions  of  fear  and  conflict  to 
those  of  peace,  harmony  and  joy.  This  change  may  be 
wrought  in  many  ways,  but  the  essence  is  a  feeling  of 
freedom  from  the  thraldom  of  external  codes  and  in- 
ternal fears.  From  Paul  to  Christian  Science,  believers 
in  a  new  birth  emphasize  the  coming  of  mental  peace 
and  the  freedom  from  the  "law."  Fear  goes,  and  with 
its  departure  old  habits  and  traditions  lose  their  seem- 
ingly absolute  character.  New  activities  and  modes  of 
thought  rise  to  replace  them. 

This  is  the  essence  of  the  mental  reconstruction  taking 
place  when  men  become  normal  and  hence  emotionally 
social.  If  the  analysis  is  correct,  the  "new  birth"  is 
not  to  be  worked  for.  It  will  come  of  itself  if  men  are 
made  normal.  Nor  are  we  to  regard  it  as  the  impress 
or  gift  of  a  higher  power.     The  reconstruction  and  the 

[221] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

peace  it  brings  come  because  of  what  we  eject  from  our 
lives,  not  from  what  is  put  in  by  outside  powers.  The 
break  is  in  the  economic  and  biologic  determinism  that 
control  through  deficit  and  fear,  not  through  any 
inherent  power  they  have  over  men.  We  are  free  when 
we  make  our  own  traditions  and  codes  instead  of  sub- 
mitting to  external  pressure  and  the  dominance  it 
imposes. 

To  make  these  facts  effective  in  religion,  a  contrast 
must  be  made  between  the  personal  and  social  mission 
of  the  church.  Each  individual  is  born  in  a  fear  econ- 
omy, and  needs  to  have  his  fear  of  the  future  removed. 
The  church  does  for  him  personally  what  saving  does 
for  the  fear  of  want,  or  battleships  do  for  the  fear  of 
foreign  foes.  The  social  mission  of  the  church,  however, 
is  not  to  make  men  religious,  but  to  make  men  normal. 
I  say  this  consciously,  because  the  religious  awakening 
comes  from  within  and  can  be  wrought  only  by  indirect 
means.  The  normal  man  is  a  religious  man  because 
his  emotions  are  social,  and  because  they  clash  with  the 
economic  and  biologic  regime  imposed  by  heredity  and 
external  conditions.  To  make  men  normal  is  to  start 
a  train  that  leads  to  religious  awakening.  These  in- 
direct means  will  make  more  converts  than  the  emphasis 
of  fear.  When  such  methods  are  employed,  conversion 
will  be  a  permanent  change  in  mental  attitude,  and  not 

[222] 


3 


THE  SOCIAL  MISSION  OF  THE  CHURCH 

a  temporary  upheaval.  Missionary  movements  suc- 
ceed only  as  they  carry  to  new  races  and  classes  the 
underlying  means  for  their  betterment.  Religion  is 
contagious  when  these  are  secured.  We  can  plow  the 
land,  but  the  fruit  comes  in  its  own  way. 


^ 

£ 


There  is,  however,  one  more  step  needed  to  make 
church  work  practical.  The  best  evidence  that  reli- 
gious movements  are  succeeding  is  that  they  make  men 
live  longer.  A  steady  increase  in  the  length  of  life 
has  followed  the  spread  of  Christianity.  When  the 
average  life  of  man  has  been  increased  to  sixty  years, 
the  advantages  of  normal  living  will  be  overwhelming, 
and  the  strength  of  forward  social  movements  corre- 
spondingly increased.  Health  is  thus  the  test  of 
normality,  and  the  church  can  safely  be  sponsor  for 
social  movements  that  improve  it.  On  this  basis  must 
the  social  program  of  the  church  be  built.  Many  evils 
are  beyond  our  present  power  to  remedy.  We  cannot 
therefore  make  their  removal  part  of  a  working  pro- 
gram for  the  twentieth  century.  But  the  crimes 
against  health  are  plainly  within  our  control.  We 
cannot  make  every  one  wealthy,  but  there  is  no  need  of 
poverty.  Neither  do  we  need  to  crush  the  life  of  chil- 
dren in  factories,  nor  to  lower  the  vitality  of  women  by 
long  working  hours.  A  standard  of  living  capable 
of  maintaining  health  and  welfare  is  not  merely  an 

[2231 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

ideal,  but  a  perfectly  workable  plan.  These  and  other 
economic  reforms  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  home  missionary- 
efforts,  just  as  the  health,  security  and  happiness  of 
other  races  is  the  essence  of  successful  work  abroad. 
Christianity  needs,  not  preachers,  but  workers.  Its 
supremacy  can  come  only  as  civilization  and  culture  are 
socialized  and  the  economic  world  so  transformed  that 
the  minimum  of  to-morrow's  welfare  will  include  more 
of  health  and  comfort  than  the  maximum  of  to-day's 
standards. 


[224] 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS 
THOUGHT 


J? 


XV 


If  the  social  view  of  religion  is  to  prevail,  not  merely 
is  a  new  basis  for  religious  activity  needed,  but  also  a 
radical  modification  in  religious  thought.  As  has  been 
shown,  thought  has  three  stages :  the  traditional,  or 
theological  stage,  the  metaphysical  or  deductive  stage 
and  the  pragmatic  or  social  stage.  In  the  first,  social 
control  lies  in  authority;  in  the  second,  it  lies  in  the 
antecedents  of  actions ;  and  in  the  third,  it  is  in  their 
results.  While  activity  has  in  many  ways  passed  over 
into  the  third  stage,  religious  thought  is  still  in  the  first 
and  second  stages.  A  religion  of  authority  still  makes 
a  strong  appeal ;  a  metaphysical  religion  deducing  its 
principles  from  a  first  cause  or  the  ultimates  of  the  uni- 
verse also  has  great  vitality.  A  social  religion,  how- 
ever, seems  to  lack  the  clear,  decisive  elements  giving 
force  to  authoritative  and  rational  religion. 

Authoritative  religion  has  its  basis  in  social  tradi- 
tion. It  comes  from  the  distant  past  and  is  colored  by 
primitive  modes  of  thought.  Its  appeal  is  largely  to 
tradition,  imitation  and  the  feeling  of  submission  that 
long  periods  of  disaster  and  oppression  impose.     Its 

[2271 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

basis,  however,  has  been  seriously  weakened  by  the 
inroads  of  skepticism.  In  consequence,  it  would  cer- 
tainly die  out  if  a  union  had  not  been  made  between  it 
and  the  metaphysics  of  rationalism.  God,  as  cause 
and  creator,  is  the  kernel  and  the  goal  of  metaphysical 
thought.  The  gods  of  national  tradition  are  thus 
displaced  by  the  one  God  of  infinite  power  and  knowl- 
edge. This  God  is  then  united  with  traditional  mo- 
rality and  made  to  give  it  an  authoritative  support. 
This  metaphysical  concept  of  God,  coupled  with 
traditional  morality,  viewed  as  a  divine  revelation, 
gives  the  basis  of  current  religious  thought.  All  the 
force  of  the  first  two  stages  of  thought  is  thus  given  to 
religious  concepts.  Reenforced  both  by  tradition  and 
reason,  and  blended  with  a  lofty  idealism,  they  are 
hard  to  analyze,  to  dislocate  or  to  transform. 

Rational  religion  is  strong  where  social  religion  is 
weak.  Social  religion  lacks  authority  and  has  no 
rigid  logic  to  make  it  effective.  Social  concepts  grow ; 
they  are  not  made  nor  can  they  be  coercively  impressed. 
They  are  based  on  the  agreements  of  past  experience, 
verified  by  the  current  events  in  which  all  participate. 
The  broader,  deeper  and  more  harmonious  the  social  life 
of  mankind  is,  the  clearer  do  the  social  ideals  stand 
forth  and  the  more  widespread  is  their  influence.  Social 
concepts  appeal ;  they  do  not  command.    They  arouse 

[228] 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

energy  and  direct  activity;  they  do  not  repress,  re- 
strict nor  define.  Were  all  men  normal,  healthy  and 
active,  their  force  would  be  irresistible;  for  then  men 
would  be  aroused  by  the  same  motives  and  struggle 
for  the  same  ends.  It  is  the  opposition,  the  conflict, 
the  degeneration,  the  differences  in  race,  type,  class 
and  language  that  keep  men  so  much  isolated  that  com- 
mon ideals  and  aspirations  do  not  arise.  Every  barrier 
broken  down  between  races,  classes  or  languages  leads 
to  a  blending  of  the  thought  and  ideals  of  the  united 
group. 

The  effect  of  this  social  process  is  apparent  in  many 
fields.  From  them  we  can  see  the  way  it  will  work  in 
religion  when  the  same  process  transforms,  blends  and 
unifies  the  various  types  of  religion  now  contending  for 
supremacy.  A  socialized  world  can  no  more  have  a 
dozen  religions  than  it  can  have  a  dozen  sciences  in 
one  field.  As  in  medicine,  there  may,  for  a  time,  be 
a  group  of  contending  factions,  but  the  growth  of  knowl- 
edge gradually  forces  them  into  unity,  in  which  the 
half  truths  of  each  faction  are  transformed  into  the 
full  truth  of  a  united  science.  Arguments,  proof  and 
authority  have  little  weight  against  the  forces  that  are 
socializing  thought,  and  thus  bringing  unity  into 
religion  as  in  other  fields.  The  belief  in  one  God 
results  from  a  social  tendency,  not  from  a  metaphysical 

[229] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

argument,  nor  from  an  authoritative  tradition.  So 
also  there  can  be  but  one  morality,  and  this  will  be 
made  effective  by  the  motives  that  prompt  men  to 
lead  normal  lives.  Normality  and  morality  have  a 
common  origin.  Whatever  raises  the  standards  of 
normal  life  gives  more  force  to  morality  and  makes  its 
rules  more  universal  and  coercive.  A  truly  social 
morality  will  be  more  authoritative  than  any  tradi- 
tional code  could  be.  At  the  same  time,  its  basis  will 
be  so  clear  and  attractive  that  no  resistance  to  its  dicta- 
tion can  arise.  What  men  must  do,  and  what  they 
desire  to  do,  will  be  so  blended  that  no  one  will  know 
which  force  determines  his  acts. 

The  present  situation  is  confused  by  the  way  in  which 
religious  problems  are  faced.  The  early  history  of  the 
race  shows  many  religions,  each  with  its  own  gods 
struggling  for  supremacy.  There  is  also  a  marked 
contrast  in  primitive  moralities,  due  to  the  concrete 
ways  in  which  moral  problems  arose.  In  addition  to 
this,  the  social  philosophy  of  each  nation  began  with 
generalizations  about  local  conditions.  These  were 
transformed  into  universal  philosophies  without  an 
adequate  survey  of  the  larger  field  to  which  they  were 
applied.  Each  language  was  also  formed  by  the  situ- 
ation in  which  the  race  using  it  arose,  and  its  ideas 
reflect  the  experience  of  this  race  in  its  local  position. 

[230] 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

Religion  shows  the  effects  of  all  these  difficulties,  and 
judging  from  them  there  seems  to  be  no  unity  to  reli- 
gious thought.  Worst  of  all  were  the  evils  brought  on 
by  the  subordination  of  religion  to  the  state,  for  this 
made  national  contests  appear  to  be  religious  and  forced 
nations  to  increase  their  religious  antagonisms  so  as  to 
give  a  firmer  background  to  national  life.  The  natural 
process  of  blending  religious  ideas  was  blocked  for  ages 
by  the  patriotic  aspirations  of  nations  and  differences 
in  race  and  language.  We  thus  seem  to  have  religious 
conflicts  where  in  reality  none  exist.  Students  of 
religion  must  be  social  before  they  are  historical  if  they 
wish  to  see  the  beauty  and  harmony  of  religious  con- 
cepts. Thought  blends  as  nations  and  localities  are 
united  into  larger  areas.  The  common  elements  of 
many  local  situations  become  the  ideals  and  standards 
of  the  larger  group.  In  the  end  there  can  be  but  one 
economic  group  with  the  whole  world  as  its  habitat. 
Morality  and  religion  must  be  reorganized  so  that 
they  match  this  situation.  When  this  happens  there 
will  be  no  opposition  to  their  dictates  nor  any  tend- 
ency to  split  up  society  into  religious  and  moral  fac- 
tions. Unity,  harmony  and  elevation  are  clearly  visible 
goals  in  each  of  these  fields.  They  will  come  as 
thought,  activity  and  language  are  made  to  express 
general  instead  of  local  situations. 

[2311 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

The  situation  that  the  early  church  faced  had  in  it  all 
these  difficulties.  The  many  national  gods  and  reli- 
gions created  dissensions  and  opposition  that  were 
hard  to  placate.  Differences  in  language  also  added 
much  to  the  confusion,  for  each  language  crudely 
expressed  the  new  religious  thought.  The  statement 
of  the  apostle  that  "In  the  beginning,  the  Word  was 
with  God,  and  the  Word  was  God  "  does  not  mean 
much  to-day.  The  God  concept  has  won  out  and  the 
Word  concept  has  blended  with  it  or  disappeared.  The 
contrast,  however,  was  real  to  the  early  Christians. 
They  used  different  languages  in  which  the  God  con- 
cept but  partially  developed,  and  as  a  result  each  group 
wanted  to  have  the  new  ideas  expressed  in  the  concrete 
fashion  to  which  they  were  accustomed.  The  blending 
of  races,  nations  and  languages  always  brings  on  these 
conflicts.  Each  group  tries  to  defend  its  position  by 
argument.  The  result  is  that  religious  controversy  is 
aroused  where  no  basis  for  it  exists.  Words  and  ideas 
cannot  be  defined  and  defended  on  any  metaphysical 
basis.  The  problem  of  words  is  one  of  use,  not  of  logic. 
We  employ  words  until  better  ones  are  presented. 
They  shift  in  meaning  as  the  social  background  is  more 
clearly  defined  and  the  area  enlarged  over  which  each 
language  and  group  of  ideas  extend.  The  dictionary 
gives  the  best  evidence  of  this  growth.     Words  remain 

[2321 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

in  use  as  long  as  they  express  ideas  or  adjustment. 
They  drop  out  when  more  effective  ways  of  expression 
are  devised.  Language  tends  towards  a  state  where 
each  thought  has  its  word  and  each  word  expresses  a 
distinct  thought.  As  this  goal  is  approached,  con- 
troversy ceases  and  the  common  elements  of  thought 
are  elevated  into  a  secure  position.  Religion  gains 
nothing  by  disputations  that  after  all  reflect  only  the 
defects  of  language  or  the  imperfect  socialization  of 
thought. 

That  which  has  been  true  of  the  elevation  of  Chris- 
tian thought  in  the  regions  dominated  by  it  is  equally 
true  of  the  progress  yet  ahead  by  which  the  whole 
world  will  be  united  in  one  religion.  The  gods  of  India, 
China  and  regions  yet  to  be  religiously  socialized  will 
be  displaced  by  the  same  process  that  has  forced  the 
Western  world  to  accept  a  single  supreme  God.  The 
disintegration  of  the  older  religious  and  moral  thought 
will  follow  the  coming  of  Western  enterprise,  education 
and  science.  The  same  blending  of  ideas  and  ideals 
will  result  that  followed  the  changes  in  the  Western 
world  by  which  its  unification  and  elevation  were 
wrought  out.  To  alter  Eastern  religions  means  to 
wipe  out  Eastern  disease  and  to  bring  security,  pros- 
perity and  education  to  regions  that  now  lack  them. 
One  God  will  come  with  one  economic  system,  one  type 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

of  government,  one  science  and  one  literature.  The 
unifying  forces  are  active  in  all  these  fields.  They  are 
delayed  by  argument  and  controversy.  Our  interest 
should  lie,  not  in  getting  this  inevitable  unity,  but  in 
making  it  express  in  its  various  fields  the  highest 
thoughts  that  life,  vitality  and  genius  can  attain. 

The  most  difficult  of  all  religious  concepts  to  socialize 
is  that  of  God.  The  early  Gods  were  national  and  were 
associated  with  the  power  and  grandeur  of  nations,  or 
they  were  a  protection  against  primitive  fears.  In 
both  cases  the  demand  is  for  a  powerful  master  who 
protects  and  upbuilds.  From  these,  thought  advances 
readily  to  the  concept  of  God  as  creator  and  judge. 
They  presuppose  the  same  dominance  of  God  over 
nature  and  man  as  was  accepted  by  the  earlier  reli- 
gious thought.  A  rigid  group  of  divine  attributes  is 
predicated  from  which  all  else  is  derived.  Coupled 
with  revelation,  this  view  presents  a  God  of  authority 
and  thus  gives  a  background  for  a  moral  code  un- 
changeable and  inflexible,  because  of  divine  origin. 

A  social  concept  of  God  loses  this  definiteness.  It 
cannot  be  made  the  basis  of  argument,  and  it  lacks  the 
authority  that  makes  the  earlier  concept  so  satisfying 
to  nations  in  conflict  and  to  individuals  in  sin  and  de- 
spair. To  make  its  basis  clear  and  to  show  how  it  grows 
we  must  first  think  in  terms  of  a  united  society  from 

[2341 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

which  discord  and  fear  have  been  banished.  Social 
forces  now  suffice  to  create  the  peace  and  harmony  that 
to  earlier  races  seemed  only  possible  through  external 
coercion.  In  such  a  society  God  will  be  transformed 
so  as  to  reflect  the  thought  stages  of  each  individual  in 
his  development.  There  are  many  social  concepts  of 
God,  but  between  them  there  is  no  opposition.  The 
change  follows  the  assent  in  thought  that  comes  with 
social  progress.  It  comes  to  the  individual  as  he  passes 
from  youth  to  maturity,  from  ignorance  to  knowledge, 
from  poetry  to  prose,  or  from  depressed  to  exalted 
mental  states.  There  is  no  real  opposition  between 
a  pantheistic  concept  of  God  and  a  unitarian  concept, 
nor  between  them  and  a  telic  concept.  Change  the 
thought  of  a  man  and  he  will  alter  his  concept  of  God 
from  one  basis  to  the  other  without  conflict  or  argument. 
As  society  progresses  and  as  the  men  who  compose  it 
become  more  normal,  the  same  concept  will  be  held 
by  all  at  maturity.  Every  one  in  his  development 
will  go  through  all  the  epochs  of  thought  development 
out  of  which  this  higher  concept  has  arisen.  The  social 
concept  of  God  is  a  blend  of  all  the  views  of  Him  that 
appeal  to  men  in  any  stage  of  their  progress.  The 
clearer  and  more  definite  each  of  these  elements  is, 
the  more  perfect  and  elevating  is  the  joint  result. 
How  this  process  works  in  places  where  discord,  fear 
[2351 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

and  argument  present  no  obstacles  is  to  be  seen  more 
clearly  in  other  social  concepts  that  have  been  put  on  a 
stable  basis.  The  most  social  of  all  ideals  is  that  which 
man  holds  of  woman.  He  sees  woman,  not  as  she  is, 
but  as  he  pictures  her.  This  vision  is  due  to  the  many 
ways  in  which  the  beauty  of  woman  is  presented. 
If  one  view  of  woman  were  declared  orthodox  and  all 
others  opposed  or  excluded,  the  ideal  of  woman  would 
be  lowered  and  its  power  to  restrain  men  correspond- 
ingly reduced.  There  is  no  opposition  to  the  various 
views  of  women  given  by  art.  They  blend  into  a  com- 
posite picture  and  create  a  powerful  social  force  to 
restrain  the  brutality  and  passion  of  men.  So  is  it 
with  the  concept  of  God.  Gods  are  in  opposition  only 
in  national  contests.  They  are  made  diverse  by  every 
struggle  or  argument  into  which  men  enter.  Lift  the 
obstacles  that  struggle  and  argument  impose,  and  the 
unifying  tendency  becomes  supreme.  God  now  reflects 
all  the  moods  and  aspirations  of  men  and  from  them  an 
ever  nobler  concept  emanates.  The  higher  the  level  of 
thought,  the  more  is  His  unity  and  glory  reflected  in  it. 
The  socializing  of  religion  is  not  a  project  for  the 
future,  but  a  process  already  well  under  way.  Few 
realize  that  we  have  a  modern  gospel  that  is  more  effec- 
tive, even  if  less  authoritative,  than  the  older  gospel  from 
which  it  sprang.     The  hymn  book  is  the  most  inspired 

f236l 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

part  of  religious  literature.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
its  contents  are  the  fittest  survivals  of  modern  endeavors 
to  arouse  religious  enthusiasm.  No  one  hymn  contains 
all  the  truth,  and  each  hymn  contains  some  error  or  at 
least  some  defect  in  its  viewpoint.  As  a  basis  for 
authoritative  statement  they  would  be  sadly  wanting, 
and  yet  when  a  congregation  sings  a  dozen  hymns, 
all  are  elevated  in  spirit  by  the  united  effect  of  the 
service.  Hymns  blend  so  that  the  joint  effect  is  that 
of  the  best  element  in  each  of  them.  This  does  not 
make  rigid  theology,  but  it  arouses  effort.  It  makes 
men  social  and  creates  a  feeling  of  unity  and  a  spirit 
of  cooperation.  Poetry  has  also  been  effective  in  pro- 
moting a  social  view  of  religion  and  in  giving  to  God 
qualities  that  appeal  to  men.  Even  where  the  poet's 
concepts  have  lacked  some  of  the  higher  attributes,  his 
ideal  of  God  has  done  much  to  keep  men  religious.  A 
religion  of  nature  is  better  than  a  religion  of  strife. 
The  poet  has  dwelt  nearer  to  God  than  the  theologian 
and  felt  more  completely  His  impress.  There  is  no 
opposition  between  the  various  religious  concepts  of 
literature  any  more  than  there  is  in  the  hymn  book. 
They  blend  and  elevate,  and  thus  stand  in  contrast  to 
the  dogmas  that  disrupt  and  depress. 

In  these  and  other  ways  a  natural  religion  has  been 
formed  that  is  a  religion  of  appeal  in  contrast  with  a 

[237] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

religion  of  authority.  Social  religion  cannot  furnish 
premises  for  argument  nor  can  it  put  restrictions  on 
conduct.  It  arouses  what  is  in  man  and  gives  a  stim- 
ulus to  activity.  Authority  suppresses ;  nature  evokes, 
animates  and  unifies.  The  passing  from  the  discord  of 
primitive  life  to  modern  social  unity  weakens  authority 
and  tradition,  but  the  losses  thus  sustained  are  more 
than  made  good  by  the  uplift  coming  through  free- 
dom, vigor  and  telic  activity.  The  road  from  strife 
to  peace  runs  also  from  restraint  and  servility  to 
inspiration,  hope  and  faith.  Authority  suppresses 
what  inspiration  evokes.  The  two  are  opposing  phases 
of  religious  progress,  one  of  which  must  disappear  before 
the  upward  movement  of  modern  thought. 

The  feeling  in  favor  of  authoritative  religion  comes 
largely  from  the  belief  that  it  furnishes  the  only  adequate 
foundation  upon  which  the  moral  code  can  rest.  What 
is  there  to  put  in  the  place  of  the  ten  commandments 
is  a  question  put  with  earnestness  by  many  who  fail 
to  see  any  other  basis  for  a  moral  code.  The  reasoning 
of  the  metaphysician  has  the  same  thought  in  the  back- 
ground. He  believes  that  in  proving  the  existence  of  a 
God  he  is  saving  morality  from  the  quagmire  into  which 
utilitarianism  and  other  inductive  schemes  of  morality 
would  put  it.  Deductive  thinkers  are  primarily  moral 
and  not  religious  teachers.     They  think  that  sound 

[238] 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

morality  must  have  some  antecedent  principle  or  sanc- 
tion. The  moral  imperative  was  nearer  to  Kant's 
heart  than  other  principles,  and  this  basis  of  morality 
he  believed  he  had  saved  from  the  destruction  which  his 
critical  method  wrought  against  other  dogmatic  prin- 
ciples. Nor  has  the  moral  attitude  of  the  leaders  of 
science  been  different  from  that  of  philosophical 
teachers.  The  one  thing  they  have  feared  has  been 
that  in  the  general  destruction  science  was  making 
morality  would  suffer  because  no  new  basis  had  been 
given  it.  Herbert  Spencer  broke  in  on  the  plan  of  his 
philosophy  and  published  the  "  Data  of  Ethics  "  out  of  its 
order  because  he  felt  that  a  crisis  in  morality  had  been 
brought  on  by  the  inroads  science  was  making  on  tra- 
ditional beliefs.  He  too  wanted  to  find  an  antecedent 
principle  from  which  morality  could  be  derived,  and  felt 
as  keenly  as  did  Kant  that  without  some  such  support 
morality  would  degenerate.  This  unanimity  of  opinion 
in  favor  of  a  morality  that  depends  on  antecedent  prin- 
ciples makes  it  hard  to  present  a  morality  based  on  its 
subsequent  effects.  The  change  in  thought  must,  how- 
ever, be  made  if  morality  is  to  be  transformed  from  a 
personal  to  a  social  basis.  Social  morality  gets  its 
force  from  its  consequences ;  it  has  no  antecedent  prin- 
ciple from  which  it  is  derived  nor  any  authoritative 
sanction  by  which  it  is  enforced. 

[239] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

To  present  clearly  the  social  basis  of  morality  a  con- 
trast must  be  made  between  culture  and  morality. 
Civilization  and  culture  are  carried  along  and  improved 
by  objective  means.  Cultural  attitudes  are  acquired 
and  come  to  each  individual  not  as  a  part  of  his  hered- 
ity, but  from  his  education  and  environment.  Culture 
and  civilization  survive  even  if  the  race  that  embodies 
them  goes  down.  There  has  been  a  series  of  culture- 
bearing  nations,  each  imparting  its  civilization  to  the 
next,  but  not  its  physical  heredity.  Our  culture  is 
not  due  to  our  racial  ancestors,  but  to  Greece,  Rome 
and  other  ancient  civilizations.  Culture  is  thus  objec- 
tive and  may  exist  along  with  a  decline  in  physical 
traits.  In  fact,  race  suicide  and  culture  are  so  inti- 
mately connected  that  the  one  rarely  exists  without 
the  other.  Morality,  however,  has  race  perpetuation 
as  its  end  and  test.  The  test  of  morality  is  not  happi- 
ness and  culture,  but  increased  vigor  and  longevity. 
The  test  of  vice,  on  the  other  hand,  is  decreased  vitality 
and  early  death.  "The  wages  of  sin  is  death  "  is  an 
old  observation  and  as  true  to-day  as  ever.  In  favor 
of  morality  increased  efficiency,  vigor  and  longevity 
are  always  working.  Against  vice  elimination  is  active. 
The  moral  is  therefore  that  which  gives  vigor,  while 
vice  is  that  against  which  elimination  is  at  work. 
Morality  is  therefore  not  made  by  an  argument  nor 

[2401 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

derived  from  an  antecedent  principle.  It  is  not  even 
an  intellectual  act,  but  the  result  of  evolutionary  and 
eliminating  forces.  Where  a  new  morality  is  forming 
there  is  a  modification  of  type  due  to  the  elimination 
of  the  vicious  and  the  growing  vigor  of  the  virtuous. 
Contests  in  morality  are  a  struggle  between  types  each 
striving  to  make  its  views  the  social  standards  of  the  com- 
munity. Morality  is  built  up  around  the  family  as  a  cen- 
ter and  it  commands  the  specific  things  that  preserve  and 
elevate  it.  The  improved  family  becomes  a  type,  and 
the  group  struggle  that  follows  is  the  basis  of  morality. 
This  can  be  plainly  seen  in  present  moral  struggles, 
of  which  the  temperance  problem  is  an  illustration. 
Mothers  want  to  preserve  their  children  and  rear  them 
with  increased  vigor  and  longer  life.  The  saloon  is  an 
obstacle  to  this  that  must  be  displaced  in  the  fight  for 
family  preservation.  Temperance  adds  to  life  and 
vigor.  The  use  of  alcohol  reduces  both.  In  every 
community  where  this  opposition  exists  there  is  a  type 
formation  which  ends  in  a  contest  between  the  abstainer 
and  the  drinker.  Back  of  all  arguments  are  these  racial 
differences  with  a  struggle  and  a  class  differentiation 
that  ends  in  the  domination  of  one  faction.  Social 
differences  may  be  settled  by  reason  and  compromise ; 
moral  differences  lead  directly  to  struggle  and  coercion. 
The  forces  back  of  morality  are  thus  not  reason  and 
b  [241] 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

authority,  but  the  increase  of  vigor  and  the  elimination 
of  the  unfit.  We  need  look  no  farther  than  this  to 
find  the  basis  of  the  coercion  that  moral  codes  exercise. 
Attractive  morality  represents  only  the  early  stage 
of  moral  progress  before  differences  in  type  are  clearly 
manifest.  Repressive  morality  is  sure  to  follow,  because 
it  is  the  only  means  by  which  social  unity  can  be  main- 
tained. The  family  must  be  strengthened,  even  if  it 
be  at  the  expense  of  culture. 

The  process,  however,  does  not  stop  here,  but  is  made 
social  by  a  change  in  attitude  towards  the  means  by 
which  family  life  is  maintained.  Attractive  morality 
and  coercive  morality  are  remedial  and  not  construc- 
tive ;  they  induce  people  to  leave  the  bad  or  prevent  them 
from  securing  it.  Social  morality  is  constructive  and 
displaces  the  evil  instead  of  keeping  men  from  it.  All 
evil  is  specific  and  local.  It  has  definite  economic  and 
social  conditions  as  its  antecedent.  These  can  be  at- 
tacked and  removed.  When  a  community  attains  this 
viewpoint,  it  thinks  less  of  coercion  and  more  of  construc- 
tive measures  that  free  society  from  long-standing  and 
deep-seated  barriers  to  a  moral  uplift.  Constructive 
morality  is,  however,  both  attractive  and  coercive. 
Every  public  measure  to  remove  disease,  degeneration, 
vice  and  crime  must  be  general  in  its  application  and 
hence  coercive ;  yet  the  coercion  is  not  exercised  against 

[242] 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

individual  acts,  but  against  bad  social  conditions.  So 
also  is  it  attractive ;  yet  the  appeal  is  not  to  personal 
happiness,  but  to  public  welfare.  Social  morality  thus 
has  in  itself  all  the  elements  for  its  upbuilding.  It  does 
not  need  antecedent  tradition,  superior  authority  nor 
external  sanction. 

Natural  religion  and  morality  make  two  inherent  con- 
stituents of  social  religion.  Both  are  to  be  found  in 
the  earliest  religions,  and  they  have  continued  as  prom- 
inent elements  ever  since.  A  religion  of  appeal  and  a 
coercive  morality  arouse  men  and  elevate  social  religion. 
The  third  element  is  of  later  origin.  No  name  has  been 
given  it,  since  it  has  appeared  under  such  different  as- 
pects that  it  seems  to  have  no  unity.  To  bring  its  con- 
stituents into  closer  harmony,  I  shall  call  it  Social  An- 
ticipation. It  might  be  called  utopism,  but  this  would 
give  it  an  unreality  that  it  does  not  deserve.  We  think 
of  Utopias  as  artificially  constructed  societies  so  different 
from  the  present  that  to  enter  them  human  nature 
must  be  modified  and  society  revolutionized.  Such 
radical  reconstructions  reveal  only  in  part  the  real  forces 
back  of  social  anticipation.  All  to-morrows  are  the 
basis  of  hope  and  the  generating  ground  of  faith.  Nor- 
mal men  modify  to-day's  acts  by  the  faith  and  hope  that 
needs  to-morrow  for  their  fulfillment.  The  future  is  in 
the  present  and  thus  helps  to  construct  itself. 

[243T 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

In  religion  these  anticipations  become  the  doctrine  of 
a  Messiah,  a  looked-for  leader  who  will  displace  despair 
and  defeat  with  courage  and  accomplishments.  The 
origin  of  this  anticipation  is  obscured  by  the  claim  that 
the  predictions  about  Christ  did  not  arise  out  of  a  natural 
inclination  to  seek  for  help  and  an  equally  natural  belief 
that  it  would  come.  Yet  nothing  is  plainer  than  that 
the  depressed,  hopeless  condition  of  the  Jewish  nation 
must  lead  to  such  anticipations.  Human  hopefulness 
revolts  against  failure ;  it  sets  up  goals  to  strive  for. 
National  ideals  are  anticipatory,  and  from  them  come 
some  of  the  strongest  motives  that  elevate  human- 
ity and  give  stability  to  political  institutions.  It  is 
equally  clear  why  after  the  death  of  Jesus,  the  Christ 
ideal  should  become  prominent.  Christ  was  to  return 
immediately  and  in  great  glory.  All  the  failures  of  the 
past  were  to  be  wiped  out  in  the  reconstruction  and  re- 
demption He  was  to  bring.  The  Christ  of  the  future 
thus  displaced  the  Jesus  of  history  in  the  thought  of  the 
early  Christians  ;  with  the  change  came  hope  in  the  place 
of  despair.  All  this  was  a  natural  movement  which 
elevated  and  strengthened  the  church  until  it  changed 
its  basis  from  anticipation  to  tradition.  It  thus  became 
an  authority  that  depressed,  instead  of  a  hope  that 
strengthened.  The  old  spirit  and  enthusiasm  would 
come  again  if  this  process  were  reversed.     We  can  have 

[244] 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

an  upbuilding  religion  only  when  it  looks  to  the  future 
and  arouses  faith  in  human  betterment. 

The  crust  of  religious  tradition  and  the  doctrine  of 
total  depravity  have  kept  the  social  anticipations  of 
modern  races  from  assuming  a  religious  form.  Religion 
separated  from  national  aspirations  has  remained  static. 
The  tendency  towards  social  anticipation  has  been  ac- 
tive in  forming  Utopias  and  in  creating  ideals  about  the 
natural  man  and  the  brotherhood  of  men.  The  demo- 
cratic spirit  has  done  much  to  arouse  anticipations  of 
social  reconstructions  which  blend  and  elevate  human- 
ity into  a  harmonious  whole.  The  growth  and  stability 
of  modern  nations  has  also  helped  to  turn  men's  atten- 
tion to  the  future.  Each  nation  has  bright  hopes  of 
what  is  to  come  and  expects  an  increase  in  power  and  in- 
fluence that  will  transform  and  elevate  the  whole  world. 
To-day  anticipation  is  largely  centered  about  socialistic 
schemes  and  gives  them  vitality.  Socialism  is  a  com- 
bination of  an  economic  program  of  reform  and  of  an 
ideal  reconstruction  of  society  that  is  to  follow.  With 
its  present  emphasis  on  class  struggle  it  is  antagonistic  to 
religion;  but  when  class  struggle  has  disappeared  and 
the  material  obstacles  to  social  progress  are  surmounted, 
social  anticipation  will  be  more  prominent.  Religious 
and  social  aspirations  will  then  harmonize.  Socialism 
will  go  the  road  of  previous  reforms.     As  the  economic 

[2451 


THE  SOCIAL  BASIS  OF  RELIGION 

program  for  which  it  stands  is  worked  out  or  displaced 
by  a  better  one,  the  social  background  will  blend  with 
other  movements  of  a  similar  nature  and  lead  to  a 
religious  upbuilding.  All  progress  starts  with  a  definite 
scheme  of  economic  reform  coupled  with  new  hope  of 
social  reconstruction.  The  economic  part  of  the  pro- 
gram depends  for  its  success  on  definite  changes. 
When  these  are  made,  there  is  a  residue  of  social 
anticipation  which  unites  with  earlier  anticipations  to 
create  higher  social  ideals.  The  same  anticipation 
which  shows  itself  in  national  life,  in  political  reform 
and  in  socialism  is  also  beginning  to  show  itself  in  city 
life.  This  new  unit  about  which  social  interests  grow 
unites  a  program  of  improvement  with  anticipations  of 
a  higher  social  life.  City  planning,  health  and  prosper- 
ity give  a  new  direction  to  social  ideals  which  in  the  end 
will  be  transformed  into  a  religious  movement  to  recon- 
struct what  is  within  man  as  well  as  what  is  about  him. 
The  new  City  of  God  will  not  only  be  well  planned, 
healthy  and  prosperous,  but  will  also  be  the  center  of 
spiritual  aspiration. 

More  powerful  than  any  of  these  hopes  and  a  com- 
plement to  them  is  the  thought  of  bodily  and  mental 
evolution  as  voiced  by  the  eugenic  movement  and  the 
disciples  of  a  superman.  Like  other  reforms,  they  start 
with  a  program  that  makes  them  antagonistic  to  religion. 

[2461 


SOCIALIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

This  especially  is  true  of  the  superman  concept,  which 
has  been  made  the  base  of  a  self-centered  morality. 
There  will  be  a  direct  clash  between  social  morality  and 
the  unsocial  morality  at  present  associated  with  the 
concept  of  a  superman.  The  conflict,  however,  is  with 
the  two  types  of  morality  and  when  social  morality 
shows  its  superiority,  the  thought  of  a  superman  will 
survive  the  defeat  of  its  morality.  The  Christ  ideal  is 
the  superman  viewed  socially.  Christ  is  one  type  of 
leader  for  the  human  race  in  its  ascent,  physical,  men- 
tal and  religious.  The  other  type  is  the  self -centered 
egoist  who  moves  up  through  the  elimination  he  creates. 
The  contrast  between  progress  by  redemption  and  pro- 
gress by  elimination  will  be  amply  illustrated  in  the 
struggle  between  these  two  views.  Both,  however, 
contain  social  anticipation  in  a  clearer  and  more  vivid 
form  than  any  antecedent  social  movement.  Out  of 
this  transformation  a  movement  in  thought  is  coming 
that  will  force  religion  to  discard  traditions  and  dogmas 
that  separate  it  from  other  social  ideals.  The  blending 
of  all  social  aspirations  is  but  a  matter  of  time.  When 
it  comes,  social  religion  will  have  its  full  growth  and  be 
the  expression  of  the  forces  that  upbuild  men  and  make 
social  thought  dominant. 


[247] 


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